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Abstract
This thesis concerns theoretical and empirical issues in face processing and facial 
trait perception. First, I present evidence that challenges two hypotheses proposed 
as alternatives to face specificity, namely the individuation and the expertise 
hypotheses. Inconsistent with the individuation hypothesis, an extensive 
investigation of a new case of acquired prosopagnosia (Herschel) revealed normal 
exemplar recognition memory for a wide variety  of objects, and normal ability to 
discriminate between highly similar items within a novel object category. 
Inconsistent with the expertise hypothesis, Herschel and Florence, a second 
acquired prosopagnosic, showed normal learning profiles and response times 
putative of successful expertise acquisition in an eight-day training procedure with 
novel objects, demonstrating that faces are processed by specialised mechanisms 
not used for objects-of-expertise. Second, testing four patients with acquired 
prosopagnosia, I demonstrate that perceptual mechanisms underlying trait 
judgments are dissociable from those implicated in recognising identity. 
Furthermore, I show that perception of facial aggressiveness does not depend on 
mechanisms for facial sex recognition, and that normal facial trustworthiness 
judgments are likely to occur without intact recognition of facial expressions, 
therefore challenging the overgeneralisation theory  in facial trait perception. Third, 
I present a series of experiments with healthy participants to characterise various 
properties of facial trait  perception. Specifically, I examine: i) the role of facial 
width-to-height ratio in perceived trustworthiness; ii) the accuracy of facial 
trustworthiness judgments; iii) the interaction between facial trustworthiness and 
reputation; and iv) the interaction between face impressions and voice impressions. 
Overall, the findings of the present thesis have important implications for the 
nature of the mechanisms underlying facial identity processing, the organisation of 
facial trait perception and its relationship to other face perception abilities, as well 
as the physical, ecological, and multimodal aspects of facial trait perception.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0. PREAMBLE 
 The human face is probably  the richest social stimulus. From faces, people 
infer such diverse information as one’s identity, race, sex, age, emotions or 
intentions. Furthermore, based on faces, people derive consistent evaluations of 
others’ attractiveness, trustworthiness or aggressiveness, evaluations which 
influence their social interactions. It is thus not surprising that researchers from 
various disciplines have devoted considerable intellectual energy in their quest to 
understand the many  aspects of face perception. Although significant progress has 
been made during the past decades, important questions remain open. The current 
work addresses several key issues. 
 First, are the mechanisms performing face recognition specific to faces? This 
concerns a larger question in cognitive psychology  and neuroscience, of whether 
the brain has high-level mechanisms specialised in processing particular types of 
information. In his influential and controversial theory of modularity, Fodor (1983) 
suggested that many cognitive functions are carried out by domain-specific 
modules. In visual recognition, face-specific effects found in behavioural, imaging, 
patient and animal studies (McKone & Robbins, 2011) point towards distinct, 
highly  specialised mechanisms not involved in recognition of other object types. 
This account is by  no means generally accepted. In this thesis I will focus on two of 
the most prominent alternative hypotheses – one that claims faces are processed by 
general mechanisms implicated in within-class discrimination of all objects 
(Damasio, Damasio & Van Hoesen, 1982) and one arguing that  apparent face-
specific mechanisms are also involved in processing non-face objects for which 
one has acquired expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986). An extensive investigation of 
a new case of acquired prosopagnosia and an expertise training exercise with two 
individuals with acquired prosopagnosia will test these two hypotheses.  
 Second, faces are not only important for identity or emotion recognition, but 
commonly lead to (not necessarily  accurate) impressions about personality  traits or 
behavioural propensities. However, face impressions have been largely  overlooked 
by leading models of face perception (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000) and their place within the face processing system remains relatively 
unknown. The two models cited here propose that face computations are performed 
along dimensions mirroring our semantic organisation of face-based judgments, for 
instance dissociating perception of invariant facial aspects (needed for identity 
recognition, but also other inferences) from perception of changeable aspects (such 
as gaze and expressions). An interesting question is whether these models can be 
modified to accommodate face impressions. For example, should face impressions 
be included among invariant or changeable facial aspects? Is trait perception 
related to identity or expression or sex perception? Or is it a category  by itself? A 
more specific hypothesis about the functional bases of face evaluations has been 
recently  proposed (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), but  its predictions have not been 
critically  tested. Investigations of four individuals with acquired prosopagnosia will 
reveal associations and dissociations between facial trait perception and perception 
of identity, expression and sex, allowing more precise inferences about the 
mechanisms behind trait perception. 
 Third, inferences about one’s personality  or behaviour based on their faces 
may be deemed unethical, but they were found to have a major impact on society, 
such as predicting electoral outcomes (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005) 
or influencing financial decisions (Ravina, 2008; Sydnor & Pope, 2008). Among 
the various traits inferred from faces, trustworthiness is one of the most important 
because of the crucial role that trust plays in social and economic interactions 
(Arrow, 1973; Fukuyama, 1995). Face trustworthiness impressions form fast 
(Willis & Todorov, 2006) and are consistent across observers (Todorov, Said, & 
Verosky, 2011), but little is known about facial aspects that are commonly 
associated with trustworthiness. Is width-to-height ratio one of them (Stirrat & 
Perrett, 2010)? Furthermore, there is a debate around the accuracy of face 
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trustworthiness perceptions, i.e. whether they can predict deceptive (or 
untrustworthy) behaviour. Most of the previous studies featured laboratory stimuli 
and generated mixed results. Could it be that people are better detectors of 
deception from faces in real-world situations? In the laboratory, face 
trustworthiness was shown to influence investment decisions when there was no 
information about potential partners (van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008), but real 
economic interactions typically involve partners who know a great deal about  each 
other. In this context, would perceived face trustworthiness still matter? Finally, 
social interactions usually involve verbal communication. Are trait impressions 
also formed from voices? How do face and voice impressions combine to reach an 
integrated person impression? A series of behavioural experiments will address the 
questions raised here. 
 Accordingly, this thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of research on face specificity and alternative hypotheses, a brief 
introduction to leading models of face perception with a focus on how they 
incorporate (or not) trait perception, and face impressions with a focus on 
trustworthiness and the issues of interest. The following three chapters present 
experimental work. Chapter 2 concerns face specificity. More specifically, I test the 
two alternative hypotheses to face specificity using acquired prosopagnosia. One 
extensive case study focuses on the individuation hypothesis, and an expertise 
training exercise with two acquired prosopagnosics provides key  findings related to 
the expertise hypothesis. In Chapter 3 I use four cases of acquired prosopagnosia to 
examine if facial trait perception can dissociate from identity  recognition and to 
test the emotion and sex overgeneralisation hypotheses in trait perception. Chapter 
4 presents behavioural studies of healthy population on face impressions. I examine 
one facial aspect thought to influence trustworthiness perception, the accuracy of 
face trustworthiness judgments, and how face impressions interact with reputation 
and voice impressions. Chapter 5 summarises the findings and considers their 
implications. 
1. INTRODUCTION
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1.1. FACE SPECIFICITY
 The debate on face specificity  is often presented as revolving around the 
question of whether or not faces are special to the brain. This is slightly  misleading, 
because researchers generally agree on this point: the visual mechanisms involved 
in face recognition are thought to be different  from those involved in most other 
objects recognition. The critical, unresolved question is just how special are faces? 
Are the ‘face mechanisms’ specific to faces, or would objects sharing critical 
properties with faces also engage them? The attempts to answer this question have 
produced considerable research, often with conflicting results and interpretations. 
1.1.1. Evidence supporting face specificity
 Advocates of face specificity cite evidence from developmental, behavioural, 
brain imaging and stimulation, single-cell recording and patient studies to support 
their view. Fantz (1963) and Goren, Sarty  and Wu (1975) showed that new-born 
babies (many tested less than 10 minutes after birth) preferred looking at face 
patterns above non-face patterns. Because this preference toward face stimuli could 
not have been learned in new-borns who were seeing faces for the first time, the 
results suggest that humans possess an innate representation of faces (Morton & 
Johnson, 1991). If that were true, faces would distinguish themselves from most 
other objects for which evolution could not have determined the development of 
innate mechanisms. Twin studies (Polk, Park, Smith & Park, 2007) and studies of 
family members with developmental prosopagnosia, a lifelong inability to 
recognise faces (Duchaine, Germine & Nakayama, 2007; Grueter et al., 2007), 
support the evolutionary basis of face-specific mechanisms.
 The behavioural evidence for face-specificity relates to qualitative differences 
noted between processing of faces and processing other objects in the adult  normal 
population. These differences are attributed to a specific property  of face 
mechanisms: holistic processing, which can be defined as the ability  to integrate 
1. INTRODUCTION
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individual features into a perceptual whole (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). In contrast, 
non-face objects are thought to be processed in a more part-based manner. One of 
the most robust effects in face perception is the disproportionate inversion effect 
(Yin, 1969). When people are presented with inverted (i.e. upside-down) stimuli, 
recognition of faces is much more affected than recognition of other objects. This is 
because holistic processing is presumed to be preferentially implicated in 
processing upright faces and less so in inverted faces or upright and inverted 
objects. The robustness of the face inversion effect made it become an acid test that 
newly developed face perception tests have to pass to demonstrate the involvement 
of face-specific mechanisms. More direct evidence of holistic processing of faces 
comes from part-whole effects (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and composite effects 
(Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). In the part-whole paradigm, participants are 
better at identifying individual face parts in the context of a whole face than when 
presented alone. In the composite faces paradigm, participants find it more difficult 
to identify top  halves of faces when perfectly aligned with bottom halves to form a 
seemingly new face, than when the two halves are misaligned. The new faces 
created by aligning top and bottom halves engage holistic processing, which makes 
irrelevant bottom halves interfere with recognition of top halves.
 Cognitive neuroscience furnished good evidence for face-specific 
mechanisms in the brain by identifying a distributed network of brain areas that are 
preferentially  activated by faces. The first area that was identified and that is most 
reliably  found in imaging studies is the fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). The activity 
in FFA has been shown not only to be higher when viewing faces of any  kind (e.g. 
human, cat  or cartoon faces; Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 
2000) than objects or other body  parts, but also to correlate with face recognition 
abilities (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005) 
suggesting that at least  part  of the computations necessary to individuate faces take 
place in this area. Other areas implicated in face perception identified by imaging 
studies are the occipital face area (OFA) (Gauthier, Tarr, et al., 2000) and a face-
selective part in the superior temporal sulcus (fSTS) (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 
1. INTRODUCTION
13
2000; Pitcher, Dilks, Saxe, Triantafyllou, & Kanwisher, 2011). Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation of the OFA revealed its causal role in face processing 
(Pitcher, Walsh, Yovel, & Duchaine, 2007) and that it is specifically activated by 
faces and not by objects or bodies (Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine, 
2009). Consistent with the imaging evidence from humans, single cell recordings 
from face-selective regions in monkeys’ temporal cortex revealed an impressive 
number of face-responsive neurons in these areas (Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, & 
Livingstone, 2006). 
 Another indicator of face-selective mechanisms is the N170 component in 
human studies measuring event-related brain potentials. The N170 represents the 
higher electrical activity  elicited by faces around 170 ms after stimulus presentation 
at occipitotemporal electrodes (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; 
Eimer, 1998). Although there are competing hypotheses regarding the source of 
this enhanced negative amplitude, being linked with increased activity  in the OFA 
(Rossion, Joyce, Cottrell, & Tarr, 2003), FFA (Henson et al., 2007) or STS (Itier & 
Taylor, 2004), the N170 is reliably found in most electrophysiology  studies. Its 
high sensitivity to face inversion (Bentin et  al., 1996; Eimer, 2000) is additional 
support that it is related to face-selective mechanisms. 
 More evidence for face-specific mechanisms comes from individuals with 
acquired prosopagnosia (AP) (Bodamer, 1947). Individuals with AP experience 
severe faces recognition deficits following brain lesion. Although most acquired 
prosopagnosics (APs) have problems with object identification as well (which is to 
be expected given that, usually, brain lesions due to strokes or accidents have a low 
specificity) (Barton, 2008; Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Delvenne, Seron, 
Coyette, & Rossion, 2004; Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999; Levine & Calvanio, 
1989; Steeves et al., 2006), there are also APs who appear to have retained their 
ability  to correctly  recognise non-face objects. Busigny, Joubert, Felician, Ceccaldi, 
and Rossion (2010) summarised 14 such cases. Unfortunately, object recognition 
has been rigorously tested in only a few cases. One such case is PS who, despite 
her severe prosopagnosia, could identify objects at a basic level (Rossion, Caldara, 
et al., 2003) and was normal at discriminating between highly similar novel shapes 
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and between exemplars of common object classes - such as cars, dogs, cups, shoes 
- parametrically manipulated for similarity (Busigny, Graf, Mayer, & Rossion, 
2010). Similarly, prosopagnosic patient GG performed in the normal range for 
within-category discrimination of birds, boats, cars, and chairs (Busigny, Joubert, et 
al., 2010) and of cars parametrically manipulated for similarity  (Busigny & 
Rossion, 2010). Another case, WJ, became a farmer after the stroke that left him 
prosopagnosic, and could accurately identify his own sheep and learn unfamiliar 
sheep from face photographs (McNeil & Warrington, 1993). The reverse pattern 
was shown by CK: he could accurately  identify faces even under the most 
challenging conditions while being object agnosic (Moscovitch, Winocur, & 
Behrmann, 1997). His results together with the normal performance at basic object 
recognition and fine-grained discrimination of non-face objects or nonhuman faces 
displayed by PS, GG and WJ show a double dissociation between mechanisms 
implicated in human face processing and those involved in other objects 
processing. 
 In one of the most comprehensive studies addressing the issue of face-
specificity in a single individual, Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth and Nakayama 
(2006) tested Edward, a developmental prosopagnosic, for all major alternative 
hypotheses to face specificity. The results did not fit any  of these alternative 
hypotheses (discussed below), favouring instead the existence of face-specific 
mechanisms.
1.1.2. Alternative hypotheses to face specificity
 Despite these suggestive results, some researchers question the existence of 
face-specific mechanisms, claiming that face effects are due to particular critical 
properties of faces rather than to faces per se. Importantly, these properties are 
presumed not to be exclusive to faces; effects may appear face-specific solely 
because performance with faces has been compared to performance with objects 
that did not have these properties. A proper comparison between faces and objects 
sharing the critical properties would reveal no difference. 
1. INTRODUCTION
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 The main alternative hypotheses to face-specificity are based on two 
observations: i) faces are a highly homogeneous class of objects, for which 
exemplar discrimination is more challenging than most other objects recognition; 
and ii) due to faces’ pervasiveness and importance in daily life, humans have 
become experts at discriminating faces. 
1.1.2.1. Individuation hypothesis
  It has been argued that, because face recognition usually occurs at an 
individual level (Jean’s face versus Pat’s face), it should be compared with 
exemplar recognition within non-face object classes (Jean’s car versus Pat’s car) if 
we are to make any statements about the special treatment of faces (Damasio et al., 
1982). Basic level object recognition (a car versus a bicycle) is generally 
considered to be easier and thus, a potential difference in recognition abilities with 
faces versus basic objects may simply reflect a difference in cognitive demands 
rather than face specificity. In one of the first papers to note this point, Damasio et 
al. (1982) observed that three prosopagnosic patients were also impaired at 
different food and car recognition and concluded that the visual recognition 
inability in prosopagnosia is not specific to faces, but extends to other objects when 
the proper within-class discrimination task is used.
 If the mechanisms involved in face recognition and recognition of non-face 
objects at the individual level are the same, one would expect to observe similar 
behavioural and neural effects. However, the behavioural effects thought to 
accompany  holistic/configural processing – inversion, part-in-whole and composite 
effects – appear to be disproportionately  large for faces compared to other objects 
(see McKone & Robbins, 2011, for a review). For example, the inversion effect for 
faces is usually  15-20%, while for several objects it was found to vary  between 
0-10% in tests of memory and perceptual matching of within-class exemplars. In 
theory, it is still possible that certain objects elicit inversion effects similar to faces, 
although the wide range of objects tested so far make this possibility somehow 
unlikely. The tested objects include airplanes (Yin, 1969), shoes (De Gelder, 
Bachoud-Lévi, & Degos, 1998), houses (Boutet & Faubert, 2006; Leder & Carbon, 
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2006), chairs (Boutet & Faubert, 2006), animals such as cats, dogs and birds 
(Minnebusch, Suchan, & Daum, 2009), and also dog faces (Scapinello & Yarmey, 
1970). The two exceptions – non-face objects where a face-like inversion effect 
was noted – came from an artificial class of stimuli called greebles (Ashworth, 
Vuong, Rossion, & Tarr, 2008) and from bodies (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 
2003). Greebles were designed to place similar demands on the recognition 
mechanisms as faces and their configuration resembled that of faces, with two 
identifying features aligned horizontally  (like eyes in faces) and two identifying 
features aligned vertically (like nose and mouth in faces). Because of this close 
resemblance, the larger inversion effect with greebles might have been driven by 
the faulty engagement of face mechanisms (McKone & Kanwisher, 2005). Indeed, 
Ge, Wang, McCleery and Lee (2006) showed that  the inversion effect depends on 
whether an ambiguous stimulus is perceived as a face or not. Similarly, some 
authors (Minnebusch et al., 2009; Yovel, Pelc, & Lubetzky, 2010) claimed that the 
face-like inversion effects with bodies are triggered by face mechanisms. The 
inversion effects with bodies will be discussed in more details in the next section, 
as they pertain more to the expertise hypothesis. 
 Most of the imaging, brain stimulation and ERP studies presented in the face-
specificity section speak against the within-level discrimination hypothesis. In 
these studies, face individuation was shown to dissociate from individuation of 
other objects from within highly homogeneous categories (e.g. Kanwisher et  al., 
1997; Pitcher et al., 2009; Rossion et  al., 2000). A controversial study (Thierry, 
Martin, Downing, & Pegna, 2007) claimed that the apparent face-sensitivity of the 
N170 component was due to an uncontrolled difference in the interstimulus 
perceptual variance between face stimuli (low variance) and other objects (high 
variance). However, several researchers (Bentin et al., 2007; Rossion & Jacques, 
2008) demonstrated this claim to be false, strengthening the original support given 
by the N170 component to a face specific account.
 Individuals with prosopagnosia showing normal recognition of exemplars 
within highly homogeneous object classes have the potential to furnish decisive 
evidence against the within-level discrimination hypothesis. However, as we have 
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seen in the section on the face-specificity hypothesis, there are only a few cases 
rigorously and extensively  tested for within-class object individuation and among 
them, as Busigny, Joubert, et al., (2010) note, none that can be called a “pure” 
prosopagnosic, with visual recognition impairments that can be unquestionably 
classified as face-specific. Impaired face recognition with spared individuation of 
various non-face objects may arise from different processing strategies (e.g. 
holistic versus part-based) rather than face-specific mechanisms; this dissociation 
in performance may not replicate with other objects processed in the same manner 
as faces. Therefore, a rigorous investigation of each new case of acquired 
prosopagnosia with within-level discrimination of a large set of objects sharing as 
many critical aspects with faces as possible (e.g. within-class similarity, consistent 
first-order configurations between parts) is important. Although, practically, one 
may never ensure an individual is normal with all objects individuation, a rigorous 
approach minimises the chance of wrong inferences. Section 2.1 presents an 
extensive investigation (21 experiments) of a new case of acquired prosopagnosia, 
with the main focus on recognition and individuation of non-face objects. 
 
1.1.2.2. Expertise hypothesis
 The other alternative to face-specificity that I present here is the expertise 
hypothesis (Bukach, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997). This is probably the most widely considered alternative and it states 
that the mechanisms involved in face processing are not specific to faces but 
contribute to individuation of all objects with which observers have had extensive 
experience. It can be considered a refinement of the within-class discrimination 
hypothesis, restricting the range of objects on which mechanisms implicated in face 
processing operate to objects for which people have developed expertise. Two lines 
of research can be distinguished inside the expertise account, one that considers 
real-world expertise developed over years of experience (Diamond & Carey, 1986) 
and another one that examines ‘rapid expertise’ acquired in the laboratory over a 
few hours of practice (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). 
 The first proponents of the expertise hypothesis, Diamond and Carey  (1986) 
1. INTRODUCTION
18
compared inversion effects for faces with inversion effects for dogs shown by  dog 
experts. Their prediction was that dog expertise encourages configural processing 
of dogs and thus dog experts (but not  novices) would show inversion effects with 
dogs, and these effects would be similar to those typically  found for faces. Indeed, 
with dog pictures, dog experts did show significantly  larger inversion effects (22%) 
than novices (2%), and these effects were comparable with those found with faces 
(23%). However, Robbins & McKone (2007) failed to replicate these findings. In 
one dog memory  and one dog matching test, dog experts did not show significantly 
larger inversion effects (7% and 2% respectively) compared to novices (3% and 1% 
respectively). Furthermore, the dog inversion effects were substantially smaller 
than those obtained for faces (23% and 11%, respectively). Similar results, 
inconsistent with the expertise hypothesis predictions, were obtained in studies 
examining inversion effects in experts of other object categories: birds (Gauthier, 
Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000), fingerprints (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005), 
cars (Gauthier, Skudlarski, et al., 2000; Xu, Liu, & Kanwisher, 2005), houses 
(Husk, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2007) and handwriting (Bruyer & Crispeels, 1992). 
Reviewing studies investigating behavioural markers of face-like mechanisms (the 
inversion effect, the whole-over-part  advantage, the composite effect), McKone, 
Kanwisher and Duchaine (2007) concluded that the early  study of Diamond and 
Carey  (1986) is the only one to show unequivocally  the hallmarks of face 
processing in objects of expertise.
 Recently, another category of objects has emerged to elicit face-like inversion 
effects. Bodies are in many respects similar to faces; they are biological stimuli 
with a consistent first-order configuration of their parts (torso, arms and legs). The 
level of exposure and the need for individuation make it reasonable to assume that 
humans developed perceptual expertise with bodies approaching that acquired with 
faces. The face-like inversion effects with bodies (Reed et al., 2003; Yovel et al., 
2010; Susilo, Yovel, Barton, & Duchaine, 2013) may be interpreted as evidence 
that bodies are processed by the same expertise mechanisms involved also in 
processing faces. Some researchers suggested that the inversion effects with bodies 
are triggered by erroneous recruitment of face-specific mechanisms, because they 
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observed that when headless bodies are presented, the inversion effect is 
significantly reduced (Minnebusch et al., 2009; Yovel et al., 2010). While this 
claim is weakened by findings from Susilo et al. (2013) who showed that face-
specific mechanisms are not required for a body  inversion effect (four APs showed 
face-like inversion effects with full bodies, including faceless heads), a large body 
inversion effect does not necessarily imply shared mechanisms between body and 
face processing. In fact, acquired prosopagnosics who show body inversion effects 
(Susilo et al., 2013) are strong evidence for distinct mechanisms. 
 Comparable behavioural markers in processing faces and other objects of 
expertise are not conclusive evidence for shared perceptual mechanisms. For 
example, configural processing may  be as important for bodies as it is for faces. If 
one assumes that configural processing is what is disrupted by stimuli inversion, 
the sizes of the inversions effects for bodies and faces will be similar, even when 
the two stimuli are processed by distinct mechanisms. Additionally, challenging the 
idea that faces and bodies share the same mechanisms, possibly specialised for 
objects of expertise, functional neuroimaging studies found that bodies 
preferentially  activate areas that may be adjacent to, but do not overlap face-
selective areas. These are the fusiform body area (Peelen & Downing, 2005; 
Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005) and the extrastriate body area (Downing, 
Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). 
 Functional imaging also produced evidence claimed to support the expertise 
hypothesis. Gauthier, Skudlarski, et al. (2000) found increased activation in the 
fusiform face area (FFA) for cars and birds in cars and birds experts but not in 
control participants. The percent signal change (PSC) correlated with the 
behavioural expertise of the subjects, but it was smaller than the PSC obtained 
when faces were presented. Additionally, the effect was not specific to FFA but 
extended beyond it. McKone and Kanwisher (2005) suggested the increased 
activation might be due to an attentional confound (experts tend to pay  more 
attention to their objects of expertise). More recently, behavioural expertise was 
shown to correlate with FFA activation to cars in a high-resolution fMRI study 
(McGugin, Gatenby, Gore, & Gauthier, 2012), although in the right FFA the effect 
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was not specific to face-selective voxels.
 Testing the expertise hypothesis is hampered by the difficulty to find real 
objects of expertise that  are properly matched to faces in terms of critical aspects. 
To alleviate this problem, expertise researchers turned to expertise developed in the 
laboratory (‘rapid expertise’) and trained participants to become experts with 
greebles, an artificial class of objects designed to place face-like demands on 
recognition mechanisms (Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998; Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997). Greebles have a body (which can vary in shape) and four 
distinguishing parts varying in size and shape, in a stable first-order configuration 
(i.e. fixed spatial relations between the parts) designed to replicate the facial parts 
configuration. Body  shape signals family  membership, while the four parts are used 
to identify  greebles at the individual level. The training procedure involves seven to 
ten one-hour sessions of learning to identify individual greebles as well as greeble 
families, after which participants should reach the criterion claimed to signal 
expertise: response times for recognizing individual greebles become comparable 
to response times for recognizing greeble families (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). The 
main advantages of studying greeble experts instead of real-world experts are that 
expertise is developed fast  and that it allows testing of participants before and after 
becoming experts. 
 Much of the evidence cited in support of the expertise hypothesis comes from 
experiments involving greebles. The basic claim in greeble studies is that the 
training procedure determines a shift in how participants process greebles, from 
feature-based to more configural processing as they become experts (Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Several studies 
claimed that greeble processing elicited face-like perceptual (Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997; Gauthier, Tarr, et al., 1999; Tarr, 2003) and neural (Gauthier, Skudlarski, et 
al., 2000) effects after but not before training. This implies the effects are related to 
expertise and not face-specific. 
 Some researchers (e.g. McKone & Kanwisher, 2005) expressed doubts with 
respect to using greebles for examining the expertise hypothesis. Their main 
concerns were that; i) greebles are too similar to faces and thus may  activate the 
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face-specific mechanisms only because the brain spuriously interprets them as 
faces; ii) the ten-hour laboratory  practice cannot produce expertise that is 
comparable with real-world expertise developed over years of practice. Indeed, a 
recent study  showed that FFA activation to greebles is correlated with how much 
face-like subjects think greebles are, not with the amount of greeble training 
involved (Brants, Wagemans, & Op de Beeck, 2011). Nevertheless, greebles 
constitute an important part of the research used to support the expertise hypothesis 
and thus a careful examination of the claims based on this experimental paradigm 
is needed.
 A fundamental prediction of the rapid expertise hypothesis is that individuals 
with severe face recognition deficits should also be impaired at acquiring expertise 
with greebles. This prediction was tested in Section 2.2 in two cases of acquired 
prosopagnosia, Herschel and Florence, who were asked to complete the greeble 
training procedure and a similar training procedure with faces. It  should be noted 
that Herschel shows abnormal functioning of the fusiform face area (FFA), an area 
selectively responsive to faces but which has been claimed to also mediate greeble 
expertise (Gauthier, Tarr, et al., 1999; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), and so his results are 
doubly  relevant to the expertise account. Two individuals with acquired 
prosopagnosia were previously reported to fail at  acquiring greeble expertise 
(Behrmann, Marotta, Gauthier, Tarr, & McKeeff, 2005; Bukach et al., 2012), 
consistent with the expertise hypothesis. Another individual with developmental 
prosopagnosia performed normally in greeble training (Duchaine, Dingle, 
Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2004), but was not tested with faces on a parallel face 
training task to show a clear dissociation between greeble and face performance.
1.2. TRAIT PERCEPTION IN MODELS OF FACE PROCESSING
 
 Faces are rapidly judged on multiple traits critical for human interactions, 
such as attractiveness, trustworthiness and aggressiveness (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 
2006; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Although these judgments can predict  important 
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real-world outcomes (Hamermesh, 2012; Olivola & Todorov, 2010a; Zebrowitz & 
McDonald, 1991), little is known about their underlying perceptual, cognitive and 
neural bases. Furthermore, even though face evaluations are obviously  derived 
from facial cues, leading models of face perception (e.g. Haxby et al., 2000) are not 
very specific about mechanisms underlying trait perception. My aim is to 
investigate the (dis)connections between facial trait perception and perception of 
other facial aspects, such as identity, expressions and sex, through the study of 
people with acquired prosopagnosia. The hypothesis is that the mechanisms 
involved in facial trait perception are (at least partly) distinct and may be spared 
when visual recognition deficits affect other aspects of face perception. 
 Before discussing some of the most influential studies related to this topic, a 
brief note about terminology. In what follows, terms such as ‘facial trait 
perception’, ‘face impression’, ‘face-based judgment’ or ‘face evaluation’ will be 
used interchangeably, to refer to the spontaneous inferences about an individual’s 
perceived trustworthiness, attractiveness, aggressiveness, etc. that take place when 
seeing a face. Although the terms are not strictly  speaking equivalent, they will be 
treated in this way to avoid repetitions.
1.2.1. Models of face perception 
 
 Divisions between mechanisms implicated in processing different aspects of 
faces are featured in most face perception models, although the nature and extent of 
these divisions may differ. Probably the most influential model that has stimulated 
much of the research in this area for the past  25 years is that of Bruce and Young 
(1986) (see Figure 1.1). They  proposed a functional model of face perception that 
begins with a structural encoding phase, in which view-centred descriptions and 
expression-independent descriptions are generated. Two parallel routes then follow 
this initial stage. One route is dedicated to processing the abstract, expression-
independent information leading to person identification through face recognition 
units. The other route is responsible for processing all other aspects of face 
perception that are not identity-specific, including separate functional components 
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for facial speech analysis, expression analysis and ‘directed visual processing’. The 
last component is thought to be responsible for information about age, sex, gaze 
direction and person impressions such as honesty and intelligence. The model has a 
highly  modular nature; according to Bruce and Young (1986), the functional 
components used to implement this architecture can be independently affected 
either by  experimental manipulation or brain lesions. As specified by this model, 
face impressions dissociate from identity recognition after the very first stage of 
structural encoding, and may also dissociate from expression recognition at a later 
stage. Although Bruce and Young (1986) do not reject the possibility  of further 
divisions (i.e. functionally-independent components) within the ‘directed visual 
processing’ module, face impressions are implied as being carried out by  the same 
mechanisms implicated also in age and sex perception.
 
Figure 1.1. The functional model of face processing - Bruce and Young (1986).
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 The dual-process model proposed by  Bruce and Young (1986) was extended 
and refined by Haxby et al. (2000), who were in addition concerned with 
specifying a neural implementation for their model. Instead of the distinction 
between identity  recognition and all other aspects of face processing proposed by 
Bruce and Young (1986), the division in Haxby model is between invariant aspects 
of faces (mainly related to identity, but which potentially include also sex and age 
perception) and changeable aspects of faces, such as expression, eye gaze and lip 
movement. The model has a core system responsible for the visual analysis of 
faces, implemented in face-selective regions in the occipitotemporal visual 
extrastriate cortex, and an extended system, where information is further processed 
by functional components involved in other cognitive functions (Figure 1.2). The 
core face system has an initial stage responsible for the early  perception of facial 
features (similar to the structural encoding phase from Bruce and Young model) 
from where information is split into a route dedicated to processing invariant facial 
aspects (implemented in the lateral fusiform gyrus - FG) and another one for 
processing variable facial aspects (implemented in the superior temporal sulcus - 
STS). There is no indication of computing face impressions in the core system. 
Information from STS is relayed to the extended system for analysing spatial 
attention (in the intraparietal sulcus), speech perception (in the auditory  cortex) and 
emotion (in the amygdala, insula and limbic lobe). Information from FG reaches 
the anterior temporal lobe, part of the extended system, where identity and 
semantic information about a person are activated. There is no explicit  mentioning 
of face impressions in the extended system either, but  by elimination one may infer 
that these are performed in the extended system component responsible for emotion 
(based on the information about changeable facial aspects received from STS). 
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  The Haxby model has been recently updated by its authors (Haxby & 
Gobbini, 2011) to reflect new findings accumulated during the past ten years. The 
updated model no longer sees the inferior occipital gyri as the “entry gate” for all 
face-related information, but continues to make a distinction between the visual 
mechanisms involved in processing dynamic facial features (in the posterior STS) 
and invariant facial features (the fusiform plus the inferior occipital gyri) (Figure 
1.3). Furthermore, the bottom-up and top-down exchange of information between 
the core face system and the extended system is less constricted (there are no 
particular connections specified between individual components within the core 
system and individual components within the extended system). A brief reference 
to trait inferences in Haxby and Gobbini (2011) confirmed the initial hint that the 
authors see them as relying on mechanisms involved in processing changeable 
facial aspects. This conjecture was based on the emotion overgeneralisation 
hypothesis put forward by Todorov and colleagues (Todorov, Said, Engell & 
Oosterhof, 2008; discussed at length in the following sections), according to which 
trustworthiness inferences are driven by subtle emotional cues detected in faces by 
mechanisms typically responsible for facial expressions. 
Figure 1.2. The distributed model of face processing proposed by  Haxby et al. 
(2000). The model includes neural implementation of the functional components.
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1.2.2. Dissociations between facial identity and trait perception
 
 As we have seen, existing models of face processing were not particularly 
concerned with trait perception, focusing instead on the division between identity 
versus non-identity  related aspects of face perception. Therefore, a first  step  in 
attempting to place face evaluations within face perception models is to clarify 
their position in relation to identity recognition. 
 Bruce and Young’s model suggested face evaluations are performed by the 
same mechanisms involved in all other aspects of face perception that are not 
related to identity  recognition. The dissociation between identity  and trait 
perception is also implied in the Haxby model, with trait judgments likely to be 
carried out in the extended system based on information about changeable aspects 
of faces (distinct  from information about invariant aspects needed for identity 
Figure 1.3. The updated distributed model of face processing (Haxby  & Gobbini, 
2011).
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recognition). This dissociation was supported by findings from amygdala patients, 
who showed abnormal facial trait evaluations with spared facial identity 
recognition (Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 1988). Subsequent neuroimaging studies, 
discussed in more detail in the following section, confirmed the critical role of 
amygdala in making face evaluations (e.g. Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002; Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Todorov, Said, Oosterhof, & Engell, 2011). 
Furthermore, transcranial magnetic stimulation of the STS induced longer response 
times for face trustworthiness judgments (Dzhelyova, Ellison, & Atkinson, 2011), 
suggesting the STS, which is associated with processing changeable facial aspects, 
is also involved in trait perception. At the same time, face recognition is thought to 
depend on face-selective areas in the occipitotemporal cortex (Haxby et al., 2000). 
The fact  that trait perception and identity recognition seem to rely  on different 
neural areas is consistent with a dissociation between identity and trait  perception. 
More convergent evidence for independent mechanisms in perception of identity 
and facial traits came from studies of individuals with developmental and acquired 
prosopagnosia (DP and AP, respectively). DP is a neurodevelopmental condition 
characterised by  severe face recognition deficits, in the absence of intellectual or 
low-level vision problems. The main difference from AP is that  in DP the face 
recognition deficits are not the result of known damage to a previously normal 
brain.
 Todorov and Duchaine (2008) tested trait perception in four individuals with 
DP, who were asked to rate three sets of faces for perceived trustworthiness. Their 
ratings of the first two sets, which featured full face photographs, were in line with 
controls. When hair and facial marks were removed (third set), two DPs provided 
ratings which differed significantly from controls. The other two, however, gave 
ratings that were highly  correlated with consensus judgments (and comparable to 
the ratings of a control group). Furthermore, Todorov and Duchaine (2008) found 
no relation between the severity  of face recognition problems and performance 
with trustworthiness judgments, indicating that the two abilities rely  on distinct 
mechanisms. These findings are consistent with face perception models presented 
above. Unfortunately, the four DPs were not tested for other aspects of face 
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perception (e.g. emotional expressions) to reveal potential associations or 
dissociations with face impressions. 
 The fact that  perceptions of identity and at least one trait (i.e. trustworthiness) 
are independent in some individuals with DP is not necessarily indicative of the 
organisation principles in normal brains. A recent study (Quadflieg, Todorov, 
Laguesse, & Rossion, 2012) examined perception of several facial traits in PS, a 
thoroughly  studied case of acquired prosopagnosia (Rossion, Caldara et al., 2003). 
PS was asked to rate faces on two occasions (separated by a few months) and she 
showed judgments comparable to controls for aggression, attractiveness, 
confidence, intelligence, sociability, trustworthiness and typicality. The only 
abnormal ratings were for dominance. Because PS showed impaired holistic 
processing of faces, the results suggest that many traits (except dominance) do not 
rely on holistic processing.  
 These are suggestive results for a dissociation between identity recognition 
and (at least  some) face impressions, but they do not answer all questions. First, 
traits seem to be an enduring and invariant feature of the face (repeated face 
evaluations are highly  correlated, Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). From this point of 
view, it might be more sensible to be processed by mechanisms involved in 
processing invariant facial aspects (such as identity), if the division between 
invariant and changeable aspects proposed by the Haxby  model exists. Haxby and 
Gobbini (2011) dismiss this possibility, stating that although people may 
“naively” (p. 97) assume trait inferences are based on invariant  facial features, this 
is not true. Unfortunately, they do not elaborate beyond a brief reference to the 
emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis. Instead, perception of facial traits 
depending on invariant  features seems a reasonable possibility. Note that relying on 
the same invariant facial features does not preclude a dissociation between identity 
and trait perception; it  would instead signal that Haxby model would need to be 
further updated to allow for finer dissociations within components of the face core 
system. 
 Second, and supporting the possibility that trait judgments and identity 
recognition rely on the same invariant facial features, most neuroimaging studies of 
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trait perception find that face-selective areas, including the fusiform gyrus, are also 
sensitive to changes in perceived facial traits (Winston et  al., 2002; Engell et al. 
2007). Coupled with the fact that lesion of right amygdala may lead to 
prosopagnosia (see the patient Florence), this questions the existence of completely 
distinct neural mechanisms for identity and trait perception. Behavioural studies 
showed that facial identity can modulate trustworthiness inferences: observers 
perceived faces resembling themselves more favourably (DeBruine, 2002; 
DeBruine, 2005).  
 Third, in all previous studies, trait perception was measured with only one 
task – ratings – which was not comparable with any of the tasks used to measure 
face identification. Furthermore, some face stimuli (e.g. Quadflieg et al., 2012) 
were in colour and included hair; normal trait judgments of face stimuli including 
hair do not necessarily  replicate with face stimuli excluding hair (Todorov & 
Duchaine, 2008), and skin colour can substantially influence trait judgments 
(Stephen, Coetzee, & Perrett, 2011; Swami, Furnham, & Joshi, 2008).
 The current thesis aims to confirm the dissociation between facial identity 
and trait perception by: i) controlling many of the potentially confounding factors 
in previous studies, and ii) using multiple tests for each ability  to increase the 
reliability  of the findings. Because no suitable tests were available for trait 
perception, a new battery of tests was developed. The tests were designed to allow 
direct comparisons across face perception abilities and were based on two formats 
(sorting and categorisation) to measure perception of three traits (trustworthiness, 
attractiveness, aggressiveness) and two expressions (happy and angry, needed for 
testing the overgeneralisation theory, see next  section). Section 3.1 details the steps 
taken to develop and validate these tests. Section 3.2 presents the examination of 
trait perception in four individuals with AP. The stimuli judged were grayscale 
faces cropped so that only internal features were visible. Perception of three traits 
(trustworthiness, attractiveness, aggressiveness) was evaluated with ratings, the 
sorting task and the categorisation task. The sorting tasks were developed based on 
a widely used test of face perception, facilitating direct comparison between trait 
and identity perception.
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1.2.3. Overgeneralisation hypotheses in facial trait perception
 The next step in trying to understand the mechanisms behind facial trait 
perception is to explore their relation to other judgments derived from faces, such 
as expression and sex recognition. My specific aim was to test the predictions of 
the overgeneralisation hypotheses derived from the leading model of facial trait 
perception (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008).
 Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) collected judgments of 15 commonly-inferred 
traits on a set of faces and, through principal component analysis (PCA), identified 
two principal components (PC) that accounted for the majority  of variance (81%) 
in ratings. The first PC was a valence evaluation, with positive loadings for positive 
traits (e.g. trustworthiness, emotional stability, responsibility) and negative 
loadings for negative traits (e.g. meanness, weirdness). It was named the 
trustworthiness dimension because trustworthiness had the highest loading (.94) on 
it. The second PC had highest  loadings from judgments of dominance, 
aggressiveness and confidence, and so it was named the dominance dimension. 
Similar two-dimensional models of social perception were proposed previously  by 
Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2007) and Wiggins, Philips and Trapnell (1989). 
According to these models, most person impressions could be reduced to warmth 
and competence (Fiske et al., 2007), or affiliation and dominance (Wiggins et al., 
1989). The similar structure across all these models is convergent evidence for the 
reliability of the Todorov model.
 Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) then used computer-generated faces to build 
an empirically validated model for how faces vary on trustworthiness and 
dominance. The model was adjusted such that the two dimensions were orthogonal, 
and it allowed new faces to be parametrically  manipulated for trustworthiness or 
dominance. Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) observed that exaggerating 
trustworthiness led to faces exhibiting smiles, while exaggerating 
untrustworthiness made faces appear angrier. These results led them to speculate 
that observers judge trustworthiness from facial features resembling very subtle 
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happy and angry  expressions. Similarly, manipulating dominance in their computer 
model led to more masculine appearance of faces, which suggests dominance is 
inferred from features indicative of the sex of a face. Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) 
proposed that facial trustworthiness and dominance are byproducts of face 
mechanisms designed to make expression and sex judgments - the emotion and sex 
overgeneralisation theories. The emotion overgeneralisation theory  was supported 
by later studies. 
 Said, Sebe and Todorov (2009) showed that a Bayesian network classifier 
trained to detect subtle cues to emotional expressions in neutral faces could predict 
how these faces were rated for impressions. Positive evaluations (e.g. 
trustworthiness) were associated with faces that were more likely  to be categorised 
as happy, while negative evaluations were linked to faces categorised as disgusted 
and fearful. Dominant faces tended to be categorised as angry. Furthermore, 
Oosterhof and Todorov (2009) showed that face trustworthiness moderates 
perception of happy and angry  expressions. Their participants saw two-second clips 
of faces expressing happy or angry emotion. When stimuli did not change identity 
and displayed changes in happiness (i.e. transition from neutral to expressive 
faces), participants rated trustworthy faces as happier than untrustworthy faces. The 
reverse was true for stimuli expressing anger. In addition, when face identity 
changed through morphing, the perceived intensity of an emotion varied according 
to whether it was congruent with the change in perceived trustworthiness between 
the start and end face in the clip. For example, perceptions of anger intensity 
increased for high-to-low trustworthiness transitions and decreased for low-to-high 
trustworthiness transitions. 
 These studies demonstrate perceptual similarities between trustworthy/
untrustworthy  and happy/angry  faces, but do not directly address the 
overgeneralisation hypothesis, which claims common functional and neural 
mechanisms between these aspects of face perception. In Engell, Todorov and 
Haxby (2010), behavioural adaptation to happy/angry  faces (but not fearful faces) 
shifted trustworthiness perceptions of neutral faces upwards/downwards. The 
results were interpreted as evidence for a common neural population. However, 
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note that the effect  may simply arise because adaptation to angry faces makes 
subsequent neutral faces appear happy and happy faces were shown to positively 
influence perceptions of trustworthiness (Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 
2001). This does not necessarily imply common neural mechanisms.
 Only a few studies investigated the neural bases of person impressions. In a 
landmark study, Adolphs et al. (1998) demonstrated the critical role of amygdala in 
perception of fear, but also trustworthiness and approachability. Patients with 
complete lesions of bilateral amygdala showed abnormal judgments related to face 
trustworthiness, i.e. they perceived untrustworthy  faces as trustworthy. The 
findings fit well with the Haxby model, where amygdala is part of the extended 
system for face perception, important for emotion recognition (and possibly person 
impressions). 
 Amygdala has been found to be involved in facial trustworthiness judgments 
by several fMRI studies. In Winston et al. (2002), bilateral amygdala and right 
insula showed increase activation to untrustworthy faces, independent of the task 
(in contrast, the right superior temporal sulcus was activated only in explicit 
judgments of trustworthiness). Untrustworthy faces activated a few other areas, 
among which were the right and left fusiform gyri. The authors speculated the 
increased brain activity  in the fusiform gyri, known for their role in identity 
recognition, was a result of modulatory influences from amygdala (possibly by 
anatomical back-projections) to enhance facial identification of threat stimuli. 
However, one cannot rule out the possibility  that  the fusiform gyrus is directly 
involved in facial trustworthiness perception, a finding that would be inconsistent 
with the Haxby model. 
 Engell et al. (2007) replicated the findings of Winston et al. (2002) by 
showing that amygdala was sensitive to changes in face trustworthiness when 
participants completed an unrelated face memory task. Furthermore, they showed 
that the amygdala response depended on consensus ratings of trustworthiness 
(average ratings from a pool of observers) and not on individual ratings, suggesting 
amygdala is sensitive to facial cues generally associated with trustworthiness by 
most observers, and not to particular cues which vary in their trustworthiness 
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significance from one observer to the other. 
 A further replication came from Todorov, Baron and Oosterhof (2008). Using 
the same face memory task from Engell et al. (2007), this time with computer-
generated faces instead of natural faces, they  observed increased amygdala 
activation to untrustworthy faces. However, right and left amygdala displayed 
different response profiles. While right amygdala showed linear effects, mirroring 
previous findings, the authors noted a quadratic response in left amygdala, with 
both untrustworthy  and trustworthy faces eliciting higher activation. A quadratic 
effect for face trustworthiness in amygdala was also found by  Said, Baron and 
Todorov (2009), Todorov et al. (2011).
 Todorov and Engell (2008) reanalysed the data from Engell et al. (2007) and 
found that amygdala activated to faces which were judged negative on 12 other 
traits (e.g. caring, sociable, mean etc), with the exception of dominance. They 
suggested that amygdala represents the valence dimension from the dual-
component model of facial trait perception (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). The fact 
that amygdala was also shown to respond more strongly to happy than to neutral 
faces (Breiter et al., 1996; Winston, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; Yang et al., 2002) 
is consistent with the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis according to which 
face trustworthiness judgments are by-products of mechanisms involved in 
recognition of emotional expressions. 
 To summarise, Todorov and colleagues presented considerable evidence in 
support of the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis. The sex overgeneralisation 
hypothesis received less attention, but previous studies showed that perceptions of 
facial masculinity or femininity influence facial dominance perception (Perrett et 
al., 1998). However, none of the above studies were designed to decisively test two 
fundamental predictions of the overgeneralisation hypotheses: i) impaired 
mechanisms for recognition of happy and angry facial expressions should lead to 
abnormal perception of face trustworthiness, and ii) impaired mechanisms for 
facial sex recognition should determine abnormal perception of face dominance. In 
Section 3.3 I test these two predictions in one individual with AP who showed 
impairments with facial expression and sex perception in preliminary tests.
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1.3. FACE IMPRESSIONS
 
 The final experimental sections of the present thesis are dedicated to four 
topics in face impressions. First, I look at facial cues influencing trait perception. 
More specifically, I examine whether facial width-to-height ratio predicts trust and 
explicit  evaluations of trustworthiness as it has been recently  suggested (Stirrat  & 
Perrett, 2010). Second, I investigate whether people can detect trustworthy 
behaviour in a real-life setting and whether the accuracy of their judgments 
depends on the stimuli source (real versus laboratory-based) and type (static versus 
dynamic clips). Third, I test if faces continue to influence economic interactions in 
an information-rich environment, a more realistic setting than those used in prior 
studies (e.g. van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008) in which participants did not  have access 
to any information about their potential partners. Finally, because social exchanges 
usually  involve both visual and auditory interactions, I examine how face 
impressions combine (or not) with voice impressions to form an integrated person 
perception. Of the various traits inferred from faces, the focus here is on 
trustworthiness, with the exception of the final study in which impressions of 
attractiveness and aggressiveness are also investigated. 
1.3.1. Cues to face trustworthiness 
 
 Face evaluations are surprisingly consistent across observers (Todorov et  al., 
2011; Penton-Voak, Pound, Little, & Perrett, 2006; Todorov et al., 2005), 
suggesting they  are driven more by stimulus characteristics than observers’ 
idiosyncrasies. In other words, facial traits are less in the ‘eye of the beholder’ (i.e. 
individual and cultural background), and more universal preferences (Cunningham, 
Roberts, Barbee, Druen, & Wu, 1995; Perrett, May, & Yoshikawa, 1994; Rhodes et. 
al., 2001). This observation leads one to wonder which facial characteristics (or 
complex of characteristics) are typically  associated with various traits. For 
example, attractiveness has been linked to facial averageness, symmetry and sexual 
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dimorphism (feminine traits are found attractive in women, and masculine traits are 
found attractive in men) (Rhodes, 2006), while perceived honesty has been linked 
to large eyes (Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996).
 A recent study (Kleisner, Priplatova, Frost, & Flegr, 2013) found that brown-
eyed faces tended to be perceived as being more trustworthy than blue-eyed faces, 
even after correcting for perceived attractiveness and dominance. However, the 
effect was not due to eye colour itself, but to the correlation between eye colour 
and face shape. Brown-eyed faces were generally rounder and broader, with big 
eyes, small distance between eyebrows and mouth corners pointing up (blue-eyed 
faces tended to have the opposite features). These features may be associated with 
trustworthiness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). 
Interestingly, a previous study from the same lab (Kleisner, Kocnar, Rubesova, & 
Flegr, 2010) found that brown-eyed faces were also perceived to be more 
dominant, which is difficult to reconcile with the negative correlation usually found 
between face trustworthiness and face dominance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). 
Kleisner et al. (2013) suggested that eye colour may transmit two independent 
signals, one related to trustworthiness and another one related to dominance.
 Because trustworthiness is positively  correlated with attractiveness and 
negatively correlated with dominance/aggressiveness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008), it  is expected that facial characteristics affecting perceptions of 
attractiveness or aggressiveness will also influence perceptions of trustworthiness. 
One reliable cue to aggressiveness has been found to be the facial width-to-height 
ratio (WHR), defined as the ratio between the bizygomatic breadth (the distance 
between the left and the right zygion) and the distance between the upper lip and 
the brow (Figure 1.4). According to Weston, Friday and Liò (2007), facial WHR is 
a sexually dimorphic aspect of the face, with greater ratios (i.e. wider faces) in men 
(but see Kramer, Jones, Ward, 2012; Özener, 2011; for challenges to this claim). 
Greater WHRs in men are independent of body size and may be related to 
increased testosterone level (Verdonck, Gaethofs, Carels, Zegher, 1999). At the 
same time, Carré and McCormick (2008) found that facial WHR in men correlated 
with self-reported dominance and aggressive behaviour in hockey games 
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(expressed as penalty minutes). In a subsequent study, Carré, McCormick and 
Mondloch (2009) showed that observers’ perceptions of facial aggressiveness were 
strongly correlated with the facial WHR and with the actual aggressiveness of the 
targets, even under brief presentation times (39 ms). Putting these findings 
together, one can infer that facial WHR in men is a valid cue that helps observers 
make accurate predictions regarding targets’ aggressive behaviour. Carré, 
Morrissey, Mondloch and McCormick (2010) confirmed this conjecture in a series 
of experiments. They found that aggressiveness judgments remained accurate for 
stimulus manipulation that did not interfere with the facial WHR (blurring and 
cropping) but not when faces were scrambled. Furthermore, they showed that facial 
WHR was the main predictor (from a larger set of facial metrics) of aggressiveness 
judgments. 
 Inspired by these studies, Stirrat and Perrett (2010) examined whether the 
relations between facial WHR and perceived and actual aggressiveness extend to 
trustworthiness. They measured the facial WHR of male and female students and 
found that, for male students, it correlated with reciprocation rates in trust games 
(i.e. actual trustworthiness). In a second study, male facial WHR predicted the 
amount invested by first  movers in the trust game (i.e. perceived trustworthiness). 
Finally, manipulation of male facial WHR was shown to influence the answers in a 
task asking to select the more trustworthy face from a pair, with narrower faces 
selected more often. The effect was more pronounced for female participants with 
Figure 1.4. Computation of facial width-to-height ratio (WHR). The metric is calculated 
by dividing the distance between the left and right zygion and the distance between upper 
lip and brows. The man on the right has a higher WHR than the man on the left.
1. INTRODUCTION
37
lower scores on a self-rated social dominance questionnaire. Stirrat and Perrett 
concluded that, as for aggressiveness, facial WHR is a valid predictor of male 
actual and perceived trustworthiness.
 In Section 4.1 I present  an attempt to replicate these findings and answer a 
few outstanding questions. First, a replication is important because the effects 
associated with WHR are relatively small and context-dependent. For example, the 
initial correlation between facial WHR and aggressive behaviour found by Carré 
and McCormick (2008) was not  replicated in a subsequent study. After measuring 
facial WHR in 470 Turkish university students, Özener (2011) failed to find a 
correlation with self-reported aggressiveness. Haselhuhn and Wong (2011) 
replicated the initial findings that facial WHR predicts actual trustworthiness; in 
their study, men with wider faces were more likely to cheat. But Stirrat and Perrett 
(2012) showed that large facial WHR is not always linked to antisocial behaviour; 
in a public goods game, men with wider faces were willing to sacrifice more for the 
benefit of other in-group members. My replication attempts include the original 
faces used by S&P and a new set of more controlled faces generated by Facegen 
Modeller 3.3 software (Singular Inversions, 2008) according to the metrics from 
S&P. Although facial WHR is thought to be a reliable cue to aggressiveness/
trustworthiness only for men, our computer-generated faces included both female 
and male faces. A second outstanding issue is that WHR may not be a direct 
predictor of perceptions of trustworthiness, but one of the cues important for other 
variables, such as perceptions of attractiveness and femininity, that lead to 
variances in trustworthiness (e.g. Perrett et al., 1998). I test whether any of these 
variables is a better predictor of face trustworthiness than facial WHR. Third, I 
examine if observers’ self-reported traits like propensity  to trust, risk-aversion, 
dominance and attractiveness mediate the relationship between facial WHR and 
trustworthiness evaluations. S&P found individual differences in raters’ judgments, 
with self-reported submissive female participants more sensitive to the male facial 
WHR.
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1.3.2. Accuracy of face impressions
 
 Face impressions are pervasive (Willis & Todorov, 2006) and typically show 
high inter-rater agreement (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). The confidence that 
people generally have on their impression of others' faces (Hassin & Trope, 2000) 
might suggest that personality  traits and/or behavioural propensities can be 
predicted from faces. Consistent with this idea, evaluations of strangers’ faces were 
found to correlate with certain self-reported traits such as extraversion and 
conscientiousness (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; Little & Perrett, 2007), 
agreeableness and emotional stability (Penton-Voak et al., 2006), power and 
warmth (Berry, 1991), honesty  (Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994) and intelligence 
(Zebrowitz, Hall, Murphy, & Rhodes, 2002). A higher-than-chance correlation 
between face evaluations and personality attributions was found across cultures 
(Albright et al., 1997). Other authors claimed that, based on faces, people can 
predict membership  to religious (Rule, Garrett, & Ambady, 2010), political (Rule & 
Ambady, 2010) or sexual minority  groups (Rule, Ambady, & Hallett, 2009; Rule & 
Ambady, 2008; Rule, Macrae, & Ambady, 2009). Together, these studies support 
the “kernel of truth” hypothesis (Berry, 1990), according to which there is some 
truth (i.e. small, but significant effect) in face-based judgments. However, the 
evidence about the accuracy  of face impressions is mixed, with many studies 
failing to find correlations with actual traits (Hassin and Trope, 2000; Pound, 
Penton-Voak, & Brown, 2007; Zebrowitz et al., 1996; Zebrowitz, Andreoletti, 
Collins, Lee, & Blumenthal, 1998). Furthermore, as Penton-Voak et al. (2006) 
point out, very few studies showing significant correlations used stimuli properly 
controlled to present only  facial cues, so personality impressions might have been 
helped by non-facial cues such as clothing and hairstyle.
  Trust is central to most social exchanges and so perceptions of 
trustworthiness have the potential to yield large payoffs when accurate and 
damaging penalties when false. However, despite its prominent role in social 
interactions, relatively  few studies have explicitly examined our ability  to infer 
trustworthiness from faces. While there is a large body of research on lie-
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detection1, these studies typically  presented participants audiovisual material 
recorded in the laboratory, encouraging reliance on both verbal and nonverbal 
information to reach hopefully  accurate lie-truth judgments about artificial 
behaviour (e.g., lies according to a script). Only a fraction of these studies 
presented face videos exclusively, and in this case the performance was not better 
than 50%. Closer to face trustworthiness detection are the studies derived from the 
evolutionary  psychologists’ hypothesis that people have evolved a specialised 
module for recognising abusers of trust  - the ‘cheater detection module’ (Cosmides, 
1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Faces of cheaters were found to be better 
remembered than faces of non-cheaters (Chiappe & Brown, 2004; Mealy, Daood, 
& Krage, 1996; Oda, 1997; but see also Barclay & Lalumiere, 2006; Mehl & 
Buchner, 2008; for failed replications of this finding). However, better memory for 
cheaters does not mean cheaters can be recognised before interacting with them or 
in the absence of any information about their actual behaviour.
 More recent studies examined whether people can reliably  predict 
cooperativeness in economic games such as the trust game, prisoner’s dilemma 
game, ultimatum game or dictator game, from 5-20s video clips of the players - 
what Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) refer to as “thin slices” of behaviour. Results 
were mixed, with some studies observing chance-level performance (Gollwitzer, 
Rothmund, Alt, & Jekel, 2012) and others finding significant correlations between 
face-based trustworthiness impressions and cooperative behaviour (Fetchenhauer, 
Groothuis, & Pradel, 2010). 
 Information available in still images of faces, under certain conditions, seems 
to be sufficient to predict trustworthy/cooperative behaviour in laboratory games. 
Verplaetse, Vanneste and Braeckman (2007) showed that participants could 
discriminate cooperators from non-cooperators in prisoner’s dilemma games from 
still photos taken at the moment of making the decision of whether or not to 
cooperate. Discrimination from still images taken before the experiment or during 
practice trials failed. In Bonnefon, Hopfensitz and De Neys (2012), successful 
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1 Bond and DePaulo (2006) carried out a comprehensive meta-analysis of 206 lie-detection studies 
and found that people correctly discriminated between truthful and deceptive messages about 54% 
of the time, on average (where 50% would be chance-level performance).
prediction of reciprocation rates from trustees in trust games depended on the face 
images being black-and-white and cropped to exclude external cues. When pictures 
were in colour and included non-facial features, performance was at chance level, 
even though participants preferred these stimuli. 
 Stiratt and Perrett  (2010) suggested that a particular facial metric is 
informative about people’s propensity to reciprocate trust. In their experiment, 
people with lower facial width to height ratios were judged more trustworthy and 
this metric correlated with their cooperative behaviour in the trust game. 
Furthermore, they showed that varying facial width modified perceptions of face 
trustworthiness and concluded that facial width is a valid cue used by  observers to 
detect trustworthiness in strangers. However, a later study (Stirrat & Perrett, 2012) 
showed that people with wider faces may switch between antisocial and prosocial 
behaviour according to the context.
 Other studies looked at generalised trustworthiness (a long-lasting character 
trait) rather than state trustworthiness (referring to a particular action in a given 
context). Generalised trustworthiness is related to state trustworthiness (can be seen 
as a collection of state trustworthiness actions), but is not a deterministic predictor 
of it. An individual high on generalised trustworthiness may display state 
untrustworthiness (e.g., a Nobel Peace Prize recipient stealing a pen at a 
conference). Porter, England, Juodis, Ten Brinke and Wilson (2008) investigated 
face-based trustworthiness perceptions elicited by two groups of people supposed 
to vary dramatically in their generalised trustworthiness (Nobel Peace Prize 
recipients and wanted criminals) and found that judgment accuracy  was above 
chance only for trustworthy  targets (i.e., Nobel prize winners). Another study 
(Valla, Ceci, & Williams, 2011) claimed that people can accurately discriminate 
between criminals and non-criminals from their photos. However, the criminals’ 
photos were police mugshots and the differences in pose and lighting to the non-
criminals’ photos made it relatively  easy to infer which faces presented criminals. 
When participants were asked to discriminate between violent and non-violent 
offenders, both groups now presented in mugshots, they failed. Similar confounds 
in the stimuli might have also affected the results of Porter et al. (2008) showing 
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above chance performance at  distinguishing wanted criminals from Nobel 
laureates. Even though photos were cropped to include only the faces, criminals’ 
photos taken from FBI’s “most wanted” list might still look different from 
photographs of Nobel laureates (no example photos were presented in the paper to 
verify this possibility).
 To summarise, there is limited evidence that state or generalised 
trustworthiness can be inferred from faces. Furthermore, all studies investigating 
state trustworthiness detection from faces relied on analysing the behaviour 
exhibited by targets in relatively low-stakes laboratory games. It is debatable 
whether such behaviour is a good proxy  for actual trustworthiness. By  not 
reciprocating trust or by  not cooperating, targets follow acceptable rules of the 
games. In the absence of an explicit commitment to cooperate, it is difficult to 
classify  their behaviour as deceptive or untrustworthy. Would the evidence for the 
accuracy  of face trustworthiness impressions be stronger if people have to judge 
targets for clear deceptive behaviour in real-world settings? Data from a television 
program featuring a high-stake prisoner’s dilemma game allowed me to investigate 
this question. In Section 4.2 I present three experiments in which I examine if face 
impressions based on static and dynamic stimuli can predict  trustworthy behaviour 
in the real-world (using the television data) and also in the laboratory (where 
targets were asked to play trust games). In addition to responses about targets’ 
behaviour, I also measure participants’ confidence in their responses to assess 
whether it correlates with accuracy. Expecting participants to reliably  classify  all 
targets may be unrealistic - some targets may be easier to “read” than others. 
Similarly, some participants may be better than others at “reading” faces. However, 
if “reading” faces is a skill, people should have insight relative to its variance and a 
reliable correlation between cheater detection and confidence levels should be 
found.
1.3.3. Face impressions and reputation
 
 The temptation to judge strangers by their faces is hard to resist, with many 
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people convinced they can accurately tell the virtuous from the wicked simply by 
their faces (Hassin & Trope, 2000). Research suggests there is limited value in 
face-based judgments (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Olivola & Todorov, 2010b; although 
see Berry, 1990; Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994) and, overtly, we label the use of this 
self-perceived ability  as unethical. Nevertheless, the fast and spontaneous process 
(Willis & Todorov, 2006) of inferring traits from faces appears to influence a wide 
range of consequential decisions: face-based impressions of competence were 
found to predict election results (Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov et al., 2005), 
facial dominance predicted achieved military  rank of West Point cadets (Mueller & 
Mazur, 1996) and facial baby-facedness and attractiveness influenced court 
decisions (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). In the laboratory, van’t Wout and 
Sanfey (2008) showed that participants in trust games invested more in anonymous 
partners with faces perceived to be more trustworthy. Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola 
and Chater (2012) (experiment 1) replicated these results with face stimuli that had 
no hair, facial marks, glasses etc., such that the effect of perceived trustworthiness 
was unambiguously linked to the facial structure. 
 However, an important limitation in prior experimental studies examining the 
role of facial trustworthiness on social or economic interactions is that participants 
had no information about their potential partners beyond their faces (e.g. van’t 
Wout & Sanfey, 2008). In the absence of information about past behaviour, it  may 
be expected that people use any cues available about a partner’s trustworthiness, 
including facial cues assumed to be unreliable. But in real life people usually have 
access to rich information about prospective partners. Considering that  face 
judgments were found to be updated quickly  in line with reputation (Todorov & 
Olson, 2008), a legitimate question is whether the effects of trustworthy facial 
configurations survive when reliable background information is available.  
 Recent studies (Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2010; Ravina, 2008) have found 
that appearance-based perceptions of borrower trustworthiness predict lending 
tendencies in online peer-to-peer lending, even when lenders have demographic 
and financial information about  borrowers. But these studies were correlational, 
and borrower photos often included more than faces, so it is uncertain what aspects 
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of appearances influenced investment choices. In a more controlled laboratory 
environment, Chang, Doll, van’t Wout, Frank, & Sanfey (2010) found that, in trust 
games involving multiple interactions with the same trustee, participants 
dynamically tuned their investment strategies to favour partners who reciprocated 
their trust. Across 15 repeated interactions, the main effect of facial trustworthiness 
was not significant, but trustworthy-looking partners who reciprocated trust still 
received more money than reciprocating partners with untrustworthy looks. 
 The experiment presented in Section 4.3 has a similar goal: to study the 
interaction between face trustworthiness and reputational information. In Rezlescu, 
Duchaine et al. (2012) (experiment 1), stable facial configurations varying in 
perceived trustworthiness affected investment decisions. I examine if the effect 
survives in a richer, more ecologically valid environment. Keeping the trust game 
setup (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), participants playing the part of the 
investors will now see not only faces but also information about their counterparts’ 
past behaviour. This information is presented in the form of visual unambiguous 
histories, aimed to suggest high or low reciprocity in previous trust games. 
 Unlike Chang et al. (2010), in the current study I use highly controlled facial 
stimuli to focus on unfakeable facial features. Furthermore, rather than gradually 
discovering trustee reputations from first-hand interactions, participants see visual 
summaries of their partners’ past reciprocations (just as one might receive third-
party reports about potential business partners). Thus, participants have 
simultaneous access to faces and reputational information, so they  can integrate 
both immediately. Finally, participants interact with each trustee only once, 
eliminating the potential confound, associated with repeated games, that investment 
decisions might be used to punish or reward trustees, or to otherwise communicate 
(dis)satisfaction with a partner’s choices (Xiao & Houser, 2005). 
 Rationally, people should consider only objective cues about a trustee’s 
behaviour and ignore facial cues. However, the prediction is that, rather than being 
obliterated, the effect of face trustworthiness will be substantially reduced (but  still 
significant).
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1.3.4  Voice impressions
 
 Voices are a rich source of socially relevant information. In this respect, they 
closely resemble faces, despite being markedly less researched. Recognition of a 
person’s identity, age, sex and emotions is commonly achieved based on a 
combination of facial and vocal information, but it can also succeed based solely 
on either faces or voices (e.g. Banissy et al., 2010; Meyer, Baumann, Wildgruber, 
& Alter, 2007; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010; Scott, 2008). These 
similarities between faces and voices led some authors to suggest that voice 
perception relies on functional and neural architectures similar to face perception 
(Belin, Fecteau, & Bédard, 2004; Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990; Ellis, 1989). 
However, this does not imply  the mechanisms behind face and voice processing are 
the same. Indeed, in addition to the obvious differences in low-level perception, 
arising from the different physical attributes of voices and faces, there is conclusive 
evidence for separate mechanisms at higher levels. For instance, most individuals 
with prosopagnosia can recognise people from their voices (e.g. Hoover, Démonet, 
& Steeves, 2010), and individuals with phonoagnosia (the inability to recognise 
vocal identity) can have normal face recognition (Garrido, Eisner et al., 2009). A 
dissociation was also documented in perception of affective information: amygdala 
patient SM could recognise fear from voice prosody but not  from faces (Adolphs & 
Tranel, 1999). 
 While face-based trait impressions have been studied extensively (for a 
review see Todorov et al., 2011), most research on voice perception has revolved 
around identity and emotion recognition, with only a few studies examining trait 
impressions. These studies were mainly  interested in vocal attractiveness and its 
influence on electoral outcomes. Voice pitch was found to be a strong cue to male 
vocal attractiveness, with deeper voices preferred by both men and women 
(Collins, 2000; Feinberg, DeBruine, Jones, & Little, 2008; Feinberg, Jones, Little, 
Burt, & Perrett, 2005; Jones, Feinberg, DeBruine, Little, & Vukovic, 2010). Low 
voice pitch is also associated with perceived dominance in men (Jones et al., 2010; 
Puts, Gaulin, & Verdolini, 2006; Puts, Hodges, Cardenas, & Gaulin, 2007). Just 
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like faces, voices were shown to bias political preferences and voting behaviour 
(Gregory & Gallagher, 2002; Surawski & Ossoff, 2006; Tigue, Borak, O’Connor, 
Schandl, & Feinberg, 2012) and, also similar to many studies on the accuracy of 
face impressions, researchers failed to find a relationship between body 
characteristics and vocal characteristics or voice impressions (Collins, 2000). 
Nevertheless, deep  voices may be honest  signals to dominance in men because they 
correlate with testosterone level (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999). 
 Trustworthiness is one of the main components in the two-dimensional model 
of facial trait perception (the other being dominance; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). 
Despite its likely important role in person evaluation, voice trustworthiness has not 
been studied so far. With faces, perceived trustworthiness was shown to have a 
positive correlation with attractiveness and a negative correlation with dominance 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Would these correlations also emerge with voices? 
Would voice-based trustworthiness, attractiveness and dominance judgments show 
the high inter-rater agreement commonly found for face-based judgments? These 
are two of the questions I address in Section 4.1, Experiment 1, where I validate a 
novel set of voices and faces for perceived trustworthiness, attractiveness and 
dominance. In the same experiment, I examine whether voice impressions correlate 
with face impressions. Feinberg (2008) suggested that faces and voices might 
signal the same qualities related to hormone levels and thus evaluations of those 
qualities from faces and voices should correlate. Indeed, women with masculine 
faces were found to also have lower-pitched voices (Feinberg et al., 2005) and 
voice and face attractiveness were related in women (Collins & Missing, 2003; 
Feinberg et al., 2005; Lander, 2008) and men (Saxton, Caryl, & Roberts, 2006). 
 Because most real-world interactions involve simultaneous access to facial 
and vocal information, another interesting question is how face and voice 
impressions combine (or not) to form an integrated person impression. However, 
research on this topic is extremely  scarce, with only one study showing that 
physical and vocal attractiveness produced a supra-additive effect on perception of 
political candidates (Surawski & Ossoff, 2006). In Experiment 2 I examine 
integrated person impressions of attractiveness, trustworthiness and dominance 
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based on faces and voices previously rated low or high on these dimensions. The 
prediction is that both faces and voices will influence person perception, but that 
the balance between visual and auditory cues and the presence or absence of an 
interaction will vary according to the judged trait. 
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Chapter 2
FACE SPECIFICITY IN ACQUIRED PROSOPAGNOSIA
 The aim of this chapter is to test two alternative theories to face specificity: 
the individuation hypothesis and the expertise hypothesis. To this end, I report a 
series of studies involving two individuals with acquired prosopagnosia (AP). The 
individuation hypothesis implies that, in addition to their definitional face 
recognition deficits, individuals with AP will also be impaired at fine within-level 
discrimination of non-face objects. The expertise hypothesis predicts that 
individuals with AP will not be able to acquire object expertise.  
2.1. SPARED WITHIN-CLASS OBJECT RECOGNITION IN 
ACQUIRED PROSOPAGNOSIA 
INTRODUCTION
 Acquired prosopagnosics (APs) are individuals who, following brain 
damage, experience severe face recognition deficits in the absence of intellectual or 
low-level visual impairments. Deficits in acquired prosopagnosia (AP) are varied 
and different forms seem likely  to have particular unique neural correlates, so an 
understanding of AP has the potential to dramatically advance our understanding of 
face processing in normal brains. Here we report a new case of acquired 
prosopagnosia, Herschel, a 56-year old British man with a degree in astronomy, 
who contacted us in 2009 because of difficulties with face identification following 
two strokes. The current study aimed to investigate his prosopagnosia and 
contribute to the debate on face specificity, a central issue in visual recognition. 
 Are the mechanisms involved in face recognition different from those used 
in other types of visual recognition? If they are different, we should expect to find 
APs who are normal with object recognition (“pure” prosopagnosics). If face and 
other sorts of visual recognition depend on the same mechanisms, the brain damage 
responsible for prosopagnosia should always impair nonface object recognition. 
While most APs present severe deficits with faces and objects (e.g. Barton, 2008; 
Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Delvenne et al., 2004; Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 
1999; Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Steeves et al., 2006), the neuropsychological 
literature also describes APs who seem to be able to correctly  identify nonface 
objects of different types (basic level recognition) and same type (within-level 
recognition). 
 A recent paper, Busigny, Joubert et al. (2010), included a detailed 
description of one such case along with a summary table of 13 other potentially 
“pure” cases, spanning 25 years of research on acquired prosopagnosia. But as 
Busigny, Joubert et al. (2010) note, there is yet  no irrefutable evidence for “pure” 
prosopagnosia. Damasio et al. (1982) pointed out that within-class discrimination 
(e.g. distinguish car A from car B) is more comparable than basic object 
recognition (e.g. distinguish car from chair) to face recognition, and a careful 
examination of the 13 cases summarized in the table from Busigny, Joubert et al. 
(2010) revealed that the ability to identify items within various highly 
homogeneous object categories was not rigorously  tested in many of them. For 
example, Case 3 from Takahashi, Kawamura, Hirayama, Shiota and Isono (1995) 
was tested for naming real basic objects (normal performance), but not for 
identification of any  within-category items. The same can be said about patient 009 
(Barton, Cherkasova, Press, Intriligator, & O’Connor, 2004) and the unnamed 
patient tested by  Wada and Yamamoto (2001), both of whom were able to name 
fruits, vegetables, and animals normally. Although some researchers (Barton et al., 
2004; Schweinberger, Klos, & Sommer, 1995) argued for a parallel between these 
tests and face recognition, the basic level recognition tests place demands on the 
cognitive system that are likely to be different from the individuation demands of 
face recognition. In addition, these basic level tests typically produce ceiling effects 
in control participants, making the discovery of subtle impairments difficult. 
 Another problem is that some within-class recognition tests used in previous 
papers had issues that made the interpretation of results problematic. For example, 
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De Renzi and colleagues assessed within-category discrimination in Patient 4 (De 
Renzi, 1986a) and VA (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 1991) with two 
tests. One was a coin discrimination test, in which patients were required to sort 
local from foreign coins, and in the second test, the patients were successful at 
recognizing personal items from a set of similar items (e.g. their necktie from other 
neckties). However it is not certain they would succeed with less familiar items and 
it is impossible to gauge whether the tasks were as difficult as the face tests these 
patients scored poorly on. Even when sensitive tests for within-level recognition 
were used, APs often were tested with only one category of objects. Such was the 
case for patients Anna (De Renzi & di Pellegrino, 1998), WB (Buxbaum, Glosser, 
& Coslett, 1996), LR (Bukach, Bud, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006), FB (Riddoch, 
Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen, & Humphreys, 2008), DC (Rivest, Moscovitch, & 
Black, 2009), who recognized exemplars normally from within one of the 
following categories: glasses, doors, novel objects and dog breeds. 
 To summarise, many of the potentially  face-specific cases of AP do not 
convincingly  demonstrate accurate perception of visually similar exemplars within 
non-face categories. A rigorous documentation of cases with normal exemplar 
discrimination for a wide array of objects is crucial to support claims that acquired 
prosopagnosia can result  from deficits to face-specific mechanisms as the face 
specificity hypothesis entails. Below we present results from Herschel on 
perceptual and/or memory tests for cars, houses, tools, sunglasses, guns, horses, 
novel objects, human bodies and hairstyles, making him one of the most 
thoroughly  tested prosopagnosics for within-class object discrimination, along with 
PS (Busigny, Graf et al., 2010) and GG (Busigny, Joubert et al., 2010).
 In addition to investigating non-face recognition, another way to address 
whether prosopagnosia can be face-specific is to test predictions of accounts of 
prosopagnosia that do not  involve face-specific mechanisms. One such account is 
Levine and Calvanio’s (1989) proposal that prosopagnosia arises as a result of a 
general impairment in visual configural processing, defined as “the ability  to obtain 
an overview of an item as a whole in a single glance”. If individuals have problems 
forming unified representations of objects from individual parts, they would be 
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impaired with objects for which recognition by parts matching is difficult and 
Levine and Calvanio (1989) suggest faces are such a category. A testable prediction 
of this view is that prosopagnosics will be impaired with objects for which 
recognition is normally  done by parts, but for which critical chunks have been 
occluded such as Mooney-type objects (Mooney, 1957). Indeed, patient LH 
performed poorly in tests of visual closure, in which he was required to identify 
objects or words presented under challenging viewing conditions (in incomplete 
form or with visual noise added) (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). LH, however, had a 
wider range of cognitive deficits, including basic level object naming difficulties 
(Levine, Calvanio, & Wolf, 1980; Levine & Calvanio, 1989), which makes the 
interpretation of his results problematic. In contrast, several other APs with 
unimpaired object recognition showed normal performance in visual closure tasks 
(Whitely  & Warrington, 1977; De Renzi, 1986a; De Renzi et al., 1991; De Renzi & 
di Pellegrino, 1998; Henke, Schweinberger, Grigo, Klos, & Sommer, 1998). Here 
we investigate whether Herschel’s prosopagnosia is associated with a deficit in 
general configural processing that may pass undetected in usual object recognition, 
but become apparent in tests of visual closure. We also test Busigny, Joubert et al.’s 
(2010) related but more specific claim that acquired prosopagnosia is necessarily 
linked to a deficit in face-specific (rather than general) configural processing.
CASE REPORT: HERSCHEL
 Herschel is a 56-year old (born 1956) right-handed British man. He holds a 
degree in astronomy (hence his patient name) and currently  manages a science and 
technology team. Herschel contacted us through the Prosopagnosia Research 
Center website (www.faceblind.org) in October 2009 because he suffered from face 
recognition problems. In February 2008 he suffered a stroke that produced 
prosopagnosia, face-related visual anomalies (“mouths had tiger-like snarls”), 
severe navigation problems (“I could not navigate around the streets where I live”) 
and an upper left quandrantanopia. In June 2008 a second stroke produced a 
temporary loss of color perception and upper right  quandrantanopia. In August 
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2008 he suffered two transient ischemic attacks that produced temporary loss of 
control of the left leg and temporary speech problems. Currently, he reports only 
face recognition difficulties and an upper visual field loss (complete left and two 
thirds right). Navigation abilities and color perception largely  returned, although 
Herschel says that they remain different from how they  were before his strokes. 
Nevertheless, he seemed to effortlessly find his way around London and the inside 
of the building where he was tested, and he performed normally in our color 
perception tests (see below). He is intellectually  normal (see tests below) and 
continues to run his lab.
NEUROIMAGING FINDINGS †
 Whole-brain imaging was performed on a Siemens 1.5 Tesla MR scanner at 
the Birkbeck-UCL Neuroimaging Centre (BUCNI) in January 2010. Functional 
data were acquired over four blocked-design functional runs each lasting 234 s 
using a gradient-echo echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (23 slices, repetition 
time, TR = 2 s, echo time, TE = 50 ms, voxel size = 3x3x3 mm). In addition, a 
high-resolution anatomical scan (T1-weighted FLASH, TR = 12 ms; TE = 5.6 ms; 
1-mm3 resolution) was acquired at the start  of each scanning session for 
anatomically localizing functional activations. In addition to Herschel, we also 
scanned four male control subjects (age range 38 to 48 years). 
 Structural data (Figure 2.1) showed hydrocephalus with enlargement of the 
lateral ventricles, the third ventricle, the fourth ventricle, and the interpeduncular 
fossa. An extensive cyst located above the right tentorium cerebelli suppressed the 
right ventral and medial occipital lobe including occipitotemporal gyrus, occipital 
gyrus, and lingual gyrus. The cyst extended to the right hippocampal formation, but 
did not reach or affect the right amygdala. There was a very minor midline shift in 
the cerebellar vermis. 
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† Structural and functional imaging were performed by David Pitcher. This section (“Neuroimaging 
findings”) was written by him for Rezlescu, Pitcher and Duchaine (2012).
 To identify  category-selective regions in the visual cortex, we used a 
dynamic functional localiser (Pitcher, Dilks, Saxe, Triantafyllou, & Kanwisher, 
2011). Stimuli were 3-second movie clips of faces, bodies, scenes, objects, and 
scrambled objects. Each functional run contained two sets of five consecutive 
dynamic stimulus blocks (faces, bodies, scenes, objects, or scrambled objects) 
sandwiched between rest blocks, making two blocks per stimulus category per run. 
Each block lasted 18 seconds and contained stimuli from one of the five stimulus 
categories. The order of stimulus category blocks in each run was palindromic 
(e.g., fixation, faces, objects, scenes, bodies, scrambled objects, fixation, scrambled 
objects, bodies, scenes, objects, faces, fixation) and was randomized across runs. 
To focus attention, participants were instructed to press a key whenever the subject 
of the movie clip was repeated twice in a row (1-back task). 
 Functional imaging data were analysed using FSL (Smith et al., 2004). 
After deleting the first four volumes of each run to allow for T1 equilibrium, the 
functional images were realigned to correct for small head movements (Jenkinson, 
Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). The images were then smoothed with a 5-mm 
FWHM  (full width at  half maximum) Gaussian filter and pre-whitened to remove 
temporal autocorrelation (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001). The resulting 
images were entered into a subject-specific general linear model with five 
conditions of interest corresponding to the five categories of visual stimuli (faces, 
bodies, scenes, objects, and scrambled objects). Blocks were convolved with a 
double-gamma canonical hemodynamic response function (Glover, 1999) to 
generate the main regressors. In addition, the estimated motion parameters were 
entered in as covariates of no interest, to reduce structured noise due to minor head 
motion. Functional images were then registered to each participant’s individual 
structural scan using a 12-degrees-of-freedom affine transformation (Woolrich et 
al., 2001). 
 The last two functional runs were used to define category-selective regions 
of interest (ROIs) within each participant. We identified face regions by contrasting 
faces greater than objects, body regions by  contrasting bodies greater than objects, 
scene regions by  contrasting scenes greater than objects, and object regions by 
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contrasting objects greater than scrambled objects. The same statistical threshold (p 
= 10-3, uncorrected) was used for all participants. Within each functionally  defined 
ROI, we then calculated the magnitude of response (percentage signal change, or 
PSC, from a fixation baseline) to the conditions of the four stimulus categories 
(faces, bodies, scenes, objects, and scrambled objects), using the data collected 
from the first  two runs. All of the data used to calculate PSC were independent of 
the data used to define the ROIs. 
 Although we could identify  all core face areas in Herschel’s right 
hemisphere, a comparison between Herschel’s and controls’ activation levels to 
different stimulus categories revealed an atypical pattern for Herschel (Figure 2.2). 
In all face areas, his absolute PSCs to faces were below those of controls, as were 
the relative increases in PSC from objects to faces. We note that the differences are 
not statistically  significant (all ps > .13), although we also point  out the limited 
statistical power provided by such a small control group. The levels of activation in 
the left  fusiform face area (FFA) and left superior temporal sulcus (STS) were 
similar to those in the right hemisphere. We could not identify a left occipital face 
area (OFA) in Herschel, but one control did not show a left OFA as well. Herschel 
also failed to show a right parahippocampal place area (rPPA) as this region of 
cortex was damaged by his stroke. The other category-selective regions targeted by 
our functional localizer (Pitcher et al., 2011) were present, including the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC). Herschel’s activation to objects in the LOC was 
comparable to that seen in controls, suggesting spared functional mechanisms for 
object recognition.
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Figure 2.1. Structural and functional imaging of Herschel. Lesion location and 
activation of right fusiform face area (rFFA), right occipital face area (rOFA), and right 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (rpSTS). Images are shown in radiological orientation 
(right hemisphere on the left).
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GENERAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
 We tested Herschel on his general intellectual and low-level visual abilities, 
to exclude them as possible causes of his reported difficulties with faces. 
Consistent with his reports, he scored within the normal range for all these tests 
(see Table 2.1 for detailed results). Herschel was in the 98th percentile for his age 
group at  the Abbreviated Raven’s Matrices, a test designed to measure abstract 
reasoning, and was in the high range for Digit  Span Memory (scaled score 11), 
demonstrating his normal working memory. His language skills were also intact: he 
Figure 2.2. Magnitude of response (percentage signal change, PSC, from a fixation 
baseline) in the right hemisphere face and object areas to five stimulus categories 
(faces, bodies, scenes, objects, and scrambled objects). Below, MNI (Montreal 
Neurological Institute) coordinates for peak activations (during the face localizer) in the 
face areas. rFFA = right fusiform face area. rOFA = right occipital face area. rpSTS = right 
posterior superior temporal sulcus. rLO = right lateral occipital cortex.
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correctly  recognized 57 out of the 61 words presented in the National Adult 
Reading Test (he did not know how to pronounce: epergne, vivace, talipes, 
synecdoche). 
 Herschel suffers from a full upper left and partial right quadrantanopia, but 
his low level vision is otherwise normal. His visual acuity, contrast sensitivity and 
color perception are all in the upper ranges. His visuospatial perceptual skills were 
assessed using the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery of tests (Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1993), and he discriminated line length, size, orientation and position 
of gap normally.
FACE PROCESSING ABILITIES
 Next we performed a series of tests to experimentally  confirm his deficits in 
recognizing facial identity  and to determine whether he also had deficits with 
evaluations of facial expressions and facial gender. In all following experiments, 
significance of test  scores differences between Herschel and controls was assessed 
using Crawford’s modified t-test for single case studies (Crawford & Howell, 
1998). Results are summarized in Figure 2.3.
Experiment 1: Famous face recognition
 In a Famous Faces test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005), participants were 
presented with 60 photographs of people familiar to most Britons, cropped so that 
only faces are visible. Each face was displayed for 3s, and participants named the 
Table 2.1. General neuropsychological assessment of Herschel. He shows normal 
general cognitive skills (A and B) and normal low-level vision (C and D)
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individual or provided uniquely identifying information. We compared Herschel to 
a middle-aged control group of 16 UK adults (M = 44.1 years).
 Herschel identified only 3 out of the 60 faces presented, more than 7 
standard deviations below controls (M = 47.3, SD = 6.2; t = 6.93, p  < .001). To 
verify  that the personalities presented were familiar to Herschel, we asked him 
afterwards which individuals were sufficiently  known to him to allow recognition; 
he confirmed that he knew 48 of the famous people presented.  
Experiment 2: face matching
 The Face Matching task is designed to test  the ability to match unfamiliar 
faces for identity  across different viewpoints. In contrast to the Famous Faces test, 
performance does not rely  on long-term memory. Participants were presented with 
a target face (frontal view) for 400 ms, followed immediately by three faces 
presented simultaneously  as half-profiles for 2000 ms. Participants chose which 
one of the three test faces was the same individual as the target face. The stimuli 
were all male faces, with their hair completely  covered by  a standard black cap, so 
that judgments were based on facial features. Sixty  trials with upright faces and 60 
trials with inverted faces were randomly  interleaved. Ten age-matched participants 
(6 female, age range: 47 – 61 years old, M = 53.6 years) provided control data.
 Herschel’s accuracy at matching upright faces was 41.8% (chance level 
33.3%), or 2.8 standard deviations below controls (M = 78.7%, SD = 13.2%; t = 
2.67, p  = .026). He scored slightly  below chance for inverted faces: 30.0% 
compared to the average 48.0% (SD = 13.1%; t = 1.31, p = .223) achieved by 
control participants. Herschel’s inversion effect of 11.8% was the lowest from all 
participants and substantially  lower than controls’ average of 30.7% (SD = 14.0%), 
although the difference was not statistically significant (t = 1.29, p = .230). 
Experiment 3: face perception
 The results above demonstrate Herschel’s problems with recognizing the 
identity  of previously seen faces. It is possible that his pronounced prosopagnosia 
is due to an inability to remember faces, while his perception of faces is still 
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normal. To test this possibility, we used the Cambridge Face Perception Test - 
CFPT (Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Duchaine, Yovel, & Nakayama, 
2007). In it, participants have one minute to sort six test faces according to their 
similarity to a target face. Test faces are morphed images containing different 
proportions of the target face - 28%, 40%, 52%, 64%, 76%, and 88%. There are 8 
trials with upright faces and 8 trials with inverted faces, presented in a random 
order. The final accuracy score represents the percentage of correct sorts using the 
formula: 100 * [1 – (sum of deviations from the correct ordering for each trial / 
maximum deviations possible)].  Chance performance is 35.6%. The control data 
came from 21 age-matched participants (mean age = 46.5 years).
 We tested Herschel twice with the CFPT, once in October 2009 and once in 
September 2011. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, his scores for upright faces were 
outside the normal range on both occasions: 55.6% and 33.3% respectively, 
whereas controls’ mean score was 74.5% (SD = 8.5%; t = 2.17, p  = .042; and t = 
4.74, p  < .001, respectively). These results indicate a perceptual component in 
Herschel’s prosopagnosia. The lower score in the repeated test  may be due to 
Herschel’s acknowledgment of the difficulty of this test for him after the first 
session; as a result he might have not  tried as hard the second time. Indeed, a 
comparison of the average time taken per trial (each trial had a time limit of one 
minute, but could be ended sooner) revealed that Herschel spent more time sorting 
the faces in the first session (M  = 44.9s) compared to the second session (M = 
37.9s; paired-samples t-test: t(7) = 2.36, p  = .051). When asked to sort inverted 
faces, Herschel performed comparably to controls in the first session: 47.2% 
compared to 54.9% (SD = 6.8%; t = 1.11, p = .282), and significantly worse than 
controls in the second session: 37.5% (t = 2.50, p = .021). This drop in performance 
from session one to session two is consistent with a general decrease in attention/
effort during the second session.
Experiment 4 & 5: facial expression recognition
 Many APs also have difficulty extracting other information from faces, such 
as expressions and age (Fox, Hanif, Iaria, Duchaine, & Barton, 2011; Sergent & 
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Signoret, 1992). We assessed Herschel’s ability  to recognize expressions with two 
tests. Control data were provided by  nine age-matched male participants (age 
range: 41 – 55, mean age 46.8).
 In the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), 
participants are presented with the eye region of a face along with four emotion 
state words. In 36 trials, they choose the word that best describes what the person is 
thinking or feeling. Herschel proved to be impaired at this task, scoring more than 
2 standard deviations below control data. He matched the eye region with the 
correct adjective in 50% of trials, whereas controls’ average was 82.2% (SD = 
6.4%; t = 4.77, p = .001).
 The second task was the Films Facial Expression Task. In this task, 
participants are asked to identify subtle facial expressions captured from 18 
obscure foreign films. In each of the 58 trials, participants see a word describing an 
emotional state, followed by three static images of the same actor/actress 
portraying different facial expressions. Images are presented for 500ms. 
Participants indicate which of the three images best matches the target emotional 
adjective (see Garrido, Furl et al., 2009, for more details). Herschel was severely 
impaired at this task too; he could recognize the expression in only 65.5% of the 
clips, while controls’ average performance was 89.8% (SD = 5.4%; t = 4.27, p = .
003).
Experiments 6 & 7: facial gender recognition
 We assessed Herschel’s ability to judge the sex of the faces with two tests. 
The first  was the Eyes test described in the previous section (same control 
participants); after choosing the expression of each pair of eyes, participants also 
indicated the sex of the eyes. Herschel was correct on 83.3% of trials, which was 
significantly below the controls’ average of 96.9% (SD = 2.8%; t = 4.61, p = .002).
 The second was the Sex Categorisation task. In this task, 60 upright faces 
and 60 inverted faces are presented for 500 ms in a fixed, randomised order, and 
subjects have to categorise them as male or female. Faces were cropped below the 
eyebrows so participants had to rely on other information. Control data were 
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provided by 9 age-matched participants (age range 52 – 59, mean age = 56.1 years; 
5 female). Performance was measured with A´ (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), a 
bias-free measure that varies between 0.5 and 1.0 with higher scores indicating 
better discrimination ability  between male and female faces. Herschel was mildly 
impaired with the upright faces (A’ = 0.90, controls: A’ = 0.96, SD = 0.02; t  = 2.85, 
p = .022). His results were not significantly different from controls with inverted 
faces (A’ = 0.71; controls: A’ = 0.81, SD = 0.11; t = 0.86, p = .414).
SPECIFICITY OF HERSCHEL’S PROSOPAGNOSIA: FACES VS. 
OBJECTS
 The results of the experiments above demonstrate that Herschel has severe 
face processing problems and suggest they result from deficits to high-level visual 
mechanisms. We next examine whether these deficits affect only face processing or 
extend to other objects.
 According to an influential view of object recognition (Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), objects are first categorized at a basic level 
Figure 2.3. Herschel’s face processing assessment. Herschel was severely impaired 
with: A) face recognition; B) face matching; C) face perception; D) inferring emotional and 
sex information from faces. Error bars show ±1 SD. Stars show significant differences 
(using Crawford’s modified t-test) between performance of Herschel and controls.
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(e.g. a car, a chair) and then identified as a specific exemplar from within that 
category (e.g. my car). We assessed Herschel’s basic level object recognition with a 
reduced set of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) image set and his within-level 
object recognition with three other tests. 
Experiment 8: Basic-level object recognition 
 For most people, identifying objects at a basic level happens 
instantaneously  and effortlessly. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that previous 
tests of basic object recognition suffered from ceiling effects, with normal 
participants consistently achieving maximum scores. These tests may be useful for 
detecting pathological performance, but unfortunately  they are not suitable for 
uncovering finer deficits, potentially affecting individuals that do not report object 
recognition problems in everyday life, such as Herschel. We therefore created a 
more sensitive test for basic object identification to more subtly probe the 
functioning and organization of Herschel’s visual recognition system.
 Basic object recognition is often assessed using the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) picture set. The set  includes 260 black and white line drawings 
of diverse common objects. Based on the norms published in Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980), we selected a subset of 82 pictures, half of which were living 
(e.g. zebra, arm, leaf) and half of which were nonliving (e.g. umbrella, glass, chair) 
objects. Familiarity and complexity were matched across the two groups. To 
increase the difficulty  of this simple recognition task, we presented each stimulus 
for only 50ms, followed by a pattern mask. After the presentation, participants had 
unlimited time to name the object. Seven age-matched participants (4 female, age 
range: 51 - 66 years, M = 56.7 years old) provided control data. 
 Herschel correctly  identified 72.0% of the objects presented, which was 
slightly below the average score for controls (M = 77.0%, SD = 12.7%, range: 
52.4% - 93.9%; the difference was not significant: t = 0.37, p  = .725). A closer 
examination of Herschel’s results revealed that a disproportionate number of errors 
were made for the 15 images depicting mammals, of which he identified only 7 (his 
46.7% performance was below normal range: controls’ M = 81.9%, SD = 14.3%, 
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range: 53.3% - 93.3%; t = 2.30, p = .061), while for the rest of the images his 
performance was in line with that of controls (77.6% compared to 75.9%, SD = 
12.7%, range 52.2% - 94.0%). Furthermore, Herschel was the only one to score 
lower for mammals (46.7%) compared to non-mammals (77.6%), while controls 
scored on average 6.0% better with mammals than non-mammals. Interestingly, for 
most missed items, he seemed to correctly identify the stimuli at a superordinate 
level (as mammals), but mistook, for example, a bear for a cat, a deer for a cow, a 
donkey for a dog, and a zebra for a horse. These results and Herschel’s low score 
on the horse old-new test (but still within normal range, see next experiment) raise 
the possibility that Herschel has a deficit with a particular type of object – 
mammals, even though he is normal with a wide range of other objects.
 Basic level object recognition (e.g. fork vs. spoon) is generally  considered 
to be easier than face recognition and thus, a difference in recognition abilities for 
faces versus basic objects in acquired prosopagnosia may simply reflect a 
difference in cognitive demands rather than face specificity. It has been argued (e.g. 
Damasio et al., 1982) that because face recognition involves discriminating highly 
similar exemplars within the same category (face A vs. face B), it must be 
compared with discrimination of other objects within the same category (e.g. car A 
vs. car B).  
Experiment 9: old-new discrimination of faces vs. non-face objects 
 In the Old-New Recognition Memory Test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005), 
participants first see 10 target items from within the same object category, with 
each item presented twice. They are then presented with 50 items, 20 targets (10 x 
2) and 30 nontargets and must discriminate between targets (old) and nontargets 
(new). We tested Herschel with nine different old-new tests: cars, horses, houses, 
tools, natural landscapes, sunglasses, guns, and two separate face tests (for details 
about the stimuli see Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005). Control data were provided by 
nine age-matched participants (age range 52 – 59, mean age = 56.1 years; 5 
female). 
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 As can be seen in Figure 2.4, Herschel was severely  impaired with Faces 1 
[A’ = .85 compared to average A’ for controls: M  = .95, SD = .03; t = 3.16, p  = .
013) and Faces 2 (A’ = .68 compared to average A’ for controls: M  = .95, SD = .04; 
t = 6.40, p < .001). With horses, he performed at the lower end of the normal range 
(A’ = .86 compared to average A’ for controls = .94, SD = .04; t  = 1.66, p = .135). 
For all the other categories, Herschel’s performance was normal (all ps > .31). His 
normal performance with objects could not be attributed to speed/accuracy trade-
offs (see Figure 2.4).
Experiment 10, 11 & 12: memory for faces vs. hairstyles vs. cars 
 The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) was developed to detect 
prosopagnosia (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) and has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties (Bowles et al., 2009; Wilmer et  al., 2010). In this test, 
participants study  six target faces and then must recognize them in 72 three-option 
forced-choice trials. The trials vary in difficulty, with the three images presenting 
faces in views and lighting conditions that are the same or different to those 
studied. Some trials also had images with visual noise added. A score of 24 
represents chance level performance. Our control participants were 20 age-matched 
individuals (average age = 45.1 years). Herschel had severe difficulties with this 
task, scoring well outside the normal range: 31 correct responses compared to 
controls’ average score of 59.6 (SD = 7.6, see Figure 2.4; t = 3.67, p = .002).
 Using the same procedure as the CFMT, we tested Herschel with two other 
non-face stimulus classes: hairstyles and cars (Figure 2.4). The Cambridge Hair 
Memory Test (CHMT) presented male hairstyles cut  out from head shots from the 
same image set which the faces used in the CFMT were drawn from. Like the 
CFMT, the 72 test items presented the hairstyles in views and lighting that were the 
same and different to those studied and with and without added noise. Control 
participants were 20 undergraduate students from Dartmouth College (15 female, 
age range 18 - 27 years old, M = 19.5 years, SD = 2.1). Herschel’s score was 
comparable to those of the young controls: 44 versus a control average of 50.85 
(SD = 6.05; t = 1.10, p = .283).
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 The Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) replaced faces with cars 
(Dennett et al., 2012). Because males were found to score higher than females on 
this task, we compared Herschel’s performance to that of the 60 males from a 
larger mixed pool of young adults (age range 18 - 35 years, M = 20.63, SD = 2.88). 
As with hairstyles, Herschel’s score with cars was well within the normal range; he 
scored 54, only slightly below the control mean (M = 57.43, SD = 8.31; t = 0.41, p 
= .684). 
Experiment 13, 14 & 15: matching for faces vs. matching for bodies and objects 
The previous experiments indicate that Herschel has a selective impairment 
in remembering previously learned faces. We next tested Herschel on three 
matching tasks with more limited memory demands (Pitcher et al., 2009). In these 
tasks participants see a target image for 500ms, followed by a mosaic mask for 
250ms and a test image for 500ms. Participants decide whether the test and the 
target images are the same or different (50% chance level). To avoid matching 
based on low-level visual cues, the test  image was displayed in a slightly different 
position on the screen than the target. 
 Herschel completed one matching test for bodies, one for objects and one 
for faces (in that order). FantaMorph software (Abrosoft, 2002) was used to make 
ten morph series between 20 pairs of stimuli for each category. Pairs of images 
were then drawn from the morph series to create 80 unique experimental trials for 
each category (40 same, 40 different). Within each block, the trial order was 
randomized. The original faces were created using FaceGen Modeller software 
(Singular Inversions, 2008; http://www.facegen.com); the bodies were created 
using Poser software (Smith Micro, 2009; http://poser.smithmicro.com); the objects 
were selected from a novel objects set available on Michael Tarr’s website (http://
stims.cnbc.cmu.edu/Image%20Databases/TarrLab/Novel%20Objects/). More 
details on the stimuli are provided in Pitcher et al. (2009). Control data came from 
8 age-matched participants (5 female, age range: 52 – 59, mean age = 56.0).
 As can be seen in Figure 2.4, Herschel scored close to chance level for faces 
(53.8% compared to controls M = 74.8%, SD = 5.2%; t = 3.81; p = .007), but 
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within normal range for bodies (73.8% compared to controls M = 73.1%, SD = 
7.9%; t = 0.08) and objects (81.3% compared to controls M = 78.6%, SD = 7.3%; t 
= 0.35). 
 The results in this section indicate that  Herschel’s high-level visual 
problems are largely  restricted to faces. He performed normally with other object 
categories in recognition memory tests and sequential matching tasks. He seemed 
to have difficulties only with basic level recognition of four-legged animals.
Figure 2.4. Specificity of Herschel’s prosopagnosia. He was markedly impaired with 
faces but normal with non-face stimuli in tests of learning, memory and sequential 
matching. Error bars represent ± 1 SD. Stars show significant differences using Crawford’s 
modified t-test.
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GENERAL AND FACE CONFIGURAL PROCESSING
 Abnormal visual general configural processing has been advanced as one of 
the possible causes of prosopagnosia (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). Indeed, many 
APs failed tests of visual closure (e.g. Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Bauer & Trobe, 
1984; Lê et al., 2002; De Renzi, 1986a; De Renzi, 1986b; De Renzi et al., 1991) or 
other tests used to assess configural processing, such as the Navon hierarchical 
letters (e.g. Behrmann & Kimchi, 2003). However, most  of these patients were also 
severely impaired with object recognition, making it  difficult to know whether their 
results were due to a specific deficit in configural processing or to general object 
agnosia. Other researchers (Busigny, Joubert  et  al., 2010) suggested that, while 
configural processing of non-face items may  be spared, configural processing of 
faces is impaired in all cases of AP.
 Visual closure tests are recognition tests that require the ability to 
reconstruct the whole from incomplete parts or shape information. This ability was 
considered by Levine and Calvanio (1989) to rely on general configural processing. 
All tests of visual closure present degraded images of objects or words, either by 
adding visual noise or deleting essential parts. Herschel was tested on four such 
tests, with a modified presentation procedure involving brief presentations so that 
the tasks depended more on normal recognition processes and less on the slow, 
visual problem-solving processes that can be used when stimuli are presented for 
long durations (Farah, 2004). Basic level recognition (Rosch et  al., 1976) was 
required in all tests, and given Herschel’s good performance with most within-class 
object tests we expected he would perform normally  in the tests of visual closure. 
In addition, we tested Herschel’s configural processing of faces with the composite 
test.
Experiment 16, 17 & 18: visual closure 
 The following three tasks are adapted from the Kit of Factor Referenced 
Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976), previously used by Levine 
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and Calvanio (1989) and Duchaine (2000) to assess visual closure in 
prosopagnosics. Pilot studies were conducted to remove the stimuli that were either 
always or never correctly  identified. For the modified tests, the control participants 
were 9 age-matched participants (6 female, age range 47 - 61 years, M = 53.0 years 
old). Two participants who were not native English-speakers (both male, age 47 
and 48) were not run on the words test.
 Modified Gestalt Completion Task (MGCT). The Gestalt  Completion Task 
involves identifying a common object from a group  of black blotches created by 
erasing parts of the object (see Figure 2.5A for examples of stimuli from all visual 
closure tests; images from MGCT are very similar to those from the Street test; 
Street, 1931). Each object was shown for 500ms followed by a pattern mask for 
250ms, after which participants were required to say  the name of the object. The 
original test  had 20 items, but after the pilot test we kept only 16 for the main 
experiment. Herschel was severely  impaired at this task; he was not able to identify 
even one object, while controls averaged 6.2 (SD = 2.5; range: 4 – 12; t  = 2.35, p 
= .046). 
 Modified Concealed Words Task (MCWT). The Concealed Words Task is 
similar to the above test, except objects are replaced with words: participants must 
identify common words from their fragments. The occluded words were shown for 
1500ms, followed by a pattern mask for 250ms, and after the pilot study we kept 
28 of the original 50 stimuli. Again, Herschel was severely impaired, recognizing 
only three words; his score was more than 3 standard deviations below controls (M 
= 14.9, SD = 3.9; range: 10 – 20; t = 2.85, p = .029).
  Modified Snowy Pictures Task (MSPT). In this task participants had to 
identify a line drawing of an object  degraded by  a snow-like pattern. The snowy 
pictures were shown for 1000ms followed by a pattern mask for 250ms, then a 
blank screen for 500ms. There were 24 items in the original version of this test and 
we used 13 of the items after the results of the pilot study. Herschel could name the 
objects presented in only  two snowy pictures, while controls managed to recognize 
an average of 6.0 objects (SD = 2.7; range: 2 – 9; t = 1.41, p = .198).
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Experiment 19: blurred objects
 We created a Modified version of the Blurred Pictures Task (MBPT) 
presented in Viggiano, Costantini, Vannucci, & Righi (2004). The original set of 
stimuli consists of 62 basic level objects, each object with 10 images varying in 
contrast, from extremely blurry to crystal clear. The test trials starts with the most 
blurred image of an object for 250 ms, then the second most blurred image for 250 
ms and so on, until the participant  correctly  identifies the object or all 10 images 
are displayed. After that, the images of the next object are presented. The onset of 
each image is controlled by participants and participants have unlimited time to 
provide an answer. The score is calculated by adding the number of images 
displayed before each object is recognized; higher scores represent worse 
recognition performance. In a pilot  study, we used the same procedure as in 
Experiment 16-18 to select  27 stimuli for our main experiment. The control data 
came from 7 age-matched participants (6 female, age range 48 - 61 years, M = 54.0 
years old). Herschel needed a total of 134 images to recognize the selected objects, 
while controls needed on average 90.6 images (SD = 15.7; range: 73 – 109; t  = 
2.59, p = .041).
 Together (see Figure 2.5B), Herschel’s scores suggest an impaired ability to 
recognize basic objects from impoverished visual stimuli, in contrast to his normal 
performance when nonliving objects were presented unobstructed. His visual 
recognition system appears to be impaired at inferring the actual form of objects 
when this information is incomplete.
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Experiment 20: Navon hierarchical letters
 We also tested Herschel’s configural processing using a Navon task (Navon, 
1977). The Navon hierarchical letters are compound letters consisting of a number 
of small capital Ss or Hs (local letters) configured to form either a global S or H 
(Figure 2.6A). The letters can be consistent (the global and local letters are 
identical) or inconsistent (the global and local letters are different). When asked to 
identify either the local or global letters, participants typically show an advantage 
for global processing (faster identification of global letters) and an interference 
effect (slower identification when global and local letters are inconsistent) (Navon, 
1977; Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta, & Kimchi, 2005). 
 Herschel and 14 control participants (average age = 41.7 years) were tested 
in two back-to-back sessions, and the order of the blocks within a session was 
local, global, global and local for a total of 384 trials. The local and global letters 
were consistent on half the trials and inconsistent on the other half (Figure 2.6A). 
Herschel performed normally  in this task (Figure 2.6B). He was on average faster 
Figure 2.5. Herschel’s performance at visual closure. A) Examples of stimuli presented 
in the visual closure tests: i) MGCT, ii) MCWT, iii) MSPT. The objects/word depicted are: 
shoe, looking and guitar. B) Herschel was impaired at two tests of visual closure and in the 
lower range at the other. He was also impaired at the Blurred images test. Error bars 
represent ± 1 SD.
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for global than for local trials, and he showed the typical global interference effect 
(he also showed a large local interference effect). He was 100% accurate for all 
trials (controls averaged 98%). These results suggest Herschel does not have a 
global processing deficit. 
Figure 2.6. Herschel’s configural processing in the Navon task. A) The compound 
stimuli used in the global-local Navon task. B) Individual RTs (averaged across the two 
sessions) of controls and Herschel on the global – local task. Each circle represents one 
control  participant. Herschel is represented by a red cross. The diagonals in the top figures 
separate participants who showed a global  advantage from those who showed a local 
advantage; the larger the distance to the diagonal the higher the respective advantage. 
The diagonals in the bottom figures represent points for which there is no global/local 
interference. The larger the distance to the diagonal  the higher the global/local 
interference. Herschel showed the largest local  interference, but it was not significantly 
different from controls and his global interference and global  advantage were comparable 
to those of controls. 
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Experiment 21: Composite faces
 Herschel’s configural face processing was assessed with the composite 
faces test (Young et al., 1987). The version we used was adapted from Susilo et al. 
(2010). Composite stimuli were created by combining top halves and bottom 
halves of different faces. Participants were presented pairs of composites 
sequentially (first stimulus for 300ms, blank screen for 400ms, second stimulus for 
300ms) and were asked to say  whether the top halves matched. Half of all trials 
presented aligned composites, with the top halves and bottom halves neatly 
arranged to form new faces, and the other half presented misaligned composites, 
with the top halves shifted to one side (left or right) compared to the bottom halves. 
Holistic face processing should make trials with aligned faces more difficult 
because of automatic processing of bottom halves. The bottom halves in each pair 
were always different, while the top halves were the same (60 trials) or different 
(30 trials). We analyzed only ‘same’ trials because ‘different’ trials are difficult  to 
interpret (Robbins & McKone, 2007). The composite effect  (indicating holistic face 
processing) was measured as the difference in performance between misaligned 
and aligned ‘same’ trials. 
 Herschel was correct on 90% of the misaligned ‘same’ trials and on 70% of 
the aligned ‘same’ trials. Seven controls (age range: 49 – 56 years old, mean age 
54.3, 4 female) averaged 95.2% and 73.3%, respectively. Herschel’s composite 
effect of 20% was not significantly different from controls’ average composite 
effect of 21.9% (t  = 0.11, p  = .919), indicating normal configural/holistic face 
processing.
DISCUSSION
 We have presented a new case of acquired prosopagnosia that displays an 
interesting and surprising cognitive profile. Herschel is a 56-year old British man 
with a degree in astronomy. Following two strokes, he suffered extensive lesions in 
the occipitotemporal cortex, especially severe in the right occipital cortex. Despite 
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his intellect, he was unable to recognize famous faces, remember faces previously 
shown to him, match or order faces based on similarity. Herschel was also impaired 
with facial expressions and facial gender judgments. In contrast, he showed normal 
memory for a wide variety  of objects in several paradigms and normal ability to 
discriminate between highly similar items within a novel object category; he was 
also successful with fine discrimination between human bodies. Furthermore, he 
was normal at  recognizing basic-level objects (with the exception of mammals) in 
brief presentations when the images were intact. Interestingly though, when visual 
noise was added or parts information was removed from the images, Herschel had 
substantial difficulties identifying objects at  the basic level. His general global 
processing (measured with the Navon task) and his holistic face processing 
(measured with the composite test) were normal.
Normal within-class object recognition in prosopagnosia
 Faces play a vital role in our daily interactions, and considerable evidence 
indicates the brain contains mechanisms dedicated to face recognition (Duchaine et 
al., 2006; Farah, 1996; Kanwisher et  al., 1997; McNeil & Warrington, 1993; 
Moscovitch et al., 1997; Tsao et al., 2006). However, not all researchers share this 
view. One alternative possibility  is that the brain uses the same mechanisms to 
recognize both faces and objects (Damasio et al., 1982). This view predicts that 
prosopagnosics will show impairments with any non-face object task of 
comparable complexity and within-class similarity to faces.
 Herschel’s lesions appear to have selectively affected mechanisms used for 
face processing, leaving object recognition largely intact. Experiments 9-15 
showed a clear dissociation between performance with faces and other objects. 
Herschel recognized unfamiliar cars, houses, horses, tools, sunglasses and guns 
normally, but he was severely impaired with faces. He scored within the normal 
range in challenging tasks measuring the ability to distinguish between highly 
similar members of complex natural classes (cars and hairstyles). His within-class 
discrimination of bodies and novel objects created to match faces for complexity 
and similarity was also normal, in stark contrast with his face skills. Herschel 
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demonstrated these dissociations in a variety of paradigms: the Cambridge Memory 
Tests were memory-based, while the matching tests were perceptual in nature. 
These results suggest his severe prosopagnosia is not associated with deficits 
relating to within-level recognition of non-face objects. 
 Herschel’s results mirror results from other patients with acquired 
prosopagnosia who could learn and/or discriminate between visually similar 
exemplars of various, complex non-face objects. PS was normal at  discriminating 
between highly similar novel shapes and between exemplars of common object 
classes - such as cars, dogs, cups, shoes - parametrically  manipulated for similarity 
(Busigny, Graf et al. 2010). GG performed in the normal range for within-category 
discrimination of birds, boats, cars and chairs (Busigny, Joubert et al., 2010). The 
case of WJ reported by McNeil and Warrington (1993) is also quite remarkable; 
following the stroke that led to severe prosopagnosia, he became a farmer and 
could accurately identify his own sheep and learn unfamiliar sheep from face 
photographs. The normal performance at fine-grained discrimination of non-face 
objects or non-human faces displayed by  these cases support the specificity  of 
mechanisms implicated in human face processing.
Normal basic-level recognition of nonliving objects
 As noted in the introduction, it  is possible that the normal basic-level object 
recognition reported for many cases of prosopagnosia in the literature was due to 
ceiling effects in basic-level tests. To avoid ceiling effects, Herschel was asked to 
identify objects from line drawings presented for only  50 ms, which made the task 
challenging even for control participants. Herschel’s performance was in line with 
controls, with the exception of mammals, of which he identified only 47% 
(controls identified 82% of mammals on average). His results show a striking 
resemblance to patient RM (Sergent & Signoret, 1992), who was also severely 
impaired at recognizing ‘feline animals’ (50% success rate) while being perfectly 
normal with other objects (success rate 96%). Selective deficits with living but not 
with nonliving objects have been noted to co-occur with prosopagnosia before (LH: 
Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Farah, McMullen, & Meyer, 1991; MB: Farah et al., 
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1991). The living-nonliving distinction has also been reported in many cases with 
semantic deficits (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Pillon & d’Honincthun, 2011; 
Warrington & Shallice, 1984), but Herschel’s deficits may be due to category-
selective visual problems. The existence of such a visual deficit would fit  well with 
functional imaging studies demonstrating that  lateral regions of the ventral visual 
stream show a stronger response to living objects compared to tools (Chao, Haxby, 
& Martin, 1999; Noppeney, Price, Penny, & Friston, 2006). Future testing of his 
visual and semantic abilities with living objects will address this possibility.
Configural processing in prosopagnosia – questions and an interesting 
hypothesis
 Another goal of our study was to examine Levine and Calvanio’s (1989) 
suggestion that prosopagnosia is generated by  a deficit in general-purpose 
configural processing. Face perception has been shown to rely  on configural 
processing, but  this could be face-specific configural processing or configural 
processing applied to many visual categories (Farah, 2004; Behrmann, Avidan et 
al., 2005; Levine & Calvanio, 1989). Here we tested Herschel on three modified 
visual closure tasks used by Levine and Calvanio (1989) to measure general 
configural processing, which they  defined as the ability to represent and recognize 
an object based on overall shape rather than the individual features. We also added 
a fourth test  looking at Herschel’s ability  to recognize objects from blurred images. 
His configural face processing was examined with the composite faces test. 
 Herschel’s normal performance on most within-category  object tests led us 
to believe that he would score normally on the tests of visual closure, but he proved 
to be severely impaired in all tests: with objects, as well as with words; with 
images of objects occluded, obscured by visual noise or blurred (all his scores were 
significantly different  from controls, with the exception of Snowy Pictures; in this 
test he recognized only  two images). His marked impairment at visual closure 
mirrors that of patient LH (Levine & Calvanio, 1989) and several other 
prosopagnosics (De Renzi, Faglioni, & Spinnler, 1968; Benton & van Allen, 1972; 
Bauer & Trobe, 1984). All these seem to point towards a general impairment with 
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configural processing, consistent  with Levine and Calvanio’s (1989) hypothesis. 
However, no configural processing deficit was apparent in the Navon task; 
Herschel showed typical global advantage and global interference effects, 
challenging the generality of his configural problems. His normal Navon results 
mirror those of PS, a well-documented case of acquired prosopagnosia with face-
selective deficits (Busigny & Rossion, 2011). One interpretation of this dissociation 
in performance on tests thought to measure configural processing is that there are 
two types of general configural processing: one that requires integration of visible 
local features and the other that requires integration of visible and occluded local 
features. In one case, there is no physical difference between the information 
available for the global versus local constructs; in the other case, the global 
construct requires filling-in. 
 While Herschel’s prosopagnosia does not seem to be a result of deficits with 
general configural processing, it  could still be linked to a face-specific configural 
processing deficit. However, Herschel displayed a normal sized composite face 
effect, providing preliminary evidence that  this is not the case. Further studies are 
needed to more firmly  establish this finding as it would be inconsistent with a 
suggestion in Busigny, Joubert  et  al. (2010) that AP cannot occur without abnormal 
holistic face processing. 
 It is conceivable that Herschel’s poor results at the visual closure tests may 
be due to his left and right quadrantanopia; damaged upper visual fields may have 
caused Herschel to see fewer parts of the objects when they were presented for 250 
ms. Considering that available visual information had already been reduced to the 
minimum necessary to allow recognition, further stimulus loss may have made the 
tasks extremely challenging for Herschel because of low-level deficits rather than 
recognition deficits. However, we believe this is not the case; Herschel was still 
unable to recognize the objects from the Gestalt Completion test and the Snowy 
Pictures test  when we allowed him unlimited viewing time, which presumably 
could compensate for his visual field defect. He could not  ‘see’ the objects in the 
images even after we named them.
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 Another possibility  is that the type of configural processing deficits that 
Herschel has (and that is apparent only  in visual closure tests) disproportionately 
affects perception of living, dynamic objects, such as faces and animals (for which 
Herschel had different degrees of impairment). This may occur because Herschel 
cannot integrate the non-nameable features that characterise living things into a 
coherent whole (Levine & Calvanio, 1989) or because of other aspects specific to 
the perception of living things. For example, constructing a flexible representation 
necessary  to accommodate the dynamics of the second-order spatial relations 
between the features of a particular living item (e.g. a face must be recognized even 
when facial expressions modify  the face parts and their spatial layout) may require 
some ability to correct the representation so it can be matched to memory 
representations. The absence of this ability would compromise recognition of living 
items, but would not be noticeable in normal object recognition tests, because no 
correction is required. Spatial relations between individual features of a nonliving 
object are expected to stay  the same and thus a static mental representation 
(allowing for differences in orientation, viewpoint etc.) would be fine. The deficit 
would become apparent only when identification depends on reconstructing the 
spatial configuration of individual parts from incomplete images, as is the case in 
visual closure tests. It is also possible that Herschel’s lesions disrupted lower-level 
processes only required when any stimulus is degraded, regardless of its animacy.
 Herschel’s abnormal results in visual closure tests suggest impairments in 
the system responsible for object perception, impairments which were not apparent 
in object recognition tests with unaltered images of non-mammal objects 
(experiment 8). This raises an interesting possibility: within-class recognition or 
discrimination (for which Herschel was normal, see experiments 9, 11, 12, 15) may 
not require intact basic level recognition. In other words, visual recognition of 
objects appears not to follow the hierarchy implied by models of object processing 
(e.g. Rosch et al., 1976), with successful within-level discrimination necessarily 
dependent on normal basic level recognition stage. Perhaps only certain aspects of 
basic level recognition are critical for the within-level recognition, which may still 
function normally despite impairments affecting basic level recognition. Farah, 
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Levinson and Klein (1995) argued that prosopagnosic LH, impaired with visual 
closure (Levine & Calvanio, 1989) and basic object recognition (Levine et al., 
1980), similarly showed normal within-level discrimination. However, LH was 
tested with only one category of non-face objects (glasses) and floor effects might 
have masked subtle impairments (he scored 63% with glasses while controls 
averaged 69%). In contrast, Herschel showed substantially  better recognition of 
houses, horses, tools, sunglasses, guns (experiment 9), cars (experiments 9 and 12), 
hairstyles (experiment 11), bodies and novel objects (experiment 15) than of faces 
(experiments 9, 10, 13) in tests whose difficulty  levels for faces and objects were 
well matched. Therefore, we believe Herschel is the first well-documented case to 
have intact within-object with compromised basic level recognition. 
 
CONCLUSION
 
 The marked contrast in Herschel’s performance with faces and non-face 
objects represents additional support for at least partly distinct processing for faces. 
While Herschel had difficulties in recognizing objects at a basic level under 
difficult conditions, he was very good at learning and discriminating between 
similar exemplars of several non-face object classes. His basic level recognition of 
objects was also fine with the notable exception of mammals. Herschel’s 
prosopagnosia does not appear to relate to a general or face-specific configural 
processing; even though Herschel failed to “see” objects beyond the sum of their 
(incomplete) individual parts in the visual closure tests, he showed normal 
configural processing in the Navon task and in the composite faces test. His 
atypical functional activation across the whole cortical face-selective network 
precludes us from linking his deficits to a particular face area.
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2.2. NORMAL ACQUISITION OF EXPERTISE WITH A NOVEL 
OBJECT CLASS IN TWO CASES OF ACQUIRED PROSOPAGNOSIA 
Introduction
 Cognitive neuroscientists generally  agree that the visual mechanisms 
involved in face recognition are different from those involved in most other types 
of object recognition. However, the question of how specialised these mechanisms 
are is a long-running debate. Are the mechanisms specific to faces, or are they  also 
engaged by  objects sharing certain properties with faces? The expertise hypothesis 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) argues for the latter possibility 
by suggesting that the mechanisms involved in face processing operate on all 
objects with which an observer has had extensive experience.
 Although some studies have examined experts with real objects (Diamond 
& Carey, 1986; Tanaka & Curran, 2001; Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005), much of the 
research arguing for the expertise view has involved participants trained in the 
laboratory to become experts with “greebles”, an artificial class of objects designed 
to place face-like demands on recognition mechanisms (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Gauthier et al., 1998). The greeble training procedure is relatively  fast and simple, 
which makes it an attractive method to investigate the acquisition of expertise. 
After seven to ten sessions of learning to identify individual greebles as well as the 
families or gender of the greebles, most participants become proficient at 
recognizing the greebles and reach the criterion claimed to indicate expertise - 
response times for recognizing individual greebles which are comparable to 
response times for recognizing greeble families or gender (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). 
Importantly, studies with greebles allow participants to be tested before and after 
becoming experts. Several studies claimed that  greeble processing elicited face-like 
perceptual (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1999; Tarr, 2003) and neural 
(Gauthier et al., 2000) effects after but not before training, therefore challenging 
the face-specificity hypothesis.
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  A fundamental prediction of the expertise account of face processing is that 
individuals with severe face recognition deficits should also be impaired at 
acquiring expertise with other objects, such as greebles. We tested this prediction in 
two cases of acquired prosopagnosia, Florence and Herschel. Herschel’s results are 
doubly relevant to the expertise account because he has atypical functioning of the 
fusiform face area (FFA), an area selectively responsive to faces but  which has 
been claimed to also mediate expertise more generally  - including greeble expertise 
(Gauthier et al., 1999; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; McGugin et al., 2012).
 Florence and Herschel were trained in a standard greeble procedure 
(Duchaine et al., 2004; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Rossion et al., 2002), involving 
eight sessions during which participants learned and were tested on 20 greebles 
belonging to five families. To ensure that this procedure elicited impaired 
performance in Florence and Herschel when faces rather than greebles were used, 
we also created a similar training procedure with computer-generated faces which 
was matched for difficulty with the greeble training.  
Materials and Methods
Prosopagnosic participants
 Florence is a right-handed female nurse from Canada who was 29 years old 
at the time of testing (born 1982). She was previously described in Fox et al. (2011) 
as R-AT1. In 2006 she became prosopagnosic after a resection of her right 
amygdala and right hippocampus to control epilepsy. Neuropsychological 
assessment and functional MRI were conducted in 2007 (see Fox et al., 2011, for 
details). Florence performed normally on a battery of cognitive and visual tests. 
Despite her face impairments, a static face localizer (faces - objects) revealed face 
activation bilaterally  in all face-selective areas: fusiform face area (FFA), occipital 
face area (OFA) and superior temporal sulcus (STS). In 2008 she underwent a 
second operation that removed most  of her right anterior temporal lobe, sparing the 
areas previously  found to be face-selective (Figure 2.7). Florence has noted no 
visual changes since her second surgery and her normal performance on tasks 
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described below suggest that her early visual processes were unaffected by the 
second procedure.
 Herschel is a right-handed British male with a degree in astronomy. He was 
55 years old at the time of testing (born 1956). In 2008, following two strokes that 
lesioned mainly his right  occipitotemporal cortex and right hippocampus (Figure 
2.7), he became severely prosopagnosic and lost the upper left visual field and a 
large part of his upper right visual field. A dynamic functional localizer (Pitcher et 
al., 2011) found atypical face activation bilaterally  in all core face areas (except left 
OFA which could not be identified), with lower percent  signal changes (PSCs) 
compared to controls. Herschel’s activation to objects in the lateral occipital cortex 
bilaterally  appeared to be normal (see Rezlescu, Pitcher, & Duchaine, 2012, for 
fMRI details and neuropsychological assessment). 
 The tests confirming Florence and Herschel’s prosopagnosia are 
summarised in Table 2.2 (see Section 2.1 for test details). In addition to face 
perception and face memory deficits, Florence shows mixed performance with 
object recognition. Herschel’s impairments however are largely restricted to faces. 
Figure 2.7. Brain lesions of Florence and Herschel. Structural scans are shown in 
radiological orientation (right hemisphere on the left).
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Control participants
 Control data were provided by two age-matched groups of six participants 
each. Florence’s control participants were between 27 and 32 years old (M = 29.3; 
five female). Herschel’s control participants were between 47 and 56 years old (M 
= 52.3; four female).
Stimuli
 The greeble stimuli were selected from those used by Gauthier and Tarr 
(1997). Greebles share a common first-order relational configuration between parts 
(Figure 2.8). They can be identified at the family level based on their overall shape 
or at the individual level based on the sizes and shapes of their parts. 
Table 2.2. Face and object perception for Florence and Herschel. Impaired scores are 
underlined. Herschel’s problems are largely face-specific; note that when compared with 
age-matched participants (see section 2.1), his scores at horse old/new recognition and 
body sequential matching are not impaired. CFPT=Cambridge Face Perception Test; 
CFMT=Cambridge Face Memory Test; CHMT=Cambridge Hair Memory Test; 
CCMT=Cambridge Car Memory Test. CCMT norms are for male participants; female 
norms are lower (Dennett et al., 2012). Scores for Old/New recognition are expressed as 
A’ which is unbiased nonparametric measure of sensitivity.
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 The face stimuli (Figure 2.8) were selected based on a pixel-based 
similarity matrix (i.e. highly similar faces were preferred) from a large set of 
computer-generated male faces produced by FaceGen Modeller software (Singular 
Inversions, 2008). 
Procedure
 The greeble training procedure was modelled after that used by Gauthier 
and Tarr (2002) and involved eight sessions, one per day. In the first  four sessions, 
20 individual greebles and the five families to which they belonged (four greebles 
per family) were gradually learned. Families had four-letter names each starting 
with a different vowel, and greebles had four-letter names each starting with a 
different consonant. Successful learning was tested with naming and verification 
trials. In naming trials, participants were asked to identify individual greebles by 
pressing the key corresponding to the first letter of their names. In verification 
trials, participants were presented with a name, which could be an individual or a 
family name, followed by a greeble, and asked to indicate if the name and the 
greeble matched. Participants received auditory feedback for incorrect answers. 
The final four sessions were testing sessions and included only naming and 
verification trials. Each learning session lasted about 60 minutes whereas each 
testing session lasted about 20 minutes. Sessions were completed in consecutive 
days (one control participant had a one-day break between two sessions). 
    
Figure 2.8. Ten of the 20 greebles and faces learned during the training experiment. 
Individual greebles belong to one of five families (in parentheses) and could be identified at 
the individual level and at the family level. Faces were identified only at the individual level. 
Faces and greebles had abstract four-letter names starting with a consonant (family 
names started with a vowel).
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  A similar training procedure was created with computer-generated faces 
instead of greebles, with the difference that  faces were not grouped into families 
(thus there were no family learning or testing trials). In pilot testing we adjusted the 
difficulty of the face training procedure to match that of the greeble training. 
Sessions one to four lasted approximately 45 minutes, while sessions five to eight 
lasted approximately 15 minutes.
 Herschel, Florence and her control group  completed first the greeble 
training and then the face training. Herschel’s control group completed first the 
face training and then the greebles. All participants completed the two training 
sessions with a break of at least four weeks in between.
Results
 To compare performance within and between participants, we computed an 
average score for the naming trials and an average score for the verification trials 
for the last four sessions. We selected the last four sessions because these were the 
testing-only sessions designed to measure recognition of all previously learned 
stimuli. Because participants are expected to become experts during the later 
sessions, this is also where we should observe a separation between controls and 
prosopagnosics in terms of performance according to the expertise hypothesis. 
Differences between prosopagnosics and controls were evaluated for statistical 
significance using Crawford’s modified t-test for single case studies (Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2002).
Performance in testing sessions
 As expected, Florence and Herschel had severe difficulties learning faces 
(Figure 2.9). Florence responded correctly on only 41% of the naming trials and 
58% of the verification trials (50% was chance level for verification trials). 
Herschel scored 30% for naming and 68% for verification. All scores were 
substantially  and significantly lower than controls’ average scores (significance 
levels are shown in Table 2.3). 
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Figure 2.9. Individual scores during the greeble and face training procedures 
(testing sessions are shaded). Herschel (in blue) and Florence (in red) were severely 
impaired at learning faces but showed normal learning of greebles. The naming scores 
were scaled to reflect the varying difficulty of each session, corresponding to the total 
number of individuals learned up  to that point (participants were tested for five individuals 
in session one, ten in session two, 15 in session three and 20 thereafter). The naming 
convention for controls reflect gender (M or F) and age. Each prosopagnosic was 
compared to his/her age-matched control group. 
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  In contrast to their performance with faces, both Florence and Herschel 
showed greeble learning curves comparable to controls’ curves (Figure 2.9). 
Florence’s average performance for the last four sessions, after all 20 greebles and 
their families were learned, was 88% for naming, 97% for verification individual, 
and 97% for verification family. Herschel’s average scores were 75%, 91% and 
97%, respectively. These scores were not significantly  different from 
controls’ (Table 2.3). 
 Florence and Herschel’s better performance with greebles than faces cannot 
be attributed to task difficulty. If anything, controls’ data suggest faces were easier 
to learn than greebles. Paired samples t-tests showed no significant differences 
between Herschel’s controls’ average scores at naming (88.5% and 87.8%, 
respectively; p  = .784) or verification (96.9% and 95.8%, respectively, p = .115) 
trials with faces and individual greebles. Florence’s group fared better with faces 
than greebles at both naming (78.0%  versus 70.3%, p = .045) and verification 
(91.% versus 87.2%, p = .002). 
 The dissociation between face learning (impaired) and greeble learning 
(normal) for Florence and Herschel was confirmed by the Bayesian Standardized 
Difference Test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2007), which estimates the percentage of 
control population exhibiting a more extreme difference between two tasks than a 
patient. With naming and with verification, for both Florence and Herschel these 
estimates were below 0.01%. 
 
Table 2.3. Average scores for the last four session. These are the testing sessions, 
after all greebles/faces were presented. P-values were calculated using Crawford’s t-test 
for single case studies (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). Impaired scores are in bold and 
underlined.
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Response times
 To check whether their normal accuracy could be explained by  speed-
accuracy  trade-offs, we compared Florence and Herschel’s response times (RTs) to 
controls’ RTs. For each participant, session, and trial type (individual naming, 
individual verification and family  verification), we computed a mean RT for correct 
responses for ‘hit’ trials (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). Means were computed after 
excluding trials with RTs more than two standard deviations away from the mean to 
remove outliers and prevent statistical equivalence due to high variability  (Figure 
2.10). For the testing sessions (5-8), Herschel’s average RT for individual 
verification trials was 1882 ms (controls: M = 1480 ms, SD = 527 ms; p = .512) 
and for family  verification trials was 1690 ms (controls: M = 1288 ms, SD = 801 
ms; p = .661). Florence’s average RTs were 1241 ms for individual verification 
(controls: M  = 1017 ms, SD = 194 ms; p  = .334) for and 890 ms for family 
verification (controls: M  = 814 ms; SD = 153 ms; p = .663). For naming trials, 
Herschel averaged 3428 ms (controls: M = 2074 ms, SD = 607 ms; p  = .094), while 
Florence averaged 2128 ms (controls: M = 1619 ms, SD = 158ms; p  = .030). Note 
that naming RTs are slower and have limited informational value because 
participants need to find the right key (therefore they reflect more than perceptual 
differences between participants). In the face learning task, Florence and Herschel 
were substantially slower for both verification (2534 ms and 2978 ms, respectively) 
and naming (4441 ms and 6559 ms, respectively), while controls‘ RTs remained 
comparable to those recorded with greebles (e.g. Florence’s controls: 938 ms and 
1747 ms, respectively).
Expertise criterion
 According to Gauthier and Tarr (1997), participants undergoing greeble 
training are considered greeble experts when average RTs for correct responses at 
individual-level recognition, initially  slower, become comparable (i.e. not 
statistically  different) to average RTs for correct  responses at family-level 
recognition. Herschel reached this criterion in sessions 6, 7 and 8 (p = .748, p = .
946, and p = . 469), while Florence reached the criterion in the final session (p = . 
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113) (Figure 2.10). As a more stringent criterion for expertise, Bukach et al. (2012) 
recommended adding an extra constraint: the absolute difference between family 
and individual level response times should be lower than 95 ms (corresponding to a 
95% interval of response times differences from a previous greeble study, Gauthier 
& Tarr, 2002). Herschel’s RTs satisfied this criterion in sessions six and seven (54 
ms and -16ms, respectively). Florence did not meet this criterion.
Figure 2.10. Response times during the greeble training procedure. Testing sessions 
are shaded. Herschel and Florence’s displayed comparable RTs to their age-matched 
control groups, indicating normal greeble learning cannot be explained by speed-accuracy 
trade-offs. Most importantly, in three (Herschel) and one (Florence) of the final four 
sessions, there were no significant differences between individual and family verification 
RTs. According to Gauthier and Tarr (1997), the absence of a difference indicates that 
Herschel and Florence were greeble experts. ns = difference not significant. The green 
ticks mark sessions where the absolute difference between individual and family level hit 
trials was below 95ms, the most stringent expertise criterion (Bukach et al., 2012). 
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Discussion
 Our results demonstrate a clear dissociation between greeble learning and 
face learning. Greeble recognition after training has been claimed to engage the 
same mechanisms used for face processing (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 
1999; Rossion et al., 2002), and this predicts lesions impairing face recognition 
will also disrupt greeble recognition after training. Here we show this is not the 
case: two acquired prosopagnosics performed normally in a standard greeble 
training procedure while exhibiting severe impairments with a comparable face 
task. Additionally, both Florence and Herschel showed reaction time effects which 
are putative markers of greeble expertise.
 Prosopagnosic individuals undergoing the greeble training procedure have 
been previously reported, but these studies had limitations that complicated their 
interpretation. Two acquired cases were unable to develop greeble expertise 
(Behrmann, Marotta et al., 2005; Bukach et al., 2012), but they also suffered from 
object recognition deficits (Bukach et al., 2012; Gauthier et al., 1999), which 
makes their results unclear. They  may have failed with greeble training because 
they  have object recognition problems rather than a disruption of expert 
mechanisms. Consistent with this interpretation, the reported cases were impaired 
with greeble recognition from the beginning of training, whereas deficits limited to 
mechanisms necessary for expert processing would be expected to become 
apparent only in later sessions after control participants have acquired expertise. 
Edward, a developmental prosopagnosic with intact object recognition, performed 
normally in greeble training (Duchaine et al., 2004), but his performance with 
greebles was not contrasted with performance on a parallel face training paradigm 
so it is not clear that the procedure would elicit deficits in Edward if faces were 
used. We based our study  on individuals whose severe agnosias were mostly  face-
specific, both showing normal processing of several other object categories 
(especially Herschel; see 1B), including sequential matching of novel objects (not 
greebles). This made them excellent candidates to reveal a dissociation between 
face expertise and greeble expertise. Furthermore, the direct comparison between 
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performance with greeble learning (normal) and face learning (impaired) should 
offset concerns recently  raised by  expertise researchers who noted: “In particular, 
evidence for separate mechanisms [for faces and greebles] would require a 
demonstration that [prosopagnosics] could learn to individuate 20 greebles, but be 
unable to learn to individuate 20 faces using the same task” (Bukach et al., 2012, p. 
290). 
 Our findings have implications for the debate concerning the specificity of 
the mechanisms that carry  out face processing. The face-specific hypothesis posits 
the existence of brain mechanisms specialised for face perception, and supports this 
claim with behavioural (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Yin, 1969; Young et al., 1987), 
neurophysiological (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Tsao et al., 2006) and patient (see 
review in Busigny, Joubert et al., 2010) studies. In contrast, the expertise 
hypothesis argues that, rather than being face-specific, mechanisms underlying face 
processing support within-category recognition of objects for which individuals 
have acquired substantial expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997).  The current study  provides evidence that undermines a set of related claims 
based on greeble research. If we assume, like proponents of the greeble framework 
do, that i) the greeble training procedure can develop expertise with a novel class of 
objects and that  this expertise is comparable to real-life expertise with certain 
objects such as faces; and ii) the ‘expertise’ criterion (i.e. similar response times for 
identification at the family and individual level) is a valid indicator of acquired 
expertise, then the dissociation between face expertise and greeble expertise is 
strong evidence against the expertise hypothesis. 
  Herschel’s normal performance with greebles is especially interesting, 
given claims about the neural basis of greeble expertise. It has been suggested that 
the fusiform face area (FFA), a functionally-defined region that responds more 
strongly to faces than to other stimuli (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Pitcher et al., 2011), 
is the locus of mechanisms mediating expertise with all objects, including faces, 
greebles and cars (Gauthier et  al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 2000; McGugin et al., 
2012). Atypical functioning of the FFA, as seen in Herschel, would thus be 
expected to interfere with acquisition of expertise. Contrary to this prediction, 
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Herschel’s normal greeble learning suggests greeble expertise is not dependent on 
the FFA and the neural mechanisms supporting face expertise and greeble expertise 
differ. This is consistent with previous research that failed to find a correlation 
between activation in the FFA and the expertise level with novel objects (Kung, 
Peissig, & Tarr, 2007; Moore, Cohen, & Ranganath, 2006; Op de Beeck, Baker, 
DiCarlo, & Kanwisher, 2006; Yue, Bosco, & Biederman, 2006) or real objects 
(Grill-Spector et al., 2004). In two of these studies (Op de Beeck et  al., 2006; Yue 
et al., 2006), changes associated with the acquisition of expertise seemed to occur 
in the lateral occipital complex, a region that showed normal activation in 
Herschel. A small but  significant effect of car and bird expertise on FFA activation 
was reported by Gauthier et al. (2000), however the effect extended beyond FFA. 
More recently, behavioural expertise was shown to correlate with FFA activation to 
cars (McGugin et al., 2012), but the effect was not specific to face-selective voxels 
(at least not in the right FFA). Other imaging findings apparently supporting the 
expertise hypothesis may  have been confounded by an imprecise localization of the 
FFA (Harley et al., 2009; Gauthier et al., 1999), particular measures of activation 
and statistical interpretation of results (Gauthier et al., 1999) or attentional bias (Xu 
et al., 2005). 
 If one believes that the greeble framework can produce rapid expertise, then 
our results conclusively reject the rapid expertise hypothesis. However, one needs 
to be cautious in extending these findings to expertise with real objects, which 
develops over a much longer period. Even though some of the initial claims made 
by proponents of the long-term expertise were disproved (face inversion effects 
that take ten years to develop; Carey, 1992) or failed to replicate (the face-like 
inversion effects for dogs in dog show judges; Diamond & Carey, 1986), it could 
be that the rapid expertise purportedly acquired in greeble training and the 
extended expertise that might be acquired for everyday objects rely on distinct 
mechanisms. Neuropsychological evidence though suggests face processing 
dissociates from long-term object expertise as well. After brain lesions causing 
prosopagnosia, WJ learned to distinguish tens of sheep (McNeil & Warrington, 
1993), while RM retained his superior ability to recognise car makes and models 
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(Sergent & Signoret, 1992). Conversely, several brain-damaged individuals lost 
their expertise with non-face objects while their face recognition remained normal 
(CK: Moscovitch et al., 1997; MX: Assal, Favre, & Anderes, 1984).
 To conclude, our current findings add to the evidence supporting the face 
specificity hypothesis. Acquired prosopagnosics who are able to learn greebles 
provide straightforward evidence that  face and greeble recognition rely  on different 
mechanisms. Claims from the greeble literature about common functional and 
neural substrates underlying faces and expert objects recognition should therefore 
be reconsidered.
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Chapter 3
FACIAL TRAIT PERCEPTION IN ACQUIRED 
PROSOPAGNOSIA
 In Chapter 1.2 I presented three models of face perception and their take, 
explicit  or implied, on face impressions. The Bruce and Young (1986) model 
proposed a functional division between mechanisms implicated in identity 
recognition and mechanisms involved in all other aspects of face perception. 
According to this model, facial trait perception dissociates from face recognition, 
but not from perception of emotional expressions or sex (although the authors 
allowed for further divisions within the functional components responsible for non 
identity-specific aspects). The Haxby model (Haxby et al., 2000) included a core 
system and an extended system for face perception. In the core system, there is a 
functional and neural division between mechanisms involved in processing 
invariant facial aspects (for example, those leading to identity recognition) and 
mechanisms for processing changeable facial aspects (e.g. perception of eye gaze 
and facial expressions). From the core system, some information about changeable 
aspects is passed on to the part  of the extended system for face perception that 
mediates emotion recognition (amygdala/insula/limbic lobe). In the Haxby model 
there is no explicit  reference to person impressions, but one may infer these are 
carried out along the same route leading to emotion recognition. In this case, trait 
perception will dissociate from identity  recognition but not from expression 
recognition. The third model presented (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) is an explicit 
model of trait perception. According to this model, face evaluations can be reduced 
to two main dimensions best approximated by trustworthiness and dominance 
judgments. More importantly for our purposes, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) 
suggested there are no dedicated mechanisms for perception of facial 
trustworthiness or dominance. Their overgeneralisation hypotheses stated that 
trustworthiness judgments are by-products of mechanisms involved in perception 
of happy and angry facial expressions, and that dominance judgments are by-
products of mechanisms for face-based sex recognition. 
 Overall, these three models imply that i) face evaluations and facial identity 
recognition rely on distinct functional and neural routes, and ii) face evaluations are 
performed by the mechanisms responsible for happy/angry expression recognition 
(the trustworthiness dimension) and sex recognition (the dominance dimension). 
Previous behavioural, computational, imaging and patient studies summarised in 
Section 1.2 revealed a mixed picture with regards to these two hypotheses. The 
goal of the studies presented here was to test these hypotheses in four individuals 
with acquired prosopagnosia. A necessary  interim step was to create a new battery 
of tests of face perception.
 In Section 3.1 I present the development of ten new tests for perception of 
facial trustworthiness, attractiveness, aggressiveness, happiness and anger (the 
reasons for measuring aggressiveness rather than dominance are presented at the 
beginning of section 3.3). These tests, together with other tests already available in 
the literature, ensured the results are robust and that  performance across different 
aspects is measured homogeneously.
 Section 3.2 tests whether face evaluations and face recognition are 
dissociable. Four individuals with severe face recognition deficits were assessed 
with multiple tests for perception of face trustworthiness, attractiveness and 
aggressiveness. The prediction was that normal trait perception can occur in the 
absence of identity recognition. 
 In Section 3.3 I extended the investigation of one acquired prosopagnosic to 
include multiple tests for face-based perception of happy  and angry  expressions, 
and of sex. The aim was to test the overgeneralisation hypotheses in facial trait 
perception. The prediction was that  normal trustworthiness and aggressiveness 
judgments do not depend on intact mechanisms for facial expression and sex 
recognition. Evidence supporting this hypothesis would be inconsistent with the 
Todorov model.
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3.1. TEN NEW TESTS OF FACE PERCEPTION
Rationale 
 Previous studies examining facial trait perception used ratings (e.g. Oosterhof 
& Todorov, 2008; Quadflieg et al., 2012; Todorov & Duchaine, 2008). Participants 
were shown one face at a time and asked to rate it on a Likert scale for a particular 
trait. To increase the robustness of our findings and facilitate comparison with other 
aspects of face perception, we wanted to assess trait perception with multiple tests 
that would have similar format across all dimensions of interest. For example, 
testing the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis in trait  perception required a 
comparison between perceptions of facial trustworthiness and of happy  and angry 
expressions. However, no suitable tests were available for individual expression 
perception; some of the existing perceptual tests of expression may  be used to 
derive a score for each expression, but the interpretation of these scores is limited 
by the reduced number of trials and interaction with other expressions (Pitcher, 
Garrido, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2008). Furthermore, these tests were not suitable to 
adapt for examining trait perception.
 Therefore we developed a new battery of tests that were specifically  designed 
to overcome shortcomings in previous comparisons of different facial deficits in 
prosopagnosia (Calder & Young, 2005). First, the level of difficulty of each test 
was adjusted to avoid floor and ceiling effects that can mask subtle impairments. 
Second, tests of different facial aspects had identical format and task demands. 
Third, within each format, tests of different  facial aspects were comparable in 
difficulty. Fourth, all tests generated substantial inversion effects (i.e., a larger drop 
in discrimination performance for upside-down faces than for upside-down objects 
that is characteristic of face processing, Yin, 1969).
 Our new battery of tests consists of two formats: a sorting task modelled after 
the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT - Duchaine et  al., 2007) and a 
categorical Odd-One-Out task. Both formats were used to assess perception of 
trustworthiness, attractiveness, aggressiveness, happy expression, and angry 
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expression. Because facial trait judgments are not intrinsically  objective, the 
judgments of control and prosopagnosic participants were compared to the 
consensus judgments of a large group of people with normal face perception 
(Adolphs et al., 1998; Todorov & Duchaine, 2008).
Face stimuli
 Face stimuli were selected from three databases. For the trait tests, we used 
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF - Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 
1998) and a subset from Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database (GUFD - Burton, 
White, & McNeill, 2010). For the expression tests, we used a subset from the 
Radboud Face Database (RFD - Langner et al., 2010).
 The KDEF set contains 70 individuals, photographed from five angles while 
displaying a neutral expression and six other emotional expressions. We selected 
the neutral frontal head-shots of 66 individuals (33 female) that were used by 
Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). To remove the potential confounding effects of hair 
and skin colour on trait judgments (Stephen et  al., 2011; Swami et al., 2008), face 
images were converted to grayscale and cropped to show only  the internal features 
(eyes, nose, mouth) (see Figure 3.1). These faces were rated for trustworthiness by 
140 online participants, and for aggressiveness by 48 online participants, recruited 
through Amazon’s online labour market called Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). 
Results from web-based samples of participants have been shown to have 
comparable means, standard deviations and internal reliability as those from lab-
based samples (Germine et al., 2012). The ratings were on a scale from 1 to 9. 
Mean trait ratings for female and male faces were comparable (all ps > .19). 
Trustworthiness ratings were negatively correlated with aggressiveness ratings (r = 
-.64, p < .001). For each trait, we normalised the scores per participant and 
computed the average z-score for each face. These average z-scores were then used 
as an indicator of the perceived trustworthiness and aggressiveness of each face. 
Because attractiveness ratings were not collected, we used the average ratings 
published by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). Note that, for trustworthiness, the 
current ratings of grayscale cropped faces correlated highly with the ratings of un-
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cropped colour faces obtained by Oosterhof & Todorov (2008). For female faces, 
the correlation was .80 (p < .001), while for male faces it was .62 (p < .001). 
Therefore, we considered the attractiveness ratings of colour un-cropped faces to 
be a good proxy for the perceived attractiveness of grayscale cropped faces. 
 The GUFD set contains 303 individuals, each with three frontal head-shots 
taken with different  cameras. We selected 200 images (half female) of young to 
middle aged Caucasians that  had closed mouth, full face visible (i.e., no hair 
covering the eyes), and no facial hair (for male). Images were converted to 
grayscale and faces were cropped to show only the internal features (eyes, nose, 
mouth) (see Figure 3.2 for examples). We then asked 150 Mechanical Turk 
participants (MTurks) to rate these faces on a scale from 1 to 9 for trustworthiness, 
attractiveness or aggressiveness (50 MTurks per trait). Inter-rater agreement (as 
measured by Cronbach’s α) was high for all traits, ranging between .92 and .95 
(Figure 3.2). Female faces were on average perceived more positively than male 
faces, with higher mean ratings for trustworthiness and attractiveness, and lower 
mean ratings for aggressiveness. We normalised the scores per participant and 
stimulus gender (i.e. scores for female faces were normalised based on the mean 
Figure 3.1. Face stimuli from the KDEF database. Faces were converted to grayscale 
and cropped to show only the internal features. Evaluations of trustworthiness and 
aggressiveness were highly reliable, with Cronbach’s α between .85 and .90. Ratings for 
male faces did not differ significantly from ratings for female faces. Trustworthiness ratings 
negatively correlated with aggressiveness ratings (r = -.64).
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and standard deviation of ratings for female faces), and then computed the average 
z-score per face per trait. We used the average z-scores as an indicator of the 
perceived trustworthiness, attractiveness and aggressiveness of each face. 
Trustworthiness ratings were positively correlated with attractiveness ratings (r = .
55, p  < .001) and negatively correlated with aggressiveness ratings (r = -.84, p < .
001). Attractiveness and aggressiveness ratings were negatively  correlated (r = -.
29, p < .001). 
 
 The RFD includes colour pictures of males and females with eight 
expressions (including neutral) at different viewpoints. We selected the frontal 
views of 18 males and 18 females in neutral, happy and angry  expressions, 
converted them to grayscale, and created morphed images using FantaMorph 
(Abrosoft, 2002). For each individual we created one morph continuum from the 
neutral to the happy image, and another from the neutral to the angry image (see 
Figure 3.3). Based on pilot testing (see next section), we selected the morphed 
images best fitted to the difficulty of each expression test. 
Figure 3.2. Face stimuli from the GUFD. One hundred female (F) and 100 male (M) 
faces were rated for trustworthiness, attractiveness and aggressiveness. Ratings were 
highly reliable, as evidenced by Cronbach’s α. Female faces received on average more 
positive evaluations; t and p values are for inter-gender comparisons. Trait evaluations 
were significantly correlated with each other (note that the correlations reported here are 
computed between actual ratings, and are slightly different from the correlations  between 
z-scores reported in the text).
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Sorting tests
 The sorting tests were modelled after the Cambridge Face Perception Test 
(CFPT) for identity perception (Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; 
Duchaine, Yovel, & Nakayama, 2007). Each test had ten trials, presented in a pre-
randomised fixed order, and in each trial, participants had one minute to sort six 
faces on a given dimension (e.g., from the least trustworthy to the most 
trustworthy). Traditionally, the CFPT score represents a sum of deviations from the 
correct ordering for each trial, with higher scores denoting poorer performance. In 
the current study, we expressed performance as percentage of correct sorts using 
the formula: [% correct = 1 - sum of deviations/maximum number of deviations 
possible]. With six faces to sort, the maximum number of deviations possible is 18, 
so the formula becomes: [% correct = 1 - sum of deviations/18]. With this formula, 
higher scores denote better performance. Using simulation data, chance 
performance was calculated to be 11.6 deviations per trials, or 35.6% correct sorts. 
 The CFPT Trustworthiness, CFPT Attractiveness and CFPT Aggressiveness 
(Figure 3.4) featured GUFD faces. Each test had ten trials, and one trial featured 
six faces of the same sex with roughly  equal spread in terms of z-scores differences 
(0.3 to 0.5) on that particular trait. Half of the trials presented female faces. Each 
face was used only once in a test, for a total of 60 faces (30 female) per test. Faces 
used by CFPT Trustworthiness were not repeated in the other tests. CFPT 
Attractiveness and CFPT Aggressiveness shared some of their stimuli, but their 
allocation within each trial was different. Note that  the correct ordering of faces on 
all tests was determined by  their consensus ratings (e.g. what most control 
Figure 3.3. Examples of morphed images created from the Radboud Face Database. 
The faces look very similar, but in fact they vary slightly on how happy they look (if you 
cover the faces in the middle and look only at the faces at the two ends, the difference will 
be more noticeable).
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participants regarded as trustworthy  or untrustworthy faces). The tests were 
validated by three control groups (ntw = 32, natt = 31, nagg = 30) of Dartmouth 
College undergraduate students (Table 3.1).
 In the CFPT Happy and CFPT Angry (Figure 3.5), each trial presented six 
morphed images of one Radboud individual on a continuum between the neutral 
and happy  (angry) version of him/herself. We conducted extensive pilot  studies to 
find the optimum distances between the morphs to reach the target  performance 
score of 75% (similar to average performance level for CFPT Identity, Duchaine, 
Germine, & Nakayama, 2007). These distances were 3% for the CFPT Happy and 
8% for CFPT Angry. Each ‘happy’ trial thus presented the 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12% 
and 15% morphs of the neutral and happy  versions of an individual, while each 
‘angry’ trial presented the 0%, 8%, 16%, 24%, 32% and 40% morphs of the neutral 
and angry versions of an individual. Morphs were shown from left to right in a 
predetermined scrambled order, different from trial to trial but comparable in terms 
of distance from the correct order. Control participants were 30 undergraduate 
students from Dartmouth College (Table 3.1).
Figure 3.4. Examples of trials from CFPT Trustworthiness CFPT Aggressiveness. 
Participants had one minute to order six identities according to perceived trustworthiness 
or aggressiveness. CFPT Attractiveness used the same format and stimuli from the same 
database.
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Categorisation tests
 For all measured abilities but sex perception, the categorisation was an odd-
one-out (OOO) task. Participants were presented with a line-up of three faces and 
were asked to select the face that is different  from the other two on the dimension 
of interest. As an example, for the OOO Happy, the correct response would be to 
select the neutral face if the other two faces are happy, or the happy face if the 
other two faces are neutral. To improve scores for the OOO Trustworthiness/
Attractiveness/Aggressiveness (which suffer from the lack of an objective decision 
criteria), we blocked the trials in two halves: one that required participants to 
identify the trustworthy/attractive/aggressive face from the three, the other that 
required identification of the untrustworthy/unattractive/unaggressive face from the 
three. The OOO Happy and Angry  trials were unblocked, such that participants had 
to flip  between selecting the happy/angry faces and the neutral faces. Presentation 
time for each line-up was 3 seconds, but participants had unlimited time to answer. 
Chance performance was 33.3%.
Figure 3.5. Examples of trials from CFPT Happy and CFPT Angry. Participants had 
one minute to order six faces (same identity) according to how happy/angry they looked.
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 The OOO tests for trait  perception used Glasgow and Karolinska faces. For 
OOO Trustworthiness and OOO Aggressiveness, we ordered the selected 200 
Glasgow faces (half of them female) on attractiveness according to the ratings 
collected from the MTurk participants. We then created, per sex, 10 equal bins 
starting from the least attractive to the most attractive face, such that each bin 
included 10 faces of comparable attractiveness. From each bin we selected three 
faces such that one face was markedly different  from the other two on 
trustworthiness/aggressiveness. For OOO Trustworthiness (Figure 3.6), we created 
16 trials with female faces and 16 trials with male faces, half of them with a 
trustworthy target (the other two faces are untrustworthy) and half with an 
untrustworthy target (the other two faces are trustworthy). The same procedure was 
used to create 32 trials (half with female faces) for OOO Aggressiveness. Faces 
were not repeated across tests. In addition to the 32 Glasgow trials, we created 24 
Karolinska trials. From the Karolinska faces, we selected, per gender, the nine least 
trustworthy/aggressive and the nine most trustworthy/aggressive faces that were 
used to create 12 female and 12 male trials for the OOO Trustworthiness/
Aggressiveness. Each face was repeated once. In contrast to the Glasgow trials, the 
Karolinska trials did not have the faces equated for attractiveness. OOO 
Attractiveness was created in a similar fashion, with the Glasgow faces (but not the 
Karolinska faces) within one trial equated for trustworthiness. Final control data 
came from 30 online participants (M =  30.1 years old, SD = 16.4; 17 female).
    
Figure 3.6. Examples of trials from OOO  Trustworthiness. Participants had three 
seconds to select the face that looked trustworthy from the three faces presented. The first 
trial present GUFD faces, while the second presents KDEF faces. OOO  Attractiveness and 
OOO Aggressiveness used a similar format.
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 For OOO Happy  and OOO Angry we used 36 Radboud individuals (18 
female) to generate 36 trials. Half of the trials presented one neutral face and two 
expressive faces, and the other half one expressive face and two neutral faces. 
Faces within one trial belonged to different individuals. We used three faces per 
individual (one neutral and two expressive, or one expressive and two neutral). 
Each individual’s expressive face was a morph between the neutral and the happy/
angry picture of that individual. The emotional intensity of each face (i.e., the point 
on the morph continuum from which the image was taken) was selected based on 
pilot testing and varied from one individual to another. To avoid the feature-based 
strategy noted in pilot studies (i.e. for OOO Happy, the choice between happy/
neutral was based on whether teeth were visible or not; for OOO Angry, the choice 
between angry/neutral was based on the creases between the eyebrows), we limited 
presentation time to three seconds per trial. Moreover, for OOO Happy we masked 
the mouth area with a grey rectangle, and for OOO Angry  we blurred the area 
between the eyebrows to make creases less conspicuous (Figure 3.7). These 
adjustments necessarily made the tests more difficult, which could potentially 
reveal finer impairments. They are also consistent with the aim of the present study, 
because the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis suggests that subtle (rather than 
obvious) resemblance to emotional expressions is what drives trustworthiness 
judgments. Control data were provided by 30 online participants (M =  35.1 years 
old, SD = 11.7; 15 female).
     
Figure 3.7. Examples of trials from OOO Happy  and OOO Angry. Participants had 
three seconds to decide which face was different from the other two in terms of how 
happy/angry they looked.
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3.2. FACIAL TRAIT PERCEPTION WITHOUT FACIAL IDENTITY 
RECOGNITION
 
 Two recent neuropsychological studies suggested that facial trait judgments 
do not rely on the same perceptual mechanisms that carry out facial identity 
recognition. One study showed that two individuals with developmental 
prosopagnosia were able to judge trustworthiness normally (Todorov & Duchaine, 
2008), while another study showed PS, a well-studied woman with acquired 
prosopagnosia, made normal judgments for several traits (Quadflieg et al., 2012).
 These studies, however, might have suffered from two methodological issues. 
First, trait judgments were measured with one format only, namely  rating, which is 
not the way identity perception was assessed. The different task demands prevent 
direct comparisons between identity  and trait results and increase the chance of 
reporting spurious dissociations. Second, face stimuli in one study  were in colour 
and included hair (Quadflieg et  al., 2012), both of which influence trait judgements 
(Todorov & Duchaine, 2008; Stephen et  al., 2011; Swami et al., 2008), and are 
absent in most tests of identity recognition. To overcome these limitations, here we 
systematically  investigated perceptions of facial trustworthiness, attractiveness, and 
Table 3.1. Ten new tests of face perception. Two test formats, sorting (CFPT) and 
categorisation (OOO) were used for each aspect measured. These aspects were two 
expressions (happy and angry) and three traits (trustworthiness, attractiveness and 
aggressiveness). We aimed to equate difficulty level across tests, with most controls’ 
means around 75%. 
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aggressiveness for greyscale faces without external facial cues. Each trait was 
assessed using three formats: rating, sorting, and categorisation.
Methods
Prosopagnosic participants
 We tested four individuals with acquired prosopagnosia. 
 Florence (described previously in Section 2.2 and in Fox et al., 2011) is a 29-
year old Canadian nurse. In 2006 she became prosopagnosic following a right 
amygdalohippocampectomy to treat epilepsy. In 2010 she underwent a second 
operation that removed most of her right anterior temporal lobe.
 Grace is an American pharmacist born in 1968 (43 years old at the time of 
testing). At 15 she contracted herpes simplex viral encephalitis and she was treated 
with acyclovir after a right temporal lobe biopsy. She is severely  prosopagnosic and 
does not reliably  recognise even family members. Her husband told us that one 
time she picked up the wrong child from the kindergarten. She also reports having 
problems with animal identification ("I ask myself, is that really a cow?") and 
colour perception: she can reliably recognise only red and yellow, but no other 
colours (black and white are fine). She claims she can perceive colour differences 
(without naming the colours), even though she failed the online Munsell Hue Test. 
She reports good navigation skills. She was previously presented as B-OT/AT1 in 
Dalrymple et al. (2011), where she performed well on most neuropsychological 
tests. Structural MRI scans revealed a large lesion of the right anterior temporal 
lobe extending to the middle fusiform gyrus, and a small lesion of the mid-fusiform 
gyrus in the left hemisphere.
 Kepler is an American man born in 1958 (53 years old at the time of testing). 
He became prosopagnosic following a stroke that lesioned his right inferior 
occipitotemporal lobe. He experiences visual deficits in the upper left visual field 
and the left half of the foveal representation.
 Sandy is an American woman born in 1975 (36 years old at  the time of 
testing). She became prosopagnosic following a resection for epilepsy in 1997. Her 
problems with faces are severe; for instance, she is unable to reliably recognise her 
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husband or her children. To be able to pick up the children from school she buys 
them backpacks from other states to ensure they are distinct from other children’s 
backpacks. Interestingly, she reports “losing” faces as they age, apparently not 
being able to update their representation. When she goes back to her hometown, 
she can recognise colleagues who have not aged a lot, but not the ones who have 
put on weight or changed significantly. Similarly, she cannot recognise her mother 
because she aged considerably during the last decade, yet she can recognise her 
father who aged mostly before Sandy’s problems started. She can recognise herself 
in photos when she was young, but not now when she sees herself in the mirror. 
She says she never really "knew" her children because they change so quickly. 
Sandy was convinced she would do fine on a famous faces test with faces from 
before 1997 (e.g. Demi Moore in the movie “Ghost”), but this was not  tested. She 
has a full left hemianopia. Structural MRI scans were not available. 
 All four individuals had severe deficits processing facial identities, as 
confirmed by their impaired performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Test, 
Face Old/New Test and Cambridge Face Perception Test (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. List of acquired prosopagnosics (APs). The four APs have been evaluated 
with the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), a Face Old-New Recognition test, and the 
Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT). CFMT introduces participants to six target faces, 
which are then presented in test items with distractor faces in different poses and lighting 
(Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). CFMT scores represent percentages of correct 
identifications out of 72 trials. In the Face Old-New test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005), 
participants memorize 10 target faces and then discriminate between those faces and new 
faces. Scores are A’ values (an unbiased measure of discrimination). CFPT is described in 
section 3.1. Note that CFPT scores have previously been expressed as a sum of errors, 
but here we present percentages of correct orderings. All CFMT, Old-New and CFPT 
scores reported above are impaired. L=left, R=right, n/a = not available.
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Control participants
 For ratings, control data were provided by 30 students from University 
College London and Dartmouth College (mean age 19.1 years, 14 female). For the 
other tests, details about each control group are provided in Section 3.1.  
Results
 We used Crawford’s modified t-test (Crawford & Howell, 1998) to determine 
whether prosopagnosics’ performance deviates from controls’ in a statistically 
abnormal manner. Figure 3.8 shows the results of the nine tests of facial trait 
perception (3 traits x 3 formats) completed by each prosopagnosic participant.
 Florence showed trait judgments in line with controls in all nine tests. 
 Grace was normal with trustworthiness judgments. For attractiveness, she 
was impaired with ratings (t = 2.28, p  = .030), but normal with CFPT and OOO. 
For aggressiveness, she provided typical ratings, but was impaired with CFPT (t = 
5.74, p < .001) and OOO (t = 2.95, p = .006).
 Kepler was normal with trustworthiness and attractiveness, but impaired with 
aggressiveness on CFPT (t = 2.88, p = .009) and scored in the lower range for on 
OOO (t = 1.41, p = .166).
 Sandy was impaired at  CFPT Trustworthiness (t = 3.81, p < .001) and CFPT 
Attractiveness (t = 3.51, p  = .001), but fine with rating and categorisation (i.e. 
OOO). With aggressiveness, she displayed normal performance in all three tests.
Discussion
 Overall, our findings robustly  demonstrate that facial trait judgments can be 
normal when facial identity  recognition is impaired. Despite their severe face 
recognition deficit, all prosopagnosics made judgements about at least one trait 
normally in all three test  formats. Florence in particular was completely normal 
with all measured traits. Grace was normal with trustworthiness judgments, Kepler 
with trustworthiness and attractiveness, and Sandy with aggressiveness. These 
3. FACIAL TRAIT PERCEPTION IN ACQUIRED PROSOPAGNOSIA
107
results indicate that the perceptual mechanisms underlying trait judgments are 
dissociable from those used in recognising identities.
 Our results are consistent with and extend previous reports of identity-trait 
dissociations in prosopagnosia. Todorov and Duchaine (2008) presented four 
developmental prosopagnosics who made facial trustworthiness judgments in line 
with controls for a heterogeneous set of faces. Importantly though, when the face 
stimuli were controlled for emotional expressions and non facial cues such as 
hairstyle and skin blemishes, two prosopagnosics failed to replicate the normal 
judgments obtained with richer stimuli. Two prosopagnosics showed normal trait 
judgments across all stimuli sets, but they were tested on only one trait  perception 
(trustworthiness) and only  using ratings. Additionally, findings from individuals 
who do not have normally  developed mechanisms for face perception are not 
warranted to be informative about the organisation of normal brains. 
Figure 3.8. Facial identity and trait perception in four acquired prosopagnosics. Bars 
represent performance in z-scores relative to controls (Grace’s score on CFPT 
Aggressiveness was -5.9, but for ease of comparison we kept the scale minimum at -4). 
Note the difference scales between identity and trait tests. Stars show significant 
differences to controls (Crawford’s modified t test). Facial identity deficits were confirmed 
by the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT, Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), Face Old/
New Discrimination Test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005) and the Cambridge Face 
Perception Test (CFPT, Duchaine et al., 2007). 
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 Quadflieg et al. (2012) extended the number of traits measured and tested PS, 
a thoroughly studied case of acquired prosopagnosia (Rossion et al., 2003). PS 
showed normal ratings for several facial traits (aggression, attractiveness, 
confidence, intelligence, sociability, trustworthiness, typicality) but not for 
dominance. However, she was tested with faces displaying various hairstyles, and, 
as Todorov and Duchaine (2008) showed, normal trait judgments of faces including 
hairstyles do not necessarily translate into normal trait judgments when only facial 
information is presented. The stimuli were also presented in colour, and skin tone 
has been shown to influence at least perception of attractiveness (Fink, Grammer, 
& Matts, 2006; Jones, Little, Burt, & Perrett, 2004; Matts, Fink, Grammer, & 
Burquest, 2007). 
 By eliminating some of these potential confounds (e.g. our study presented 
only grayscale images, cropped so that only facial information was available), we 
present strong evidence for a dissociation between facial identity and trait 
perception. Importantly, we used the same sorting format (i.e., CFPT) to examine 
both identity and trait processing, and some prosopagnosics were impaired only 
with identity perception. In addition, a critical contribution of our study is the use 
of three test formats to assess trait judgments. Because several participants 
performed normally with ratings for a trait but were impaired with our sorting and 
categorisation tasks, our results suggest the ratings format used in previous studies 
may have limitations that make it too insensitive for use in neuropsychological 
investigations: a relatively low average of correlations to consensus judgments 
(between .42 and .58) and large standard deviations (.16 to .29) in controls. Subtle 
impairments in trait judgments may be masked by floor effects. For example, 
Grace showed normal judgments of aggressiveness only for rating, but  not for 
sorting and categorisation. Similar problems with ratings (i.e. relatively  low means 
with large standard deviations) were also noted in the other studies, with mean 
correlations to consensus judgments typically  between .50 and .60, and standard 
deviations frequently  up  to .20 (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008; Quadflieg et al., 
2012). In general, spurious findings are more likely to arise whenever a single test 
is used. 
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 The dissociation between facial trait and identity perception noted in acquired 
prosopagnosia is consistent with findings from neuroimaging and other patient 
studies which have posited different critical areas for the two abilities. Functional 
MRI studies suggest that changes in facial identity are primarily reflected in 
increased activation in the fusiform gyrus (Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton, 2009; 
Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, Driver, & Dolan, 2005; Winston, Henson, Fine-
Goulden, & Dolan, 2004), while facial trait  evaluations are thought to depend on 
other areas. For example, variations in perceived attractiveness are tracked by 
activation changes in the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Cloutier, 
Heatherton, Whalen, & Kelley, 2008; Kranz & Ishai, 2006; O’Doherty  et al., 2003; 
Winston, O’Doherty, Kilner, Perrett, & Dolan, 2007), nucleus accumbens (Aharon 
et al., 2001; Cloutier et al., 2008) and anterior cingulate cortex (Winston et al., 
2007; Cloutier et al., 2008). Facial trustworthiness in turn has been linked to 
amygdala activation by several fMRI studies (Engell et  al., 2007; Said, Baron, 
Todorov, 2009; Todorov et al., 2008; Winston et al., 2002). In addition, Adolphs et 
al. (1998) presented three patients with complete lesions of both amygdalae (SM, 
JM, RH) who displayed abnormal perception of facial trustworthiness and 
approachability. One of them, SM, was able to recognise famous faces (Adolphs, 
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994), learn new faces (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, 
& Damasio, 1995) and discriminate between similar faces (Tranel & Hyman, 
1990), providing the reverse side of a double dissociation between facial identity 
and trait perception from our prosopagnosic patients. 
 In this context, Florence’s results are somewhat puzzling. Although she 
shows a marked dissociation between facial identity and trustworthiness 
perception, the dissociation is the opposite of what it should be expected given that 
she does not have a right amygdala. More specifically, while previous studies 
featured amygdala patients with impairments in facial trustworthiness judgments 
but normal identity  recognition (Adolphs et al., 1994; Adolphs et al., 1995; 
Adolphs et al., 1998), Florence displays the reverse pattern, with impaired face 
recognition but  normal trustworthiness judgments. We note that even though 
currently Florence has lesions affecting a large part of the right anterior temporal 
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lobe (which is linked to face recognition), she became prosopagnosic before that, 
after the first  operation that resected the right amygdala and hippocampus. It is 
however possible that other damaged regions beyond right amygdala contribute to 
her severe prosopagnosia. Furthermore, she has an intact left amygdala, while 
previous cases with abnormal trustworthiness perception had bilateral amygdala 
lesions. It could be the case that the left amygdala is sufficient for normal trait 
judgments. 
 As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the patterns of results for the trustworthiness 
and attractiveness judgments are quite similar. Considering the high correlation 
usually  found for these judgments (e.g. Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), one concern 
for tests of trustworthiness and attractiveness perception is that they  measure the 
same construct (or that responses rely  on the same visual cues). However, this is 
not the case for our tests. When controls sorted the CFPT Trustworthiness and 
Attractiveness with the instructions switched (i.e. faces from CFPT Trustworthiness 
were sorted for attractiveness, and faces from CFPT Attractiveness were sorted for 
trustworthiness), performance was outside normal range. Instead, the fact that 
judgments of attractiveness – a positive trait – are closely linked to judgments of 
trustworthiness is consistent with the Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) model of 
facial trait perception. 
 Finally, our findings also speak to dissociations within trait judgments. For 
example, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) suggest that all trait judgments can be 
accounted for by two distinct components: trustworthiness (representing positive 
traits such as attractiveness) and dominance (representing ‘status’ judgments such 
as aggressiveness and competence). Our data are consistent with this idea: Grace 
was normal with trustworthiness and impaired on two of the three tests of 
aggressiveness, while Sandy showed normal aggressiveness but was impaired with 
trustworthiness (at least on the CFPT).
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3.3. DISSOCIATIONS IN PERCEPTION OF FACIAL TRAITS, 
EXPRESSIONS AND SEX IN ACQUIRED PROSOPAGNOSIA 
 
 We have shown that  normal trait perception is possible without intact face 
recognition. The next question is whether trait  perception is dependent on other 
routes within the face system, such as the expression or sex recognition route. A 
recent facial trait perception model posits that two primary dimensions, namely 
trustworthiness and dominance, account for the majority  of variance in judgments 
of multiple facial traits (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Oosterhof and Todorov 
developed an empirically  validated computer algorithm that could orthogonally 
manipulate perceived trustworthiness and dominance in faces. They observed that 
increasing trustworthiness made faces appear happy, while decreasing 
trustworthiness made faces appear angry. Inspired by this observation, they argued 
that subtle resemblance to happy and angry expressions drives perceptions of 
trustworthiness of neutral faces, and that trustworthiness judgments are in fact by-
products of mechanisms responsible for recognising emotional expressions. This 
emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis was supported by subsequent studies (Said, 
Sebe, & Todorov, 2009; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009; Engell et al., 2010). Similarly, 
because increasing dominance made faces appear more masculine, while 
decreasing dominance made faces appear more feminine, judgments of facial 
dominance were suggested to be by-products of mechanisms involved in 
recognition of sex (i.e., the sex overgeneralisation hypothesis). Two predictions 
naturally  follow from these hypotheses: (i) individuals with impaired facial 
expression perception will have deficits with trustworthiness judgments, and (ii) 
individuals with impaired sex perception will have deficits with dominance 
judgments. 
 Acquired prosopagnosics, individuals with severe face recognition problems 
following brain damage (Bodamer, 1947), provide a powerful means to evaluate 
the overgeneralisation hypotheses. In addition to their definitional impairment with 
facial identity, acquired prosopagnosics exhibit a variety  of other face deficits. For 
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example, some prosopagnosics are impaired with facial expressions (Fox et al., 
2011), while others cannot recognise the sex of a face (Sergent & Signoret, 1992) 
or both (Rezlescu, Pitcher, & Duchaine, 2012; Rossion et al., 2003; Sergent & 
Signoret, 1992). A diverse constellation of face deficits other than identity can 
reveal informative associations and dissociations between mechanisms operating 
on different facial aspects that may be involved in facial trait processing. 
 The goal of the following experiments was to test the predictions of the 
overgeneralisation hypotheses with one prosopagnosic individual, Florence, who 
showed trait judgments comparable to controls in all nine tests. We examined 
perception of happy and angry  expressions, sex, and perceived trustworthiness and 
aggressiveness. We chose aggressiveness rather than dominance for several 
reasons. First, dominance seems more a complex, artificial construct than a natural 
trait spontaneously inferred from faces. When asked to produce unconstrained 
evaluations of facial traits, none of the 55 participants in Oosterhof and Todorov 
(2008) used dominance to describe the faces they saw. Second, aggressiveness had 
the highest loading (0.66) than any other trait on the dominance dimension of the 
Oosterhof and Todorov model. Third, dominance is a rather ambiguous construct: it 
may  refer to physical or social attribute and, depending on the context, it can be a 
positive or a negative trait.  
Methods
Participants
 Florence, the prosopagnosic individual, was described previously in Sections 
2.2 and 3.2. For tests of facial expression and trait perception, details about control 
groups are provided in Section 3.1 that describes the development of these tests. 
For CFPT Sex, control participants (n = 36) are described in Chatterjee and 
Nakayama (2013). For the sex categorisation task (see below), control data were 
provided by 18 participants (age range 23 – 43, mean age = 28.9 years; 11 female).
Procedure
 Florence’s perception of face trustworthiness, aggressiveness, happy 
expression, angry expression and sex was tested with two tests per ability. One was 
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a sorting test (CFPT) and the other a categorisation test (OOO, with the exception 
of the categorisation test for sex perception described below). The CFPT for sex 
perception was created by Chatterjee and Nakayama (2013). Each trial presented 
six versions of one individual varying in terms of how masculine or feminine they 
looked. The initial scrambled order of the six faces was predetermined. Participants 
had to sort  the faces from most masculine to most feminine. The morph level for 
each trial was chosen to set overall mean control performance at  75%. Control data 
came from 36 individuals (Chatterjee & Nakayama, 2013). In the categorisation 
task for face-based sex perception (Rezlescu, Pitcher et al., 2012), participants had 
to categorise 60 faces as male or female. Faces were cropped below the eyebrows 
to avoid reliance on diagnostic individual features. Performance was measured with 
A´ (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), a bias-free measure that varies between 0.5 and 
1.0 with higher scores indicating better discrimination ability  between male and 
female faces. 
 
Results
 We used Crawford’s modified t-test (Crawford & Howell, 1998) to determine 
whether Florence’s performance deviates from controls’ in a statistically abnormal 
manner. Results are displayed in Figure 3.9.
 Florence’s results on tests of facial trait perception showed that her ability to 
judge trustworthiness and aggressiveness in faces is intact despite her 
prosopagnosia (see previous section).
 Florence’s perceptions of happy and angry  expressions were mixed. She 
achieved only 61% correct sorts (controls: M  = 75%, SD = 8%; t = 1.72, p  = .096) 
and 53% correct  categorisations (controls: M = 75%, SD = 10%; t = 2.16, p = .039) 
of happy faces. These results indicate that  her perception of happy expression was 
weaker than controls, bordering on impaired. Florence’s perception of angry 
expression, however, was in the normal range: her scores were 62% for sorting 
(controls: M = 77%, SD = 9%; t = 1.64, p = .112) and 81% for categorisation 
(controls: M = 77%, SD = 10%; t = 0.39, p = .697). Together, these scores suggest 
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that Florence may have a selective deficit in perceiving happy but not angry 
expressions.
 Florence was impaired on both tests of sex perception. She scored 56% on 
the sorting task, significantly  lower than controls’ average of 76% (SD = 9%, t = 
2.19, p = .037), and .81 on the categorisation task, substantially lower than controls 
(M = .97, SD = .02; t = 7.79, p < .001).
  
Discussion
 In Oosterhof and Todorov’s (2008) computer model of trait  perception, 
varying facial trustworthiness was associated with changes in how happy or angry 
faces appeared, and varying dominance was linked to changes in how masculine or 
feminine a face appeared. Todorov and colleagues (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009; Engell et al., 2010) 
suggested that trustworthiness and dominance judgments were by-products of 
mechanisms responsible for perception of happy/angry expressions and sex, 
respectively (emotion and sex overgeneralisation theory). Their conjecture predicts 
Figure 3.9. Florence’s performance in sorting and categorisation tests of 
expression, sex and trait perception. All scores are expressed in percentages, with the 
exception of the sex categorisation score expressed as A’. Dashed lines represent chance 
levels. Error bars show ±1 SD. Stars show significant differences (using Crawford’s 
modified t-test) between performance of Florence and controls. 
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that people with expression recognition deficits will also be impaired with 
trustworthiness judgments, and people with sex recognition deficits will necessarily 
be impaired with dominance judgments.
 We tested these predictions in Florence, a case of acquired prosopagnosia. 
Despite her severe deficits in recognising identities, Florence was able to make 
normal judgments of facial trustworthiness and aggressiveness. Critically, these 
judgments were made in the absence of intact perception of expression and sex, 
thus challenging the overgeneralisation hypotheses. Florence was impaired at the 
categorisation test for happy expression, and scored in the lower normal range for 
two other tests (she was fine at the categorization test for angry  expression); 
although these results do not reflect severe impairments, they question the integrity 
of her expression perception. For sex perception, results were unambiguous: 
Florence scored outside the normal range in both tests, indicating severe deficits. 
 Several considerations suggest our results are robust. Previous studies of 
facial trait perception in prosopagnosia have only used rating agreements (e.g. 
Quadflieg et  al., 2012; Todorov and Duchaine, 2008). Here we extend these studies 
by measuring trait perception using two non-rating formats, namely sorting (CFPT) 
and categorization (OOO), increasing the robustness of our results. We also used 
the same test formats to assess different aspects of face perception, ensuring that 
observed dissociations are not caused by different task demands. Our results thus 
indicate that Florence’s normal aggressiveness judgments are the result  of 
perceptual mechanisms distinct from those responsible for sex perception. A 
dissociation between mechanisms involved in facial trustworthiness and expression 
perception was partly supported.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
 
 The main goals of the studies reported in this chapter were to investigate a 
possible dissociation between facial identity and facial trait  perception noted in 
previous studies (Quadflieg et al., 2012; Todorov & Duchaine, 2008) and to test 
two predictions of the overgeneralisation hypotheses in trait perception: (i) 
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individuals with impaired facial expression perception will have deficits with 
trustworthiness judgments, and (ii) individuals with impaired sex perception from 
faces will have deficits with aggressiveness judgments. 
 We present strong evidence that  facial trait perception is dissociable from 
other aspects of face perception, such as identity, expression and sex recognition. 
Using three test formats per trait, we showed that four acquired prosopagnosics 
could provide at least  one trait  judgment (confirmed by all three tests) in line with 
controls. One case, Florence, succeeded with all traits measured: trustworthiness, 
attractiveness and aggressiveness. In contrast, she was impaired with face-based 
sex recognition and showed mixed performance with expressions of happiness and 
anger. The results challenge the overgeneralisation hypotheses, according to which 
trustworthiness and dominance judgments are by-products of mechanisms involved 
in perception of happy/angry expressions and sex, respectively. Previous studies 
postulated a critical role for amygdala in facial trustworthiness judgments. Florence 
does not have a right  amygdala, so it is possible that normal trustworthiness 
perception is achieved solely by the left amygdala. Even though previous imaging 
studies indicate an involvement of the fusiform gyrus in perceived trustworthiness 
(e.g. Winston et al., 2002), the results from Florence, Grace and Kepler confirm 
that (at least the right) occipitotemporal and anterior temporal lobes are not 
necessary for normal trustworthiness judgments. 
Implications for general models of face processing
 Our findings suggest that contemporary models of face perception, which 
tend to focus on the division between subsystems for identity and expression 
processing (Young & Bruce, 2011), or between subsystems for processing of 
invariant and changeable aspects in faces (Haxby & Gobbini, 2011), need to 
broaden their account to explicitly incorporate processing of facial traits. Facial 
traits may  be handled by the subsystem for processing changeable face aspects, 
because the amygdala (which has been implicated in processing of facial 
trustworthiness, e.g. Adolphs et al., 1998; Winston et al., 2002) receives 
information from mechanisms that are responsible for processing dynamic 
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information in faces such as expression and gaze (Haxby & Gobbini, 2011), and 
because visual aftereffect studies have observed overlapping neural representations 
of facial trait and facial expression (Engell et al., 2010). Alternatively, because trait 
is an enduring and invariant feature of the face (repeated judgments of facial traits 
are highly correlated, Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), they may be processed by  the 
subsystem that carries out invariant computations in faces, most notably those for 
recognising identities. A third possibility is that facial trait is primarily  processed 
by its own dedicated subsystem.
 That Florence (and other prosopagnosics) was able to provide normal trait 
judgments despite severe deficits with facial identity  and sex recognition, as well as 
compromised perception of expression, is most consistent with the third possibility. 
However, her results are also consistent with the idea of a finer division within the 
invariant subsystem. Perhaps there is one set of overlapping mechanisms 
responsible for processing all kinds of invariant aspects in faces, only  that some 
mechanisms are more involved in analysing facial identity and others more 
involved in analysing facial trait. This idea is consistent with evidence from single-
cell studies in monkeys, showing that the same set  of face neurons in the face-
selective middle face patch respond to multiple kinds of basic facial cues (e.g., eye 
height, face aspect ratio) (Freiwald, Tsao, & Livingstone, 2009). If this idea is 
correct, facial identity and facial trait perception are identical from a computational 
point of view; they  differ only in terms of which facial cues are more informative 
for one task over the other (see next section).
What explains the identity vs. trait dissociation?
 What might account for Florence’s impaired identity but normal trait 
perception? One explanation is that facial trait judgments, unlike facial identity 
recognition, do not vary  dramatically  with subtle changes in facial structure. This 
explanation is consistent with the nature of the tasks on which Florence was not 
able to perform normally: Florence was impaired or scored in the lower normal 
range when she had to sort highly similar face exemplars from the same morph 
continuum (CFPT Identity, CFPT Happy, CFPT Angry, CFPT Sex). Moreover, 
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Florence was also impaired on a match-to-sample task involving pairs of morphed 
faces (Susilo et al., 2013). These results suggest that identity recognition involves 
computations over subtle face cues, whereas trait judgments do not. Note that this 
does not necessarily mean identity computations are more difficult  than trait 
computations, because in this study they have been matched.
 Another possibility is that identity and trait computations involve dissociable 
cues. One framework relevant to this issue is face space, which suggests that in a 
psychological space, all faces are mapped and organised according to their values 
on multiple dimensions that represent the difference between those faces 
(Valentine, 1991). Face space has traditionally  been used to explain how facial 
identities are recognised (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006), but it has recently  been adapted 
to account for trait perception as well as social evaluations in faces more generally 
(Said, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2010). Recent studies have observed that  neural 
responses in face-selective regions are primarily  driven not by  computations 
regarding certain aspects of the face (e.g., identity vs trustworthiness), but rather 
relatively simpler computations of face typicality, or how far and distinctive a face 
is from an “average” face in the centre of the space (Said, Haxby & Todorov, 
2011), making the distinction between identity and trait processing less clear.
 
CONCLUSION
 
 Using acquired prosopagnosia, we showed that normal trait perception can 
occur without facial identity recognition. Furthermore, we presented evidence that 
facial trait perception dissociates from expression and sex recognition, challenging 
the emotion and sex overgeneralisation theories in trait perception. 
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Chapter 4
TRUSTWORTHINESS IMPRESSIONS
 This chapter concerns four topics in face trustworthiness judgments; the 
experiments addressing each topic are summarised in separate sections. 
 It has recently been proposed that perceived face trustworthiness depends on 
facial width-to-height ratio (WHR), independent of attractiveness (Stirrat & Perrett, 
2010). In Section 4.1 I report three experiments aiming to replicate and extend this 
finding. The experiments explore implicit and explicit impressions of 
trustworthiness for two sets of faces: the original stimuli created by  Stirrat and 
Perrett  (2010) (male only) and a new set of standardised faces (male and female) 
manipulated for facial WHR according to the metrics from Stirrat and Perrett 
(2010). Possible confounds (targets’ attractiveness and femininity) and individual 
differences in terms of propensity  to trust, risk-aversion, dominance and 
attractiveness are also considered. 
 Face trustworthiness judgments influence consequential decisions (e.g. 
Rezlescu, Duchaine et al., 2012), but are they  valid? Previously, to establish their 
accuracy, face impressions were typically compared with self-reported personality 
measures (Bond et al., 1994) or behaviour in laboratory experiments (Fetchenhauer 
et al., 2012; Gollwitzer et al., 2012). In Section 4.2 I use data from a high-stake 
television program in which contestants have an incentive to deceive to examine 
whether deceptive behaviour can be inferred reliably  from faces (static and 
dynamic stimuli). The predictive power of face impressions in this real situation is 
compared with their predictive power in a laboratory-based economic game.
 Face trustworthiness has been shown to influence economic interactions 
when people do not have other information about potential partners (e.g. van’t 
Wout & Sanfey, 2008). However, this is not a realistic scenario; in real life, people 
have access to more than just the face. Section 4.3 explores the role of face 
trustworthiness on investment decisions when reliable information about economic 
partners is available. 
 Voices are rich social stimuli, in many respects similar to faces. Therefore, it 
is likely that reliable trait impressions are also formed based on voices.  Section 4.4 
is concerned with voice impressions and their integration with face impressions 
when forming a person impression. The focus is not solely on trustworthiness, but 
extends to include perceived attractiveness and aggressiveness. Possible 
correlations between face and voice-based impressions are also investigated. 
 
4.1. FACIAL WIDTH-TO-HEIGHT RATIO AND PERCEIVED 
TRUSTWORTHINESS
 Previous studies suggested explicit  and implicit evaluations of face 
trustworthiness can be explained by  face attractiveness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008; Wilson & Eckel, 2006), resemblance between observer and target (DeBruine, 
2002), structural similarity  to expressions of happiness and anger (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2009) or brown eyes (Kleisner et al., 2013). Some of these signals may be 
deceptive though; Takahashi, Yamagishi, Tanida, Kiyonari, & Kanazawa (2006) 
found that male faces judged to be more attractive were more likely to abuse trust 
in economic games.
 Recently, a sexually dimorphic (Weston et al., 2007) facial metric related to 
testosterone level (Verdonck et  al., 1999) - the facial width-to-height ratio (WHR) - 
was shown to predict male aggressive behaviour in the lab and on the ice-hockey 
ring (Carré & McCormick, 2008). WHR also predicted face-based evaluations of 
aggressiveness (Carré et al., 2009; Carré et al., 2010). Consistent with the negative 
correlation between dominance/aggressiveness and trustworthiness judgments 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), Stirrat  and Perrett (2010) found that facial WHR also 
predicted perceived and actual trustworthiness of male students. Female 
participants high on a self-reported scale of submissiveness were more sensitive to 
WHR in their trustworthiness evaluations of male faces. However, the relation 
between facial WHR and trustworthy behaviour is not straightforward. Depending 
on the context, men with wide faces were found to engage in both more and less 
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prosocial behaviour than men with narrow faces (Stirrat & Perrett, 2012). 
 The following experiments present further investigations of the links between 
facial WHR and face trustworthiness.
EXPERIMENT 1†
 This experiment aimed to replicate the original findings relating facial WHR 
to perceived trustworthiness (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) with a new, better-controlled 
set of stimuli. The stimuli were computer-generated faces created to match the 
facial WHR of the original faces. They included both male and female faces to 
examine if the presumed effect of WHR on evaluations of male faces extends to 
female faces. We also examined if individual differences in terms of propensity to 
trust, risk-aversion, dominance and attractiveness predicted differences in 
trustworthiness evaluations. The face stimuli were binned in two groups, one with 
‘narrow’ faces (i.e. low WHR) and the other with ‘wide’ faces (i.e. high WHR). 
The groups matched in terms of attractiveness and femininity. We wanted to 
control for attractiveness because attractiveness correlates highly with explicit 
ratings of trustworthiness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) and was found to be a 
strong predictor of implicit trustworthiness measured by investments in trust games 
(Wilson & Eckel, 2006). In Stirrat and Perrett (2010), attractiveness explained five 
times more variance (30% compared to 6%) in trust decisions than facial WHR. 
Increased cooperative behaviour was also associated with femininity  (Perrett et al., 
1998). 
  
Methods
Participants
 Twenty participants (age range: 19 to 36 years old, mean age: 26.6 years; 13 
female) were recruited from the University College London’s subject pool. 
Participants were paid £5 at the conclusion of the second session. To increase 
motivation, one randomly selected participant received a bonus of £10 (see 
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† The results of this experiment were previously reported in the MSc thesis of Katarzyna Borowska, 
supervised by Adam Harris and Constantin Rezlescu.
procedure for details).
Face stimuli
 One hundred and sixty facial characters (80 female) were randomly  generated 
using FaceGen Modeller 3.3 software (Singular Inversions, 2008), with the 
following constraints: Caucasian faces, average age 20 years old, caricature 
features between attractive and typical, and asymmetry between symmetrical and 
typical. We then used available controllers in FaceGen to create one face version 
with low width-to-height ratio (WHR) and one face version with high WHR per 
character (Figure 4.1), by: i) narrowing the face and/or increasing the distance 
between eyes and lips; ii) widening the face and/or decreasing the distance between 
eyes and lips. From this set of 320 faces we eliminated characters for which the 
narrow or wide faces looked unrealistic and characters who looked very similar to 
each other (for a wider diversity). Furthermore, we selected only the characters 
with WHR for the narrow faces between 1.65 and 1.85, and WHR for the wide 
faces between 1.85 and 2.05. Per character, wide faces had an WHR which was on 
average 1.10 times larger than that of the narrow faces (range: 1.05 to 1.15), which 
was comparable to the WHR difference between wide and narrow face stimuli in 
Stirrat and Perrett  (2010). In the end, we retained the narrow and wide faces from 
40 male and 20 female characters. 
Figure 4.1. Examples of computer face stimuli varying on WHR. Two face versions, 
one with low WHR (‘narrow face’) and one with high WHR (‘wide face’), were created for 
each male and female character.
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   The female faces were then rated for attractiveness and the male faces for 
attractiveness and femininity/masculinity by 104 online volunteers recruited on 
Psychological Research on the Net (http://psych.hanover.edu/research/
exponnet.html). The femininity scale ranged from 1 (very feminine) to 7 (very 
masculine) and the attractiveness scale from 1 (not at all attractive) to 7 (very 
attractive). Each participant rated either the narrow or wide version (randomly 
determined) of each character. Attractiveness ratings were lower for male faces (M 
= 2.70) than for female faces (M = 3.14). To match attractiveness level across male 
and female faces, we ordered the male faces on attractiveness and further selected 
only the ten faces immediately  below the average attractiveness level for female 
faces (i.e. 3.14) and the ten faces above that level. Our final set of stimuli consisted 
of narrow and wide faces from 20 female and 20 male characters. Table 4.1 
presents details about facial WHR, perceived attractiveness and femininity. Note 
that the four groups of stimuli (male narrow, male wide, female narrow, female 
wide; each with 20 faces) do not differ in terms of attractiveness, and the two male 
groups do not differ on femininity/masculinity. Male narrow and female narrow 
were also matched in terms of facial WHR, as were male wide and female wide. 
The average ratios between the wide and the narrow versions of the same 
characters were also comparable for male and female faces. The only significant 
difference was between the facial WHR for narrow and wide faces, according to 
our manipulation. 
Table 4.1. Facial width-to-height ratios (WHR), attractiveness and femininity  ratings 
for the selected 80 face stimuli (20 faces per sex per width). Femininity ratings for 
female faces were not collected. Note that the stimuli groups are matched in terms of 
facial WHR between sexes, ratios between Wide and Narrow faces, attractiveness and 
femininity (all ps > .05). The only significant differences are for facial WHR between male 
narrow and male wide (p < .0001) and female narrow and female wide (p < .0001).
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 Facial WHR did not correlate with perceptions of attractiveness for neither 
male nor female faces (absolute rs < .14, ps > .42). For male faces, attractiveness 
and femininity were also uncorrelated (r = -.20, p = . 213). 
Procedure 
 The experiment had two parts. In the first session subjects were asked to play 
a series of trust games with faces seen on the screen. The trust games were 
introduced as part of an online investment game played simultaneously between 
students at  various universities. Participants were told they  would play the role of 
the investor, and decide whether to invest their money in the trustees whose faces 
they  would see on the screen. On each trial, participants had 100 virtual pounds 
(VP) available for investing. If the decision was to invest, this amount tripled 
automatically (i.e. became 300 VP) by the time it reached the trustee. Participants 
were told it  was then up to each trustee to return or not half of that tripled amount 
to the investor. Therefore participants had an incentive to invest  only in trustees 
looking trustworthy (i.e. likely to share the money). If participants decided not to 
invest, they “banked” the 100 VP and moved on to the next trustee. In sum, each of 
our trust games allowed for three outcomes: i) participants invested 100 VP and 
trustee shared the tripled amount; in this case, the investment was successful, 
participants made a profit of 50 VP and banked 150 VP; ii) participants invested 
100 VP but the trustee did not share the money; the investment is unsuccessful, 
participants lost 100 VP and banked 0 VP; iii) participants did not invest; in this 
case, they banked 100 VP. To ensure participants believed they were interacting 
with real people, before starting the experiment each participant was photographed, 
their image uploaded in FaceGen and processed to create a “computerised” version 
of their face, similar to the face stimuli in the experiment. Then they  had a few 
practise trials to allow familiarisation with the rules of the game. During these 
practice trials, participants were given feedback about each trustee’s decision (to 
share or not) and the end result of their decision (how much they ‘banked’). No 
feedback was provided during the main experiment, but participants were told that 
a summary for all trials would be presented at the end and that the most successful 
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investor (the one who accumulated the largest  sum of money on all trials) would 
receive a bonus of £10. 
 The trustees seen during the experiment were in fact faces of the computer-
generated characters described in the previous section. The 20 male characters and 
the 20 female characters were split  in two equal groups per sex. Each participant 
saw the narrow faces (n = 10) of one group of male characters and the wide faces 
(n = 10) of the other group of male characters. The same was valid for female 
characters. This allowed for a 2 x 2 within-subjects factorial design, with facial 
WHR (low and high) and gender (male and female stimuli) as independent 
variables. The dependent variables were the judged probability of reciprocation and 
number of ‘invest’ decisions.
 The judged probability  of reciprocation was a continuous implicit  measure of 
perceived trustworthiness. After seeing the face of the trustee, participants were 
asked to provide an estimate between 0% and 100% of how likely the respective 
trustee was to reciprocate. Then participants had to decide whether or not to invest 
in that trustee. The ‘invest’ decision was a binary variable of perceived 
trustworthiness; it also showed whether participants were likely to make 
consequential decisions in line with their estimations of trustee’s trustworthiness. 
 The second session of the experiment was scheduled seven to ten days after 
the first session. Participants were told they  would play the same trust games again, 
with the same trustees, and were asked to try  to give the same answers as they did 
in the first session. The session was presented as a memory test. However, the 
assumption was that participants would not remember their decisions, making the 
second session effectively  a re-run of the first session. Crucially, in the second 
session the face versions from each character were flipped. Thus, if the narrow face 
of a character was presented in the first session, the wide face of the same character 
was presented in the second session. This allowed us to directly measure the impact 
of facial width of investment decisions; for example, if a participant did not invest 
in the narrow face of a character in the first session but invested in the wide face of 
the same character in the second session, it can be concluded that  it was the facial 
width that affected his decision. If participants’ decisions to invest did not change 
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from one session to the other, there are two possibilities: facial width did not affect 
investment decisions, or participants remembered their decisions from the first 
session (the narrow and wide faces of the same character are similar and may be 
perceived as the same faces). However, the time interval between the two sessions 
made the possibility of accurately  remembering the decisions linked to 40 highly-
standardised, computer-generated faces extremely unlikely. During debriefing, 
participants confirmed they could not remember their actions from the first session. 
 At the end of the second session, participants were asked to self-rate their 
perceived attractiveness and (social and physical) dominance, and fill in three 
questionnaires measuring propensity to trust, risk-aversion and submissive 
behaviour (Appendix 1). All participants were debriefed by email several days after 
all testing had concluded to avoid contamination of the subject pool.
Results
 In general, when judging the probability of reciprocation, participants made a 
good use of the scale available (0%-100%), with 14 participants (out of 20) having 
a difference between the maximum and minimum judged probability larger than 
50%. In the first session, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of facial WHR [F(1,19) = 5.89, p  = .025, partial η2 = .24], with participants 
estimating wide faces to be more likely to share money (49%) than narrow faces 
(47%). There was no main effect for face gender [F(1,19) = 0.01] or interaction 
effect between face gender and WHR [F(1,19) = 0.34]. 
 If participants evaluate wide faces more favourably than narrow faces as 
suggested by the results of the first session, we would expect  to find a main effect 
(in the same direction) of facial WHR in the second session as well. If, on the 
contrary, participants were able to remember the evaluations linked to each 
character from the first session, we would expect to find a main effect of facial 
WHR in the opposite direction, with narrow faces judged more favourably 
(because characters shown with wide faces in the first session were shown with 
narrow faces in the second session, and vice versa). However, none of these 
predictions turned out to be true. In the second session there were no significant 
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main or interaction effects (all Fs < 0.11). 
 In terms of investment decisions, we note that  one participant did not invest 
in any of the faces he saw on the screen in session one or two, and one participant 
invested in all instances except one face in the second session. The other 18 
participants varied their investment decisions. In the first session, on average, 
participants decided to invest in 9.10 (SD = 4.01) narrow faces and 10.15 (SD = 
4.22) wide faces (from the 20 faces seen in each category). The average number of 
investments in male faces was 9.90 (SD = 4.67) and in female faces 9.35 (SD = 
4.65). A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for 
face gender [F(1,19) = 0.22], or face width [F(1,19) = 2.48, p  = .132], and no 
interaction effect [F(1,19) = 0.08]. 
 The pattern of investment decisions in the second session was very similar to 
the first session. First, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant 
main effect for face gender [F(1,19) = 0.03], for face width [F(1,19) = 0.13], and no 
interaction effect [F(1,19) = 2.16, p = .158]. Second, a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA with session (first or second) as the third independent variable revealed no 
significant main or interaction effects (all ps > .25). 
 One concern in our experiment might be that participants remembered their 
decisions in the first session and stuck to them in the second session. However, this 
was not the case. On average, participants switched their investment decisions from 
session one to session two for 14.3 characters (of the 40 characters; 20 would be 
chance). Notably, most of the changes were from ‘invest’ in wide faces to ‘not 
invest’ in narrow faces (7.9) rather than the reverse (6.4) as findings of Stirrat & 
Perrett (2010) would suggest. The difference was not significant (p > .05).
 We saw that the binary variables facial WHR (low/high) and sex (male/
female) do not influence investment decisions or implicit trustworthiness 
judgments. We next analysed whether other variables had an effect. For this, we 
computed the total number of ‘invest’ decisions and the average estimated 
probability  of reciprocation per face across the two sessions and correlated these 
with the continuous variables: facial WHR (i.e. the precise ratio not the binary 
variable used above), perceived attractiveness and perceived femininity (only  for 
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male faces). For female faces, estimated reciprocation probability correlated with 
attractiveness (r = .39, p  = .013), but not with facial WHR (r = .05, p  = .779). 
Number of ‘invest‘ decisions did not correlate with either attractiveness or facial 
WHR (ps > .24). For male faces, estimated reciprocation probability correlated 
with perceived femininity - more masculine faces were trusted less (r = -.43, p = .
006) but not with facial WHR (r = .06, p  = .738) or attractiveness (r = .17, p = .
306). Perceived femininity was also the only variable to correlate with investment 
decisions (r = -.32, p = .042) (Table 4.2).
 Participants’ age, gender, propensity to trust, risk aversion, self-rated 
dominance and attractiveness did not influence reciprocation probability or 
investment decisions. Participants’ submissiveness correlated with both 
reciprocation probability   (r = .36, p  = .005) and number of investments in female 
faces (r = .22, p = .005), showing that submissive individuals were more likely to 
trust female faces.
Discussion 
 Following Stirrat and Perrett’s (2010) suggestion that facial WHR influences 
face trustworthiness judgments, we investigated whether people take potentially 
Table 4.2. Facial WHR, attractiveness, femininity and perceptions of trustworthiness. 
Implicit trustworthiness measures did not correlate with facial WHR, but were predicted by 
perceived attractiveness (for female faces) and femininity (for male faces). The numbers 
are Pearson’s correlations (p values in parentheses). Significant correlations are in bold. 
Note that “reciprocation probability” refers to the estimates provided by participants in their 
role as investors in trust games, and not to the actual probability of reciprocation by the 
trustees (in our experiment, trustees were fictional).
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costly  actions based on facial WHR. More specifically, we measured the number of 
‘invest’ decisions in trust  games featuring trustees whose faces were manipulated 
for WHR. The trustees were also judged for probability of reciprocation (another 
implicit measure of trustworthiness). In contrast with Stirrat and Perrett  (2010), our 
results indicate that faces with low WHR are not favoured in decisions based on 
trust. If anything, we noted a trend in the opposite direction, with wider faces 
judged to be more likely to reciprocate trust. Increasing facial WHR also tended to 
determine more positive switches (from ‘not invest’ to ‘invest’) than decreasing it.
 Instead, our measures of implicit trustworthiness negatively correlated with 
perceived masculinity of male faces, i.e. more feminine faces were perceived as 
more trustworthy. This result is consistent with previous findings showing that 
increased masculinity of male faces decreased perceptions of cooperativeness 
(Perrett et al., 1998). 
 What can be the reasons behind the different results related to the effect of 
facial WHR on perceived trustworthiness obtained by Stirrat and Perrett (2010) and 
us? One possibility concerns the different stimuli used. Our stimuli were computer 
generated, while Stirrat and Perrett (2010) used natural-looking faces. Furthermore, 
manipulation of WHR in our stimuli occurred mainly by increasing the facial width 
(‘stretching’ the face horizontally), while in Stirrat and Perrett  (2010) the WHR 
was modified predominantly by increasing the facial height (‘stretching’ the face 
vertically).
 However, another interesting possibility  is that  the trustworthiness-based 
choices in Stirrat and Perrett (2010) were not driven by the facial WHR, but by the 
apparent femininity. Narrower faces in Stirrat and Perrett  (2010) tended to appear 
more feminine; if facial WHR correlated with perceived femininity and this in turn 
influenced participants‘ responses, facial WHR might appear as a predictor of 
trustworthiness choices if femininity  is not partialled out. To investigate this 
possibility, we attempted an exact replication of Stirrat and Perrett’s (2010) study 
with an extra variable collected. After choosing the most trustworthy-looking faces 
from various pairs, participants were also asked to select  the most feminine-looking 
from the same pairs.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
 We recruited 109 online volunteers through Psychological Research on the 
Net (http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html).
Face stimuli
 We used a subset of the original stimuli presented in Stirrat  & Perrett (2010). 
The stimuli were of 12 male composite characters. Each image was manipulated in 
shape to create one version with high WHR and one version with low WHR (more 
details about the stimuli are given in Stirrat & Perrett, 2010).
Procedure
 Participants were presented with pairs of faces consisting of the two versions 
(narrow and wide) of each character, and were asked to indicate which image 
looked: i) more feminine; and ii) more trustworthy. The trials were blocked 
according to the trait judged; femininity judgments were first. Position of narrow/
wide faces to the left or right of the screen was randomised.
Results  
 Of all participants, 54 (50%) chose more often the narrow faces and 43 
(39%) chose more often the wide faces when judging femininity (12 chose an equal 
number of narrow and wide faces). For trustworthiness judgments, 56 (51%) chose 
more often the narrow faces and 42 (39%) the wide faces (11 showed no 
preference). Chi-square tests revealed both distributions were significantly different 
from chance (p = .020 and p = .007, respectively).
 For each participant and dimension measured, we calculated the proportion of 
choices for narrow faces (chance level: 50%). On average, participants showed a 
significant preference towards narrow faces when judging femininity: M  = 55%, 
4. TRUSTWORTHINESS IMPRESSIONS
131
SD = 24%; t(108) = 2.30, p  = .023. Similarly, when judging trustworthiness, 
participants preferred on 53% (SD = 26%) of the trials the narrow faces, although 
the result was not significantly  different from chance: t(108) = 1.24, p = .218. 
 In 9 out of 12 pairs, the narrow face was chosen more often for both 
perceived femininity  and trustworthiness. There was a large correlation between 
the number of times a narrow face was judged more feminine in a pair and the 
number of times the same narrow face was judged more trustworthy: r = .90, p < .
001. 
Discussion  
 We replicated Stirrat and Perrett (2010) findings that faces with lower WHR 
are judged as more trustworthy. Additionally, we also found a preference towards 
perceiving faces with lower WHR as more feminine. The high correlation between 
choices for trustworthy  and feminine faces indicates there is a strong link between 
the two dimensions. Therefore, it is possible that trustworthiness judgments depend 
on variations in perceived femininity rather than facial WHR. In Stirrat and Perrett 
(2010), attractiveness was excluded as a potential confound (by including it in the 
regression), but femininity was not.
 The correlation between responses favouring the narrow faces in judgments 
of trustworthiness and femininity  might have been artificially inflated by our 
design. Same participants were asked to complete both tasks and thus faces 
selected in the first task might have become the ‘default’ option for the second task. 
To exclude this possibility, we conducted a short follow-up experiment in which a 
different group of participants were asked to complete only the trustworthiness task 
(which was the second task in the current experiment). 
EXPERIMENT 3
Methods
Participants
 We recruited 32 online participants (mean age 33.2, 16 female) through 
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Their participation was paid $0.10.
Face stimuli
 Same as in Experiment 2.
Procedure
 In a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task, participants indicated which 
image from pairs of faces consisting of the narrow and wide version of each 
character looked more trustworthy. 
Results and discussion
 Of all participants, 14 (44%) chose more often the narrow version and 13 
(41%) chose more often the wide version as the more trustworthy face (5 were 
equally split). Per participant, the proportion of choices for narrow faces was on 
average 52% (SD = 6%), which was not significantly different from chance: t(31) = 
0.48, p = .634. However, the number of times a narrow face was judged to be more 
trustworthy in this experiment correlated highly with the number of times the same 
face was judged to be more feminine in experiment 2: r =  .83, p  = .001. This is 
compelling evidence for a strong correlation between femininity  and 
trustworthiness judgments for the face stimuli from Stirrat & Perrett (2010) and 
lends additional support to the possibility  that facial WHR does not influence 
perceived trustworthiness directly, but through changing perceived femininity. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
 
 Experiment 1 showed no clear preference for faces with low WHR when 
participants were asked to make investments in trust games, implying that narrow 
faces were not perceived as more trustworthy than wide faces. If anything, we 
noted the opposite trend, with wide faces attracting more trust decisions. Our 
results are inconsistent with those obtained by Stirrat and Perrett  (2010) who found 
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that investments in trust games negatively correlated with facial WHR of the male 
counterparts, and that narrow face versions were preferred to wide face versions in 
2AFC paradigms.
 Our stimuli were computer-generated faces, while Stirrat and Perrett (2010) 
used either natural faces or composite images of natural faces, so one concern is 
that replication was not successful because of the different nature of the stimuli. 
However, we believe this is not the case. First, faces created using FaceGen have 
been used in numerous studies before and were shown to elicit trait judgments 
similar to natural faces (e.g. Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Second, our stimuli were 
carefully  controlled to match the facial WHRs of the faces used by Stirrat and 
Perrett  (2010). We matched not only the average WHRs for the narrow and wide 
faces, but also the average WHR difference between face versions derived from the 
same character. 
 One difference between our stimuli and Stirrat and Perrett’s (2010) stimuli 
concerned the method by which facial WHR was varied; we varied facial width 
while keeping facial height relatively constant, while Stirrat and Perrett (2010) did 
the opposite. It may  be that perceived trustworthiness is increased by either 
increasing facial height (as in Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) or increasing facial width (as 
in Experiment 1), independent of the facial width ratio. One simple explanation is 
that people select the bigger face to be more trustworthy. Another explanation may 
be that increasing facial height and increasing facial width produced similar 
changes in expressions making the faces appear happier (or less angry). Subtle cues 
resembling happy or angry expressions were shown to bias trustworthiness 
perception (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008).
 A more likely possibility suggested by our results is that, at least for male 
faces, trustworthiness judgments are driven by perceived femininity. Femininity 
was previously shown to influence perceptions of trustworthiness (Perrett  et al., 
1998) and female faces are generally  perceived as more trustworthy (Kleisner et 
al., 2013). In Experiment 1, we found a significant correlation between femininity 
and both investment decisions and judged probability of reciprocation (implicit 
measures of trustworthiness), but not  between facial WHR or attractiveness and our 
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dependent variables. We therefore argue that it  is perceived femininity, rather than 
facial WHR, that is driving trustworthiness judgments.
 In Experiment 2 we verified this claim with the original set  of faces used by 
Stirrat and Perrett (2010). First, we successfully  replicated the results reported by 
Stirrat and Perrett  (2010), with the narrow faces attracting significantly more 
choices in terms of perceived trustworthiness. Second, we showed that the narrow 
faces were also judged to be the more feminine ones from the pairs. Third, and 
most importantly for our purpose, we found a very high correlation (r = .90) 
between the number of times a narrow face was judged more feminine in a pair and 
the number of times the same narrow face was judged more trustworthy. 
Experiment 3 confirmed this high correlation was not an artefact of the within-
subjects design used in Experiment 2. 
 It is important to note we do not argue that facial WHR is unrelated to 
impressions of trustworthiness for certain faces. In fact, our second experiment 
confirmed Stirrat  and Perrett’s (2010) original findings that narrow faces are 
perceived to be more trustworthy. However, the relation is not direct and the effect 
appears to be mediated by  perceived femininity, such that a preference for narrow 
faces is not seen any more when faces vary in WHR but not perceived femininity 
(experiment 1). 
 In real life, facial WHR may correlate with a more masculine (i.e. aggressive) 
behaviour. Men with wider faces were found to be more aggressive (Carré & 
McCormick, 2008) and more likely to exploit trust in laboratory games (Haselhuhn 
& Wong, 2011; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). Although these findings were recently 
challenged (Özener, 2011), there is a plausible biological mechanism proposed to 
account for the relation between facial WHR and behaviour (Verdonck et al., 1999; 
Weston et  al., 2007), by which testosterone level influences both. We note that our 
experiments did not examine actual behaviour and thus our results cannot 
contribute to this debate.
 To conclude, we showed that facial WHR is not a direct predictor of face 
trustworthiness. Instead, facial WHR may be linked to perceived femininity which 
in turn influences trustworthiness judgments. Future studies should attempt to 
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further disentangle the effects of facial WHR from the effects of perceived 
femininity on perceptions of trustworthiness. For example, our experiments may be 
replicated with faces that vary orthogonally on facial WHR and femininity. A 
simple way to modify  perceived femininity  of a face is to interfere with the 
eyebrows, which were shown to be a strong cue to facial sex (Bruce et al., 1993). If 
our hypothesis is correct, wide faces with less pronounced eyebrows (i.e. more 
feminine) will be judged as more trustworthy than narrow faces with prominent 
eyebrows (i.e. more masculine). 
4.2. ACCURACY OF FACE TRUSTWORTHINESS JUDGMENTS 
INTRODUCTION
 Although people tend to agree on their evaluations of faces along many social 
dimensions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), there is no conclusive evidence to 
support a correlation between face impressions and the actual personality or 
behaviour of the targets. Some studies found that certain self-reported personality 
traits can be inferred from faces (Little & Perrett, 2007; Berry, 1991; Bond et al., 
1994; Penton-Voak et al., 2006), as can be membership to religious (Rule et al., 
2010), political (Rule & Ambady, 2010) or sexual minority  groups (Rule, Ambady, 
& Hallett, 2009; Rule & Ambady, 2008; Rule, Macrae, & Ambady, 2009). 
However, other studies found no relations between face impressions and 
personality or behaviour (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Zebrowitz et al., 1996; Zebrowitz 
et al., 1998; Pound et al., 2007).
 Accuracy of facial trustworthiness judgments received less attention, possibly 
because of the difficulty to have an objective criterion to measure actual 
trustworthiness. Some studies (Porter et al., 2008; Valla, Ceci, & Williams, 2011) 
investigated whether people can infer group membership of targets thought to vary 
dramatically in their trustworthiness (e.g., criminals and non-criminals). They 
found slightly  higher than chance performance but, in at least one of the studies 
(Valla et al., 2011), heterogeneity  of stimuli facilitated group  membership 
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recognition (criminals’ photos were mugshots).  
  However, membership to a criminal group does not necessarily imply lack of 
trustworthiness (not more than receiving a Nobel prize certifies one’s 
trustworthiness). More recent studies examined whether people can reliably  predict 
trustworthy (i.e., cooperative) behaviour in economic games, such as the trust 
game, played in the laboratory. Results were mixed. When participants saw short 
face clips of the targets, usually  between 5s and 20s (“thin slices” of behaviour; 
Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992), some authors reported significant correlations 
between face trustworthiness impressions and cooperative behaviour (Fetchenhauer 
et al., 2010), but others could not replicate this effect (Gollwitzer et al., 2012). 
 Stiratt and Perrett (2010) suggested that people’s impressions of 
trustworthiness vary  with the targets’ facial width-to-height ratio and that this 
metric is a significant predictor of reciprocation rates in trust games (signalling 
trustworthiness). The implication is that  cooperative behaviour can also be inferred 
from static face images. Some evidence supporting this view came from two 
studies (Bonnefon et  al., 2012; Verplaetse et al., 2007) which showed that, under 
certain conditions (with photos taken at the moment of deciding to cooperate or 
not; or with black-and-white cropped photos to exclude external cues) participants 
were better than chance at identifying cheaters and cooperators. 
 Trust  games were shown to be a good proxy for the trust  investors place on 
trustees (Berg et al., 1995), but they are not an ideal measure of trustees’ 
trustworthiness. At no point during the game do trustees commit to returning 
money  to the investors; on the contrary, they are usually told that they have no 
obligation to do so. In the absence of an explicit  commitment to cooperate, it is 
difficult to classify their behaviour as deceptive or untrustworthy. A better proxy  to 
(un)trustworthiness is provided by situations in which explicit social commitments 
are broken for a personal gain at the expense of the other party. A television game 
show broadcasted in the Netherlands in 2002 provided just such a setup (Belot, 
Bhaskar, & van de Ven, 2012). In the final stage of the show, contestants were 
asked to play  a prisoner’s dilemma game for the prize money they had earned up to 
that point (usually  in the order of thousands of Euros). Crucially, before deciding 
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whether or not to share the money, they  had an opportunity to make explicit 
promises to share. These promises were later kept or broken, providing a measure 
of each contestant’s trustworthiness. 
 Using data from this television game show and from a series of trust games 
played in the laboratory, we investigated the accuracy  of facial trustworthiness 
impressions under various conditions. In Experiment 1, we showed participants 
still photos of contestants on the television game show and asked them to predict 
which ones kept their explicit promise to share the prize money. Experiment 2 
aimed to compare face-based judgment accuracy for static (still photos) versus 
dynamic (5s video clips) stimuli, and for two very different interaction situations: i) 
a high-stakes prisoner’s dilemma game on a television show, and ii) a lower-stakes 
trust game in a laboratory experiment. The criterion for trustworthiness in the 
laboratory trust games was the average rate of reciprocation. Experiment 3 was a 
within-subjects replication of Experiment 2 using a sub-sample of the face stimuli 
(both static and dynamic) from the television show. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Methods
Participants
 Sixty-six participants (41 female, age range: 18 - 62 years, M = 24.1, SD = 
7.1) were recruited from University  College London’s psychology subject pool. 
They  received £3 for their participation. Moreover, an additional £20 was awarded 
to the most accurate person.
Face stimuli
 We used data (recorded in 2002) from 61 episodes of a Dutch television game 
show called “Will (s)he share or not?” (see Belot et al., 2012). In this show, five 
players compete for money by answering trivia questions. The least accurate 
players are progressively eliminated until only  the two most successful contestants 
are left. In the final round of the show, the prize money  accumulated by the two 
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remaining players (based on their answers to the trivia questions) is pooled. These 
two players then play a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game in which they each 
secretly decide whether to share or ‘steal’ the pooled prize money. If both players 
chose to share, their pooled gains are evenly split (i.e., they each get an equal share 
of the total). If one player decides to share but the other decides to ‘steal’ then the 
latter takes all the money while the former goes home empty-handed. Finally, if 
neither player chooses to share (i.e., they both decide to ‘steal’) then they both go 
home empty-handed. Critically  for our study, the two final contestants could 
discuss their strategies with each other and make explicit  promises to share (or not) 
before secretly making their decisions. Two Dutch-speaking judges independently 
identified 47 Caucasian finalists from the show who made firm and unambiguous 
promises to share (we ignored finalists who did not make firm commitments to 
share). For each of these finalists, we extracted a still photo of their face from the 
beginning segment of the show where each contestant introduced him/herself. The 
stills we selected were frontal shots with closed mouth, neutral expression and 
standard lighting (see Figure 4.2). Of the 47 finalists, 19 (5 female) broke their 
promise and chose to ‘steal’ (i.e., they  were untrustworthy), while 28 (13 female) 
kept their promise  and shared (i.e., they were trustworthy).
Figure 4.2. Examples of face stimuli from the Dutch television game show. All 
selected contestants made firm promises to share the prize money. Contestants in the top 
row kept their promise and shared (trustworthy targets), while those in the bottom row 
broke their promise and chose to ‘steal’ (untrustworthy targets).
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Procedure
 Participants were first given details about the television game show and how 
the face stimuli were selected. The instructions explained that they would be seeing 
these photos, presented one at a time, and that they would have to guess whether 
each person shown in the photo had kept his/her promise to share the prize money. 
The base rate (i.e., the overall proportion of trustworthy players) was not disclosed. 
Before starting the experiment, participants were asked to predict their performance 
- predicted accuracy  rate (AR). They were then shown the stimuli, one by one 
(presentation order was randomised), and asked to guess whether the target had 
chosen to share or ‘steal’ (binary variable) by clicking on the corresponding button 
(the position of the buttons was counterbalanced between participants). After each 
choice, participants reported how confident they were in their judgment (using a 0–
100% scale). No feedback was provided during the trials. After completing all 
trials, participants were asked to estimate how well they thought they did 
(estimated AR). At the end, they reported basic demographic characteristics, self-
assessed ability to “read” faces (a binary variable), and familiarity with the 
television program and contestants (all reported seeing the stimuli for the first 
time). 
Results
 Results are summarised in Table 4.3. The average accuracy rate (AR = 
number of correctly identified cheaters and cooperators / number of trials) achieved 
by participants was 53.2% (SD = 8.0%). The result was significantly greater than 
chance: t(65) = 3.26, p = .002. A 2×2×2 mixed ANOVA with target behaviour 
(trustworthy/untrustworthy) and target gender (male/female faces) as within-
subject factors and participants gender as a between-subjects factor revealed a 
significant main effect of target behaviour on accuracy [F(1,64) = 25.10, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .28], with higher rates for trustworthy targets (57.4%) than for 
untrustworthy targets (47.1%). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all ps > .37).
 The ability to infer behaviour from faces was overestimated by participants, 
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of which 66% claimed to be able to “read” faces. The average predicted AR 
collected before the experiment (63.8%) and the average estimated AR collected 
after completion of all trials (58.6%) were both significantly  greater than chance 
(both ps < .001). Both values were also significantly greater than the actual AR 
(53.2%): t(63) = 6.02, p = 1.00×10-7, η2 = .37, and t(65) = 4.40, p = 4.19×10-5, η2 
= .23, respectively. Furthermore, 67% of participants estimated they would be 
above chance before seeing the stimuli and this percentage remained high (62%) 
even after seeing the stimuli. 
 Because of the larger number of trustworthy than untrustworthy  targets in our 
sample, a higher than chance accuracy rate may be achieved if participants have a 
bias towards positive evaluations. To exclude this possibility, we computed A’, a 
nonparametric measure of judgment sensitivity independent of response bias 
(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). A’ typically  ranges from .5, corresponding to no 
ability  to distinguish signal from noise, to 1, reflecting perfect discrimination. The 
average A’ in our experiment was .54 (SD = 0.13), which was significantly  higher 
than .5: t(65) = 2.29, p  = .025. The average response bias, B”, was .20 (SD = .31), 
showing a significant preference towards providing more “trustworthy” responses: 
t(65) = 5.10, p < .001. 
 Individual differences in the ability to discriminate between trustworthy and 
untrustworthy targets did not correlate with how well participants thought they  did. 
The average point-biserial correlation between response accuracy (correct/
incorrect) and confidence level (continuous variable between 0 and 100%) was .03 
(SD = .27; p = .353). Furthermore, accuracy rates achieved by  participants did not 
Table 4.3. Accuracy, discriminability  and response bias in identifying trustworthy 
and untrustworthy  targets from the television game show face stimuli. Significant 
deviations from chance levels are in bold and underlined (standard deviations are 
presented in parentheses).  
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correlate with predicted ARs (r = .07, p = .595) or estimated ARs (r = .06, p =.623). 
 The inter-rater reliability  of responses in our sample was low, Fleiss’ kappa 
= .07. Fleiss’ kappa calculates the degree of binary scale agreement between raters 
over that expected by chance and ranges from less than 0 (chance-level agreement) 
to 1 (perfect agreement). 
Discussion
 Our results suggest that people can infer trustworthy behaviour in real-life 
situations from faces, at  slightly better than chance levels. The effect may be driven 
by individual differences between observers (how good they are at “reading” faces) 
or targets (how easy  to “read” the faces are). If certain observers are better ‘face 
readers’ than others, one might expect to see this reflected in their confidence when 
categorising faces. This is not what we found. In general, confidence in the ability 
to “read” faces exceeded actual ability, and there was no correlation between 
confidence and accuracy of responses. If certain faces are easier to “read” than 
others, this would imply that there are generally useful diagnostic facial cues to 
trustworthiness, cues that are apparent to most  observers. This in turn would imply 
that observers should agree on who looks trustworthy and who looks 
untrustworthy. Inconsistent with this idea, our inter-rater agreement measure was 
relatively low. 
 In the next experiment we compared accuracy of face trustworthiness 
impressions from static and dynamic stimuli. In addition, we examined whether our 
findings replicate with a second set of data: faces and behavioural data from 
participants in laboratory trust games. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Methods
Participants
 Eighty participants (43 female; age range 18 - 54 years old, M  = 24.4, SD = 
6.4) were recruited from the psychology subject  pools of University College 
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London and the University of Warwick. They were paid £3 for their participation.
Face stimuli
 We had two sources for our stimuli and we created two types of stimuli from 
each source: still photos and silent video clips of five seconds. The first source 
were recordings of the Dutch television program presented in the previous 
experiment. For each of the 47 Caucasian contestants selected in Experiment 1, 
who made strong and unambiguous promises to share, we aimed to have two 
stimuli. The first was a still photo, frontal shot with closed mouth, neutral 
expression and standard lighting, from the individual presentations at the beginning 
of the show. The second was a five-second silent clip, frontal shot, cropped from 
the moment they committed to share the prize money with their partner. Due to 
certain limitations (e.g., some finalists were not filmed frontally for at least  five 
seconds when making promises to share), we ended up with stills and clips from 38 
players (15 female) that promised firmly to their partners to share the earnings. Of 
these, 19 (10 female) kept their promise and shared, while 19 (5 female) broke their 
promise and chose to ‘steal’.
 The second source for our stimuli were recorded interviews of first year 
Psychology undergraduates students from Bangor University detailing their reasons 
for choosing to study  Psychology. Some of these students took part a few months 
later in another experiment in which they played trustees in a series of trust games 
with other students. In trust games (Berg et al., 1995), an investor is endowed with 
money  and given the possibility to invest part or all of it in a trustee, hoping for a 
higher return. The amount invested is a good proxy for the trust  the investor places 
in the trustee. In line with previous studies (e.g., Stirrat & Perrett, 2010), we used 
the amount returned by the trustee as a measure of his/her trustworthiness. We 
selected ten “trustworthy” students (five female) with average return rates above 
50% (M = 54.9%, SD = 6.7%) and ten “untrustworthy” students (five female) with 
average return rates below 50% (M = 26.6%, SD = 6.7%). From their recorded 
interviews, we created for each student a five-second silent clip  and a still photo 
(neutral expression). 
4. TRUSTWORTHINESS IMPRESSIONS
143
 To summarise, we had four groups of stimuli. One set  of 38 still photos and 
one set of 38 clips were created from the finalists in the Dutch television show (we 
call these the TV stimuli). One set of 20 still photos and one set of 20 clips were 
created from the interviewed students who played trust games in the laboratory (we 
call these the Lab stimuli). Within each set, one half of the stimuli were of 
‘trustworthy’ targets and the other half of ‘untrustworthy’ targets.
Procedure
 Participants were allocated, in a counterbalanced order, to one of four 
conditions, corresponding to the stimuli set seen first: TV stills, TV clips, Lab stills 
or Lab clips. The second set of stimuli was selected such that the source (TV or 
Lab-based) and the type (stills or clips) were different from those of the first set. 
For example, TV stills were followed by Lab clips, while Lab stills were followed 
by TV clips. 
 Before the TV stimuli, participants were given details about the TV show and 
how the stimuli (stills or clips) were selected, including disclosure of the base rates 
(i.e., 50% trustworthy and 50% untrustworthy targets). They were then shown the 
stimuli, one by one (presentation order was randomised), and asked to guess 
whether the target chose to share or ‘steal’ (binary  variable) by clicking on one of 
two buttons (the position of the buttons was counterbalanced between participants). 
After this binary  choice, participants reported how confident they were in their 
judgment on an 11-division ruler ranging from “not at all confident” (coded as -5) 
to “extremely confident” (coded as +5). The division in the middle was coded as 0. 
In addition, participants were asked to predict their accuracy rate before seeing any 
TV stimuli (predicted AR) and to estimate their achieved accuracy rate after 
completing all the TV trials (estimated AR). 
 Before the Lab stimuli trials, participants received information about  the trust 
games and how we selected the stimuli (stills or clips). They were then shown the 
stimuli, one by  one (presentation order was randomised), and asked to provide an 
estimate of the return rate of that target  (continuous variable, between 0 and 100). 
Estimated return rates below 50% were coded as “untrustworthy target” responses, 
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while return rates 50% and above were coded as “trustworthy target” responses. 
After each judgment, participants were asked for their confidence (see previous 
paragraph).
 No feedback was provided during the trials. At the end of the study, all 
participants reported basic demographic characteristics, self-assessed ability to 
“read” faces (a binary  variable), and familiarity with any faces seen on the screen 
(all reported seeing the stimuli for the first time). 
Results
TV stimuli 
 Performance (i.e., accuracy of trustworthiness judgments) was measured as 
proportion of correct responses. Because the base rate of trustworthy to 
untrustworthy targets was 50/50, the percentage of correct responses can be 
considered an unbiased indicator of the ability  to discriminate between trustworthy 
and untrustworthy targets (i.e. potential response biases do not  artificially increase/
decrease the computed sensitivity). 
 Our experimental design ensured that each stimuli set was rated as the first 
set by  20 participants and as the second set by another 20 participants. Independent 
t-tests failed to find significant differences between the accuracy of participants 
judging the TV stills first versus participants judging the TV stills second [t(38) = 
0.48, p  = .631], or between participants judging the TV clips first  versus 
participants judging the TV clips second [t(38) = 1.62, p = .1451]. Likewise, 
independent t-tests failed to find differences in performance related to participants’ 
gender [TV stills: t(37) = .27, p = .786; TV clips: t(36) = .06, p = .950]. Therefore, 
for the following analyses we collapsed all data across order and gender, such that 
we had 40 participants judging the TV stills and 40 participants judging the TV 
clips. 
 As expected, estimated AR and predicted AR correlated (for TV stills: r = .78, 
p < .001; for TV clips: r = .50, p  = .001). More importantly, one-sample t-tests 
revealed they were all significantly higher than chance level (50%), an indication 
of participants’ confidence in their judgments. There were no significant 
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differences between estimated AR and predicted AR for either stills or clips (all 
scores and significance levels are presented in Table 4.4).
 In terms of response accuracy, the average percentage of correct  responses 
was 50.3% for TV stills - indistinguishable from chance [t(39) = .27], and 54.5% 
for TV clips - significantly higher than chance level [t(39) = 3.77, p = .001]. 
Accuracy for TV clips was also significantly higher than accuracy for TV stills 
[t(78) = 2.48, p = .016]. A mixed 2×2 ANOVA revealed in addition a significant 
interaction effect  between stimulus gender and type [F(1,78) = 5.16, p  = .026, 
partial η2 = .06], with discrimination of male stimuli more successful from clips 
(56%) than from stills (48%).
 To analyse the distribution of participants’ responses, we coded each 
“trustworthy” response as 1, and each “untrustworthy” response as 0. Therefore, an 
equal distribution of responses between the two options would be reflected by an 
average of 0.5. There was a slight bias towards selecting the “trustworthy” option 
for both stills [M  = 53.2%; t(39) = 2.56, p = .014] and clips [M  = 52.8%; t(39) = 
2.02, p  = .050]. An independent t-test revealed no difference in response bias 
between stills and clips. 
 We next examined whether there was any correlation between participants’ 
confidence and their accuracy, trial by trial and at an aggregate level. For each 
participant, we computed an average of their confidence levels across all trials and 
correlated these averages from all participants with the average accuracy  scores. 
Confidence scores ranged from -5 (not at all confident) to +5 (extremely 
confident). The average confidence across all trials for TV stills was 0.48 (SD = 
1.63), while for TV clips was 0.81 (SD = 1.28) (no significant difference between 
the two groups). The average confidence scores per participant correlated with 
accuracy  scores neither for stills (r = .14, p = .387) nor for clips (r = .05, p = .762). 
For each participant, we computed the point-biserial correlation between 
confidence (continuous variable) and response accuracy (correct/incorrect). The 
average point-biserial correlations for TV stills and TV clips were close to zero, .01 
for each group (both ps > .55). 
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Lab stimuli 
 In contrast to the categorical response recorded for the TV stimuli, the 
response asked for the Lab stimuli was continuous, with possible values between 
0% and 100%. However, based on these values, we also computed a categorical 
variable - response category -with values 1 (i.e., “trustworthy  target”) for responses 
of 50% and above, or 0 (i.e., “untrustworthy target”) for responses below 50%. 
Similarly, based on their actual return rates during the trust games, the targets were 
classified into two categories: “trustworthy”, if the actual return rate was 50% or 
above (half of them), and “untrustworthy”, if the actual return rate was below 50% 
(the other half). To measure the accuracy  of participants’ response we computed 
two indicators: the correlation between participants’ response and targets’ actual 
return rate, and the accuracy of categorisation (similar to the one computed for the 
TV stimuli), calculated as the percentage of matches between the participants’ 
response category and the targets’ actual return rate category (i.e., trustworthy-
trustworthy or untrustworthy-untrustworthy). Responses from participants seeing 
the Lab stimuli first and from participants seeing the Lab stimuli second were 
comparable (p = .511) and thus pooled together. 
 Overall, across both stills and clips, the average response given by 
participants (i.e., estimated reciprocation rate) was 43.1% (SD = 15.7%). This was 
surprisingly accurate, considering that the average targets’ actual return rate was 
40.7%. Estimated reciprocation rates did not vary between stills and clips (see 
Table 4.5). Accuracy of responses may be estimated by computing the correlation 
Table 4.4. Summary  of participants’ performance at  identifying trustworthy  and 
untrustworthy  targets in the TV show. The face stimuli were still photos or 5s clips. p 
values to the right (in italics) reflect differences to chance levels, while p  values at the 
bottom reflect differences between performance with stills and clips. Significant results are 
in bold and underlined.
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between estimated and actual return rates. This correlation was .11 (p = .019) for 
stills, and -.03 (p = .353) for clips. The correlation for stills was significantly  higher 
than for clips (p = .013). 
 Next we analysed the computed categorical variables. Categorisation 
accuracy  was not significantly different from chance for either stills or clips 
(although approaching significance for stills, see Table 4.5). Response category 
indicated a bias towards estimated rates below 50% (i.e., “trustworthy” responses) 
for stills, but not for clips. Confidence levels did not differ between stills and clips, 
and there was virtually  no correlation between confidence and categorisation 
accuracy  (Table 4.5). Also, the average accuracy  obtained by each participant did 
not significantly correlate with average confidence level (Table 4.5). 
 To better understand the factors behind differences in performance, we 
submitted our data to a series of 2×2 mixed ANOVA with stimulus type (stills/
clips) as the between-subjects factor, and stimulus gender (female/male) as the 
within-subject factor. The dependent variables were: estimated reciprocation rate, 
correlation between estimated and actual reciprocation rate, categorisation accuracy 
and response category (Table 4.6). 
 For the estimated return rate, there was a significant interaction effect 
between stimulus type and stimulus gender [F(1,78) = 9.99, p  = .002, partial η2 = .
11], with female clips judged as more generous (estimated return rate 47.4%) than 
female stills (40.5%), male clips (42.4%) and male stills (41.9%). No other effects 
Table 4.5. Summary  of participants’ performance at  identifying trustworthy  and 
untrustworthy  targets in the Lab trust games. The face stimuli were still photos or 5s 
clips. p  values to the right (in italics) reflect differences to chance levels, while p  values at 
the bottom reflect differences between performance with stills and clips. Significant results 
are in bold and underlined.
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were significant (ps > .08).
 For the correlation between estimated and actual return rate, we found a main 
effect of stimulus type [F(1,78) = 5.17, p  = .026, partial η2 = .06] and a strong 
interaction effect [F(1,78) = 30.39, p < .001, partial η2 = .28]. The correlation was 
positive for female stills (r = .26, p < .001) and negative for female clips (r = -.13, p 
= .007). 
 For categorisation accuracy, there was a significant main effect of stimulus 
gender [F(1,78) = 8.81, p  = .004, partial η2 = .10], with higher accuracy for the 
female stimuli (M = 54.9%) than for male stimuli (M  = 50.0%). The interaction 
effect between stimulus type and stimulus gender was also significant [F(1,78) = 
17.54, p  < .001, partial η2 = .18], reflecting higher accuracy for female stills (M = 
59.0%) compared to female clips (M  = 50.8%), male stills (M = 47.3%) and male 
clips (M = 52.8%). Accuracy  for female stills was the only one significantly higher 
than chance level [t(39) = 3.98, p < .001; the other three ps were above .09].
 For response category, we noted a significant main effect for stimulus gender 
[F(1,78) = 11.17, p = .001, partial η2 = .13], with female stimuli categorised more 
often as trustworthy (46.9%) than male stimuli (40.1%). No other effects were 
significant (ps > .22).
 
Table 4.6. Responses to lab stimuli per type (stills vs. clips) and sex (female vs. 
male). Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. P values below each statistic 
reflect differences to chance levels. Significant results are in bold.
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 In the end, all ANOVAs reported above were re-run with two additional 
between-subjects factors: participant gender and stimuli set order (whether the Lab 
stimuli were seen before or after the TV stimuli). The results did not modify in any 
notable way: we found no significant main effects or interaction effects involving 
any of these factors (all ps > .05).
  
Comparison and correlation between TV and Lab stimuli judgments 
 In our experiment, participants provided judgments for both TV and Lab 
stimuli, only the stimulus type differing between the two blocks. Thus, participants 
either judged TV stills and Lab clips, or TV clips and Lab stills. As we have 
pointed out above, the results suggest that participants were better than chance at 
judging (male) clips from the TV stimuli, and female stills from the Lab stimuli. 
Considering that the same participants who judged TV clips also judged Lab stills, 
one possibility  is that  our counterbalanced allocation of participants to conditions 
produced, by chance, a higher proportion of participants able to distinguish 
trustworthy from untrustworthy targets among those that saw TV clips and Lab 
stills. If that were the case, one would expect  to find a correlation between 
performance with TV clips and performance with Lab stills. 
 The correlations between participants’ performance with one type of stimuli 
versus the other are summarised in Table 4.7. The only significant correlations 
were between confidence levels, which means that participants confident in their 
judgments for stills were similarly confident in their judgments for clips. 
Participants’ judgments for TV clips did not correlate with their judgments for Lab 
stills, in terms of either response bias or accuracy, suggesting that the participants 
who performed better with TV clips were not also better with Lab stills. The 
situation was similar for participants that judged TV stills and Lab clips. 
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  Although our data did not come from a pure between subjects design (each 
participant completed two out of four conditions, see above), we ran a 2×2 
between-subjects ANOVA with stimulus source (TV/Lab) and type (clips/stills) as 
independent variables and accuracy as dependent variable. Confirming the noted 
anomaly between higher performance with dynamic stimuli in the TV condition 
and higher performance with static stimuli in the Lab condition, we found a 
significant interaction effect between stimulus source and type: F(1, 156) = 5.83, p 
= .017, partial η2 = .04. Main effects were not significant (ps > .11).
Discussion
 When asked to categorise targets from a TV show as trustworthy (i.e., 
keeping their promise) or untrustworthy  (i.e., breaking their promise), participants 
performed better than chance with dynamic stimuli. When static images of the 
same targets were presented, performance was at chance. The difference between 
performance with clips and stills was more evident for male faces. This result 
suggests that, for the TV targets, cues to trustworthiness are extracted from facial 
motion and not from facial structure.
 For the Lab stimuli the situation was reversed. When looking at female still 
images, participants could distinguish targets who returned half or more of the 
amount received (i.e., showing trustworthy behaviour) from those who returned 
nothing or less than half of the money  available (i.e., showing untrustworthy 
behaviour). With male stills and both male and female clips, participants were at 
Table 4.7. Correlations between performance in the two experimental blocks (TV and 
Lab stimuli, different types). p  values are presented in italics below each correlation. 
Significant correlations are in bold.
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chance. The increased accuracy with TV clips and Lab (female) stills was not due 
to chance allocation of better ‘face-readers’ to the group seeing these stimuli, 
compared to the group seeing TV stills and Lab clips. Performance with the two 
stimulus types did not correlate for any of the groups. 
 How can we explain that it was possible to distinguish between trustworthy 
and untrustworthy targets in clips from the TV show but not from the Lab trust 
games? The difference might be due to how these stimuli were produced. First, the 
TV clips included the facial sequence when the potential deceptive behaviour 
occurred, while the Lab clips were taken from before the trust games. The TV clips 
could thus feature additional information about ‘state trustworthiness’, while the 
Lab clips were limited at presenting information about ‘general trustworthiness’. In 
this respect, the Lab clips are not more informative than the Lab stills and might 
even have a detrimental effect on detecting deception (as is the case for the female 
stills) by increasing noise. Second, in one case we have stimuli linked to 
(un)trustworthy behaviour exhibited in the real world, while in the other case the 
stimuli are related to artificial behaviour in the lab. It is conceivable that people 
behave differently in these contexts. 
 Up to now, our attempts to understand if and how trustworthy behaviour in 
the real world can be predicted from faces (static or dynamic) have produced mixed 
results. In Experiment 1 we found that trustworthiness can be inferred from static 
images, but the result  did not replicate in Experiment 2. Instead, in Experiment 2 
dynamic images seemed to be more informative. Therefore, we conducted a final 
experiment to inform us about the role of stimulus type (static and dynamic image) 
and gender (female and male targets) on the accuracy  of trustworthiness 
impressions in real-world situations.
 
EXPERIMENT 3
Methods
Participants
 We recruited 120 online participants (68 female) through Amazon 
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Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Results from web-based samples of 
participants have been shown to have comparable means, standard deviations and 
internal reliability  as those from lab-based samples (Germine et al., 2012). 
Participants were U.S.-based and had a task completion rate of at least 95%, an 
indicator of good previous performance. Age range was between 18 and 63 years 
old, with a mean age of 34.0 years old (SD = 10.7). Four participants (three female) 
were excluded because they did not vary their responses in one or more of the four 
conditions (see procedure). The experiment took seven minutes to complete and 
participants were paid $0.60.
Stimuli
 From the 38 TV targets (15 female) presented in Study 1, we randomly 
selected 32 targets (12 female) with the constraints imposed by the desired 
experimental design (i.e., number of trustworthy female, untrustworthy female, 
trustworthy male and untrustworthy male should be multiple of four). We had 8 
trustworthy females, 4 untrustworthy females, 8 trustworthy males and 12 
untrustworthy males. For each target, we had one still photo and one clip, but 
participants saw one or the other (see below).
Procedure
 The experimental design was a 2×2 within-subjects design, with target 
trustworthiness (trustworthy  versus untrustworthy) and stimulus type (stills versus 
clips) as independent variables. The trials were blocked based on stimuli type and 
gender, producing four blocks: female stills, male stills, female clips, male clips. 
The blocks were clearly delimited, with a starting screen announcing the next block 
(e.g., “Female stills”). The order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants, 
such that an equal number of participants started with clips or stills (stimuli type 
counterbalancing) and female or male stimuli (target gender counterbalancing). 
Each participant saw all characters once, in either a still or a clip (randomly 
determined). To ensure all characters were seen an equal number of times in stills 
and in clips, we created yoked pairs; the characters that appeared in stills to one 
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participant appeared in clips to the next participants, and vice versa (keeping the 
same order of the blocks, but randomising the trials within one block). There were 
32 trials in total (8 per condition). Notably, the ratio of trustworthy to 
untrustworthy characters was different between male and female, but equal 
between stills and clips if gender was ignored.
 Before starting the actual experiment, participants were asked whether they 
believed they could determine a person’s personality  from appearance (binary 
answer) and whether they thought they could spot deceptive individuals when they 
saw them (binary answer). Following each question, we also collected their 
confidence levels in the answers given (continuous variable between 0 and 100). 
Then, after a presentation of the experiment and the task, participants were asked to 
estimate how well they  thought they would do in each block (four estimates 
between 0 and 100%).
 
Results 
 Almost half of our participants thought that  faces reveal information about 
personality or behaviour: 46% said they  can infer personality from face (average 
confidence 50%, SD = 24%) and 44% said they  can detect untrustworthy 
individuals by  their face (42% confidence, SD = 25%). A 2×2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of target  type on the accuracy estimates [F(1,115) = 
50.69, p < .001, partial η2 = .31], with higher estimates for clips (57%) compared to 
estimates for stills (50%). The main effect of target gender [F(1,115) = 0.07] and 
the interaction effect [F(1,115) = 0.77] were not significant.
 Because ratio of trustworthy  to untrustworthy targets was not equal across the 
four conditions, we analysed participants’ performance using nonparametric 
measures from signal detection theory. We computed A’, a bias-free measure of 
sensitivity (i.e., the ability to discriminate cooperators from cheaters), and B” or 
response bias (i.e., the tendency to select  one option more often than the other). We 
coded trustworthy  characters as targets, so each trustworthy character correctly 
guessed was a Hit and each untrustworthy character incorrectly  guessed was a 
False Alarm. A’ usually ranges between 0.5 corresponding to zero sensitivity and 1 
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corresponding to perfect sensitivity to detect  the target. B” ranges from -1 to 1 and 
the absolute distance to 0 reflects the response bias to one option or the other (0 is 
no response bias). 
 In terms of sensitivity (i.e., performance), a 2×2 repeated-measures ANOVA 
with target gender (female/male) and type (still/clip) as independent variables and 
A’ as the dependent variable revealed no significant effects (all ps > .12). Adding 
participants’ gender as a between-subjects factor to the above ANOVA produced 
negligible changes, with neither the main effect nor any interaction effects of 
gender reaching significance (all ps > .10). The average A’ for stills was 0.58, while 
the average A’ for clips was 0.56, and they were both significantly higher than 0.50 
[t(115) = 4.40, p < .001; and t(115) = 3.20, p = .002, respectively].
 In terms of response bias, a 2×2 repeated-measures ANOVA with target 
gender (female/male) and type (still/clip) as independent variables and B” as the 
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of gender [F(1,115) = 25.38, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .18], with women perceived to be more trustworthy. The other 
effects were not significant (ps > .29). The average B” for stills and clips was .49 in 
both cases, showing a tendency to select more “trustworthy” responses (both ps < .
001).
  
Discussion
 Our results indicate that trustworthy behaviour can be inferred from faces. In 
contrast with the results from Experiment 2, we found that judgments about 
targets’ trustworthiness from stills and clips were comparable in terms of accuracy. 
This suggests that diagnostic cues to trustworthiness may be also linked to facial 
structure, in which case facial motion, even at  the moment when targets are 
considering deception, adds limited information. 
 Consistent with the results from the first two experiments and previous 
studies (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 
1981), we noted a response bias in favour of selecting the ‘trustworthy’ option.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
 
 The present studies showed that people were able to predict trustworthy 
behaviour from faces (see summary in Table 4.8). This capacity was used to 
discriminate at higher than chance levels between trustworthy and untrustworthy 
individuals in laboratory  trust games and in real-world, high-stake televised 
prisoner’s dilemma games. The implicit trustworthiness judgments were based on 
static and dynamic face stimuli. Discrimination based on static images was 
successful for the laboratory behaviour and in two out of three instances for the 
real-world behaviour, especially  with female faces. Discrimination based on 
dynamic images was better than chance on both occasions when TV stimuli were 
presented, but failed for Lab stimuli. In this case, it appeared dynamic images 
degraded performance compared to static images. Target sex did not make a 
difference.
 Comparing performance with dynamic versus static images produced mixed 
results. The difference was in favour of clips (Experiment 2, TV stimuli), stills 
(Experiment 2, Lab stimuli) or none (Experiment 3, TV stimuli). The results are 
inconsistent with the “leakage” hypothesis (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman et 
Table 4.8. Summary  of sensitivity (A’), response bias (B’’) and correlations between 
confidence and response accuracy  in three experiments on detection of trustworthy 
behaviour. Significant results are in bold and underlined. Negative B’’ values represent 
response biases towards selecting the ‘untrustworthy’ response, while positive B’’ values 
represent biases towards the ‘trustworthy’ response.
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al., 1981), according to which deceivers “leak” nonverbal cues to deception that 
can be observed by their counterparts. Examples of such visual cues are micro-
expressions, less eye contact, increased blinking and increased fidgeting. 
 A common finding in all three studies is that people overestimate their ability 
to ‘read’ faces. This is consistent with the general overconfidence bias described in 
the judgment and decision-making literature (Harvey, 1997; Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1977), according to which individuals systematically  overestimate the 
accuracy  of their responses to cognitive or perceptual problems. However, higher 
confidence did not equal better performance. In fact, we noted almost null 
correlations between confidence level and response accuracy, indicating that people 
had little insight on the correctness of their answers. These results are consistent 
with the findings from a meta-analysis examining the correlation between 
judgment accuracy and confidence in studies of deception detection (DePaulo, 
Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997).
 Detection of (un)trustworthiness in laboratory and real-world games is one 
aspect of a more general capacity  to detect cheaters in social contexts. Researchers 
argued that evolution equipped us with a specialised module for cheater detection 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), with fast and automatic mechanisms that are 
independent of central cognitive processing. Our evidence that (un)trustworthiness 
detection can occur without conscious insight supports this view and it is 
inconsistent with a more recent hypothesis (Sturgis, Read, & Allum, 2010) which 
suggested success at detecting deceptive behaviour is correlated with intelligence.
 A rather puzzling finding is the difference in accuracy between 
trustworthiness judgments from static images (higher than chance) and dynamic 
images (at chance) in the case of the laboratory targets (Experiment 2). It seems 
reasonable to assume that, given the increased richness of dynamic stimuli, 
accuracy  of face-based trustworthiness judgments can only improve. However, 
recent studies (Bonnefon et al., 2012) showed that richer stimuli interfered with 
accuracy  of face impressions of trustworthiness; external cues such as hairstyle and 
clothing increased people’s confidence in their impressions but negatively affected 
their accuracy. In our study, facial motion of laboratory targets was recorded a few 
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weeks before the trust games and thus it was extremely unlikely to be any more 
informative than facial structure with respect to the behaviour exhibited during the 
games. Instead, it probably  added just noise and made participants’ judgments less 
accurate. In contrast, the clips of the TV targets (discriminated at better than chance 
level) were recorded at the moment when promises to cooperate were made, 
increasing the probability that cues to deception were “leaked” into facial motion. 
 In line with previous studies of lie/cheater detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
DePaulo et al., 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981), we document a “truth bias” in 
participants - a higher proportion of “trustworthy” than “untrustworthy” responses 
in the experiments featuring TV stimuli (stills and clips) when people were asked 
for binary judgments. When participants were asked to estimate the average return 
rate in laboratory trust  games, most responses were below 50%. This tendency 
reflected in the negative average B’’ values. A general propensity to judge most 
people as trustworthy or untrustworthy may produce significant results in 
experiments investigating accuracy of trustworthiness impressions when the base 
rates favour cooperators. To guard against this possibility, we computed sensitivity 
measures independent of response bias whenever necessary.
 One aspect not elucidated by our studies is which facial cues facilitate 
trustworthiness detection. Stirrat  and Perrett  (2010) claimed that facial width-to-
height ratio (WHR) is a valid signal to trustworthiness that is successfully used by 
observers to infer targets’ behaviour. The appeal of WHR as a cue to behaviour lies 
on its biological plausibility; higher facial WHRs were linked to increased 
testosterone levels in men (Verdonck et al., 1999), and testosterone was linked to 
more aggressive (Carre & McCormick, 2008), thus potentially uncooperative 
behaviour. However, other aspects (e.g., brown eyes, Kleisner et al., 2013) may 
also play a role.
 Future studies should explore the factors that influence trustworthiness 
detection. Although it is unlikely  that faces can provide sufficient information ever 
to allow a reliable forecast of trustworthy or cooperative behaviour (if that was the 
case, cheaters would have been eliminated by evolution long time ago), perhaps 
trustworthiness detection can be improved beyond the slightly above chance level. 
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In a series of laboratory  studies, Bonnefon et al. (2012) showed that facial 
trustworthiness judgments are more accurate when faces are converted to black-
and-white and cropped to exclude external cues (including hair). It would be 
interesting to see whether this ‘less is more’ effect replicates with real-world 
stimuli and behaviour. Bonnefon et al. (2012) also found that trustworthiness 
detection was successful only for consequential decisions and not for explicit 
evaluations. A straightforward way to test these hypotheses on real-world data 
would be to run an experiment in which participants are assigned to the role of 
investors in trust games (or partners in PD games), with trustees (or partners) 
represented by black-and-white cropped faces of the TV contestants. 
 Another factor to consider is that trust  may be contextual. For example, in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game each player is likely  to adjust his/her strategy according 
to the forecasted action of the other player. Especially  if a player is perceived as a 
“grabber” (i.e. selecting to not share in the game), the player might want  to punish 
this behaviour by selecting to not share as well. In the TV show, the two 
contestants in the prisoner’s dilemma game could communicate and send true or 
false signals. The contestants might have adjusted their strategy according to how 
these signals were decoded or interpreted. Therefore, their decision might have to 
do not only with their actual trustworthiness, but also with their partner’s perceived 
trustworthiness. In our experiment, we presented the faces of the players one at  a 
time, with no information about their partners. Perhaps a presentation of both 
partners would increase the accuracy of trustworthiness judgments.
 To conclude, we showed that people are slightly better than chance at 
recognising (un)trustworthy behaviour in laboratory and in real high-stake 
economic games. Contrary  to what might be expected and in contrast with the 
predictions of the “leakage” hypothesis (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman et al., 
1981), in most cases dynamic stimuli did not improve the ability to detect 
deception. Importantly, we found null correlations between accuracy and 
confidence, suggesting that  relying on face-based judgments to infer 
trustworthiness on a case-by-case basis is likely to be unsuccessful.
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4.3. FACE TRUSTWORTHINESS AND REPUTATION† 
 Previous studies have demonstrated a causal role of facial cues in economic 
interactions, with participants investing more in partners with trustworthy-looking 
faces (Rezlescu, Duchaine et al., 2012; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; van’t Wout & 
Sanfey, 2008). However, these studies offered participants no information about 
their partners beyond their faces, a situation rarely  encountered in real life (Olivola 
& Todorov, 2010b). People usually go beyond appearances and learn more about 
prospective partners before engaging in any social or economic cooperation, and 
face judgments are known to be quickly updated in line with background 
information (Todorov & Olson, 2008).
 Thus, an important question for confirming the ecological validity  of the 
effects of trustworthy-looking faces is whether they survive in richer informational 
environments. The current study aims to explore the interaction between face 
impressions and reputational information in trust  games (Berg et al., 1995). To 
convey  reputational information, we created relatively unambiguous behavioural 
trustee histories, designed to suggest high or low reciprocity in previous rounds of 
trust games. Rationally, people should focus on the trustees’ past behaviour and 
ignore facial cues.
Methods
Participants
 Fifty-two participants (30 female, age range: 18-62 years, Median = 23 years) 
participated for payment (£4 show-up fee plus variable bonus, see Procedure 
below).
Face stimuli
 We used the 40 computer-generated faces presented in Study 1 from 
Rezlescu, Duchaine et al. (2012). The faces were originally  created by Oosterhof 
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† Pilot data from this study were previously presented in the thesis submitted in 2009 to University 
College London for the MSc. degree in Cognitive and Decision Sciences.
and Todorov (2008), who developed a computer model that can manipulate faces to 
make them less or more trustworthy-looking. Twenty  Caucasian faces 
(‘characters’) with neutral expressions were generated randomly using FaceGen 
Modeller 3.3 software (Singular Inversions, 2008). For each character, the model 
produced two different facial ‘identities’ at opposing ends of the trustworthiness 
scale (at -3 and +3 SD away from the original face on the model’s trustworthiness 
dimension; see Figure 4.3). The distance on the trustworthiness scale between the 
identities was sufficiently large that participants would be unlikely to realise the 
two identities were derived from the same face, but  not so extreme that faces lost 
their neutral expression (Todorov et al., 2008) or looked unrealistic. In the end we 
had 20 untrustworthy and 20 trustworthy faces.
Behavioural history stimuli
 In addition to face identity, participants saw each trustee’s behavioural history 
in the trust game. Behavioural histories were presented as 3 × 3 grids of blue-
coloured cells varying in shading (Figure 4.4). Participants were told that these 
cells represented nine randomly selected return rates in past rounds from the 
corresponding trustee. Lighter shades of blue corresponded to low return rates and 
darker shades to high return rates. We used colour rather than numbers to avoid 
explicit  arithmetical operations and simple cutoff-rule investment strategies. Our 
intention was to provide summary  representations of partners’ behavioural 
Figure 4.3. Examples of face stimuli. Face identities of the same computer character 
varied on the trustworthiness scale. For each character, we selected the faces found at -3 
SD and +3 SD on the trustworthiness scale (indicated here with arrows). 
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histories. We also aimed to discourage the belief that these histories were perfect 
predictors of future return rates, hence the random selection and variable nature of 
trustee past behaviour.
 The behavioural history variable had two levels: Good and Bad, 
corresponding to predominantly high or low past return rates, respectively. History 
stimuli were selected by asking ten volunteers to rate 50 Bad and 50 Good 
behavioural histories, quasi-randomly  generated (i.e. following a series of 
parameters designed to ensure that Bad histories contained predominantly low 
return rates, while Good histories contained mostly high return rates), on a scale 
from 1 (not at all trustworthy) to 7 (very trustworthy). Fifteen histories with 
average ratings between 2.5 and 3 and the lowest SDs (between 0.47 and 0.95) 
were picked for the Bad condition; 15 histories with average ratings between 5 and 
5.5 and the lowest SDs (between 0.67 and 0.97) were picked for the Good 
condition. Hence we selected 30 histories that were consistently  perceived as either 
“bad” or “good”, without appearing extreme. These histories were then rotated 
clockwise and anticlockwise to produce more variations for a total of 70 stimuli 
(half “bad”).
 
Experimental design
 We had two independent variables of interest: history  (Bad vs. Good) and 
face identity (Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy). The total number of trials was 70: 
10 trials for each of the 2 × 2 conditions in which faces and histories were 
presented simultaneously to the participants, plus 30 trials for a control condition 
Figure 4.4. Examples of trustee behavioural histories shown to participants (i.e. 
investors in trust games). (A) Behavioural history from a “Bad” history trial with two very 
low (white boxes), five medium-low (light blue), two medium-high (intense blue) and no 
very high (dark blue) return rates. (B) Behavioural history from a “Good” history trial.
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where each behavioural history  was presented alone (“No-face” condition). Faces 
and histories were randomly paired according to each condition (e.g. an 
Untrustworthy face could be presented with any Bad behaviour). Trials were 
randomised with the constraint that two (trustworthy and untrustworthy) face 
versions of the same character could not be presented directly one after the other. 
The dependent variable was the amount invested by participants.
Procedure
 Participants were ostensibly  engaged in a series of online trust games (Berg 
et al., 1995) and all were assigned to the role of investor. On each round, they 
received 100 virtual pounds (VP) and could invest any  part of this amount in a 
trustee whose computerised face and behavioural history  (the stimuli described 
above) appeared simultaneously  on the screen. Participants were informed that they 
would not see their partners’ faces on some trials (i.e. the “no face” condition). The 
amount invested tripled before reaching the trustee. Participants were (falsely) told 
the trustees were real players from other universities who could decide, without any 
obligation, to return part of the tripled amount to the investors. Furthermore, 
participants were (correctly) informed that they would be paid based on their 
accumulated earnings across 70 rounds of the game (according to an exchange rate 
of £1 per 1000 VP) so they had an incentive to invest  in trustees who would return 
more than their initial investment. Thus, the amount invested in each partner 
measured the perceived trustworthiness associated with the corresponding face 
identity. We stressed the anonymity of the game and that interactions were non- 
repeating (i.e., only one interaction with each trustee). There was no time limit for 
decisions, nor feedback provided after each round; the amounts ‘returned’ by 
trustees were concealed to avoid subsequent decisions being affected by earlier 
outcomes.  As in experiment 1 from Rezlescu, Duchaine et al. (2012), we took a 
number of measures to ensure participants believed they were interacting with real 
trustees. First, we insisted participants arrive on time for the experiment so that 
they  could start at the (allegedly) agreed-upon time with their partners in the game. 
If they  arrived more than five minutes late (or failed to show up), we rescheduled 
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the experiment at a later date. Second, before starting the experiment, participants 
were photographed wearing a neutral expression and their photo was uploaded into 
FaceGen to create a “computerised” version of their face. These computerised 
faces were similar to the face stimuli used in our study: they preserved the facial 
structure of each participant, yet had no hair or specific face identifiers, and had 
perfect skin texture. After showing participants their own computerised FaceGen 
photo, we pretended to upload it for the trustees to see during the game. Thus, 
participants had a good reason to believe that the FaceGen trustee faces they  saw 
during the experiment were computerised representations of real people’s faces 
whose photos were similarly taken, transformed, and uploaded for the study. Third, 
between the practice trials and actual games, we intentionally added a delay of 
several minutes – a fake “waiting time” for other players to (allegedly) join the 
game – during which the experimenter complained about the difficulties of running 
such a large scale study. Finally, we added random-length 10-20 second delays 
between participants’ investment decisions and the confirmations they received 
from trustees (that the latter players’ decisions had also been made). This was done 
to strengthen participants’ impressions that they were interacting with real, 
deliberating human players. To avoid contaminating the subject pool, participants 
were fully debriefed by email only after all testing had been concluded.
Results
 In trust  games in which reputational information was presented next to the 
trustees’ faces, investments were influenced by both histories and face identities 
(Figure 4.5). A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with history  (Bad and Good) and 
identity  (Untrustworthy  and Trustworthy) as independent variables, revealed 
significant main effects of behavioural history: F(1, 51) = 214.48, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .81; and face identity: F(1, 51) = 5.94, p = .018, partial η2 = .10, but no 
interaction effect: F(1, 51) = 2.31, p = .135. The average amount invested in 
Trustworthy identities (of both “Good” and “Bad” trustees) was 6% higher than the 
average amount invested in Untrustworthy identities (45.2 versus 42.4 VP).
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 “Good” histories attracted an average of 67.39 VP, while “Bad” histories 
attracted an average of 20.65 VP, further confirming that participants considered 
the coloured history matrices to be informative of their partners’ tendency  to 
reciprocate. The study also included trials in which participants were only  shown 
the behavioural history of their partner (i.e., without the face presented). This 
allowed us to compute the facial trustworthiness bonus for each character, which 
was the difference between the amount invested in the character's trustworthy 
identity  coupled with a behavioural history and the amount invested in the same 
behavioural history alone, without any face (i.e., facial trustworthiness bonus = 
trustworthy face – no face). We also computed the facial untrustworthiness penalty 
for each character, which was the difference between the amount invested in the 
character's untrustworthy identity coupled with a behavioural history  and the 
amount invested in the same behavioural history alone (i.e., facial 
untrustworthiness penalty  = untrustworthy face – no face). The mean facial 
trustworthiness bonus, averaged across participants and characters, was 1.57 VP. 
The mean facial untrustworthiness penalty was -1.83 VP. A within-participant t-test 
confirmed that the difference between the trustworthiness bonus and the 
untrustworthiness penalty (Δ = 3.40 VP) was significant: t(51) = 2.94, p  = .005, η2 
= .15. However, a within-participant t-test comparing the absolute values of the 
Figure 4.5. Average amounts invested in Untrustworthy  and Trustworthy  face 
identities with Good and Bad behavioural histories. Note that behavioral histories are 
represented on two different scales: the blue scale corresponds to Bad history trials; the 
green scale corresponds to Good history trials. Main effects of both behavioral history and 
face identity were significant. Error bars represent standard error.
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trustworthiness bonus and the untrustworthiness penalty failed to reveal a 
significant difference between the two: t(51) = .16. Thus facial trustworthiness 
appears to shift investments symmetrically upwards or downwards (relative to no 
face) according to its valence.
 
Discussion
 Building on one of our previous studies (Rezlescu, Duchaine et al., 2012; 
experiment 1) showing that facial configurations perceived to indicate 
trustworthiness have an impact on economic decisions, here we showed that 
trustworthy-looking facial features influenced investors’ actions even when 
information about trustees’ past behaviour was available. However, the facial 
trustworthiness premium was much reduced, from 42% when participants saw only 
the faces of the trustees (Rezlescu, Duchaine et al., 2012, experiment 1) to 6% 
when reliable ‘good’ or ‘bad’ information about trustees was provided.
 The lack of an interaction between face trustworthiness and background 
information suggests that  the trustworthiness effect is independent of behavioural 
history type, so that trustees with “Good” and “Bad” histories benefited equally 
from trustworthy-looking facial features. Furthermore, we showed that trustworthy 
and untrustworthy identities contributed equally to the facial trustworthiness effect 
(but in opposite directions).
 The fact that trustworthy-looking faces are still favoured when accompanied 
by objective cues about trustworthiness is consistent with recent studies which 
found that perceptions of borrower trustworthiness influenced lending decisions 
and received interest rates in online peer-to-peer lending where lenders have 
relatively rich background information about borrowers (Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 
2010; Ravina, 2008). In this study though, borrower photos often presented a full 
body, clothes etc. and sometimes included other people as well (e.g. family 
members, small children), so it is difficult to assert which aspects associated with 
trustworthiness influenced lending choices. 
 Another study (Chang et al., 2010) found that, in laboratory trust games 
involving multiple interactions with the same trustee, participants invested 
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increasingly  more in partners who proved to be trustworthy. In contrast with our 
findings, the main effect of facial trustworthiness was not significant, but partners 
who showed trustworthy behaviour (i.e. higher reciprocation rates) still received 
more money if they had trustworthy rather than untrustworthy looks. The different 
results obtained by Chang et al. (2010) and us are probably due to how reputational 
information was acquired. In our experiment, rather than gradually  discovering 
trustee reputations from first-hand interactions, participants saw visual summaries 
of their partners’ past reciprocations (just as one might receive third-party reports 
about potential business partners). Thus, our participants had simultaneous access 
to faces and reputational information, so they could integrate both immediately. 
 The face trustworthiness effect was arguably  small, but surprising 
considering how clear-cut the historical information about the investment partners 
was. A question to be answered by  future studies is how an increased degree of 
ambiguity  related to the partners’ past behaviour would alter decision-making and 
whether we can establish an inverse correlation between the richness and reliability 
of background information available and the face trustworthiness premium.
4.4. VOICE IMPRESSIONS 
 As social stimuli, voices are in many respects similar to faces and thus are 
likely to play a significant role in forming trait impressions. Spectral analysis of 
U.S. presidential candidates’ voices predicted eight out of eight surveyed elections 
(Gregory & Gallagher, 2002), and voices were shown to influence evaluation and 
voting of political candidates (Surawski & Ossoff, 2006; Tigue et al., 2012). Men 
with lower-pitch voices are overwhelmingly perceived to be more dominant (Jones 
et al., 2010; Puts et al., 2006; Puts et al., 2007) and more attractive (Feinberg et al., 
2008; Feinberg et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2010), irrespective of the judge’s gender. 
Vocal characteristics or voice impressions seem to be unrelated to body 
characteristics (Collins, 2000), but male voice pitch is correlated with testosterone 
level (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999) and thus may be a valid cue to dominance.
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 Despite their importance in social interactions, trait impressions based on 
voices received considerably  less attention than facial trait impressions. In 
Experiment 1 I validate a new set of voices and faces and investigate whether 
voices, like faces, lead to formation of reliable trait impressions of trustworthiness, 
attractiveness and dominance. Furthermore, I study the intramodal correlations 
between the three trait  impressions and the intermodal correlations between voice-
based and face-based impressions. Experiment 2 examines how voice impressions 
combine (or not) with face impressions to form an integrated person perception. 
The different integration patterns across various traits are explored.
EXPERIMENT 1: Voice and face impressions
Methods
Participants
 We recruited online participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com). Results from web-based samples of participants have been 
shown to have comparable means, standard deviations and internal reliability as 
those from lab-based samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Germine et al., 2012; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 
2011). Participants were U.S.-based and had a task completion rate of at least 95%, 
an indicator of good previous performance. 
 Two hundred ninety-eight Mechanical Turks (MTs) rated the voice and face 
stimuli in exchange for $0.60. Fifteen MTs were excluded because of extremely 
low variance in ratings (below 0.7), denoting lack of involvement with the task 
(average variance in our sample was 3.43, SD = 1.55). In the end, we analysed the 
ratings from 283 participants (age range 18 - 67, mean age 31.1, SD = 11.9; 141 
female). 
 
Voice and face stimuli
 We obtained audiovisual material from 41 volunteers (age range 19 - 49, 19 
female) recorded in a sound proof chamber. Volunteers were asked to face the 
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camera and pronounce five English vowels in various expressions (neutral, happy, 
angry, surprised, disgusted, fearful and sad, in this order). They were instructed to 
be as expressive as possible in both voice and face and produce sounds lasting 
approximately one second. We opted for vowels (as opposed to words or sentences) 
to avoid potential confounding factors related to accents or verbal information. 
Each vowel-expression was repeated once.
 For the current study we selected as voice stimuli the first neutral expressions 
of vowels A, E and O (we discarded I and U because of the potential verbal 
loadings). Stimuli were normalised to a standard intensity  level using Audacity 
(http://audacity.sourceforge.net). The face stimuli were full grayscale head shots in 
neutral expression. The volunteers were grouped into ‘white British’ (WB) (n = 26; 
9 female) and ‘others’ (Other) (n = 15; 10 female) based on their reported ethnicity.
Procedure
 In this between-subjects study, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
nine (3 x 3) conditions: they  were asked to provide trustworthiness (Tw), 
attractiveness (Att) or dominance (Dom) judgments for the 41 neutral vocalisations 
of vowels A, E or O. Additionally, they were asked to rate the 41 neutral faces on 
the same trait  assigned for voice judgments. Each condition had at  least 29 
participants. Face stimuli did not differ according to vowels (i.e. the same faces 
were presented regardless of the vowel condition), thus the number of ratings per 
face per trait was approximately triple the number of ratings per vowel per trait. 
The ratings ranged from 1 (not at  all trustworthy/attractive/dominant) to 9 
(extremely trustworthy/attractive/dominant). The trials were blocked as follows: 
WB voice stimuli, WB face stimuli, Other voice stimuli, Other faces. The order 
within each block was randomised.
Results and discussion
 Random allocation of participants to condition groups aimed to ensure the 
groups were comparable in terms of participant characteristics. Chi-square values 
for 3-by-3 contingency tables (trait-by-vowel) confirmed the groups did not differ 
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for total number of participants (p = .900), number of female participants (p = .
622), or number of white participants (p = .460). A two-way ANOVA confirmed 
there was no difference in age between groups according to trait (p = .921) or 
vowel (p = .695), just a marginally significant interaction effect (p = .046, partial η2 
= .04).
 
Validation of voice and face stimuli
 We first analysed whether target stimuli were rated differently based on their 
ethnicity (WB or Other). Average ratings of trustworthiness and attractiveness were 
lower for WB voices than for Other voices (trustworthiness: 5.14 vs. 5.27, t(100) = 
2.36, p = .020; attractiveness: 4.62 vs. 4.85, t(88) = 2.90, p = .005). WB faces were 
also perceived as more dominant than Other faces (4.92 vs. 4.73, t(92) = 2.68, p = .
009). The other ratings (dominance for voices, trustworthiness and attractiveness 
for faces) did not differ between WB and Other targets (all ps > .05). 
 One of the most common findings in previous studies of face impressions is 
the high reliability  of these judgments. For example, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) 
reported reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) above .90 and interrater agreements (r) 
between .26 and .47 for 13 traits. While Cronbach’s α is primarily used in 
psychometrics to indicate the degree to which a questionnaire’s items measure the 
same construct (i.e. how similar are the item scores belonging to the same 
participant), by substituting respondents with target stimuli and item scores with 
raters’ judgments, it  becomes a measure of the similarities between different raters’ 
impressions of the same stimuli. The interrater agreement was calculated as an 
average of all pairwise correlations between raters’ judgments. As can be seen in 
Table 4.9, we replicate the high reliabilities and interrater agreements for face 
judgments obtained by  Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). Importantly, especially for 
WB targets, voice judgments appear to also have high reliabilities (above .88) and 
average interrater correlations comparable to faces (between .22 and .33). Because 
of their lower reliability, we excluded the Other voice stimuli from the subsequent 
analyses.   
 We next examined whether trait  judgments across different vowels correlate, 
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in other words, looking at whether individual voices receive similar ratings 
regardless of the vowel they are asked to produce. If trait  perceptions are linked to 
voice attributes, one can expect high correlations here. Indeed, correlations ranged 
between .47 and .76 and were significant across all categories (Table 4.10). 
Therefore in the following sections, for simplification, we collapsed ratings of 
different vowels into one general rating per voice (and per trait) and report results 
based on these average voice ratings. 
Table 4.9. Interrater agreements (r) and reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) for voice and face 
stimuli. Note that Cronbach’s α tends to increase with sample size (number of raters); 
therefore the slightly higher reliabilities for face stimuli may be simply due to larger sample 
size. White British targets were selected for subsequent analyses.
Table 4.10. High correlations between trait judgments of same voices under different 
vocalisations. All correlations were significant (in bold). p  values are given in 
parentheses.
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Intramodal correlations
 Among the various trait judgments, face trustworthiness and face 
attractiveness are usually  found to correlate the most (e.g. Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008). This was also the case for the voice impressions in our study: Tw and Att 
judgments of both male and female voices correlated highly (.87 and .83, 
respectively; see Table 4.11). In contrast, neither Tw - Dom nor Dom - Att 
correlations were significant.
 In the case of faces, Tw and Att correlated when all stimuli were considered 
(see Table 4.11). However, a closer look revealed that the significant correlation 
held only for male faces, while for female faces the correlation was close to zero. 
Attractive female faces were not necessarily perceived as trustworthy. The 
differences in perception of female and male faces underline the importance of 
dividing all analyses of trait perceptions by target gender. For male faces, we also 
found a significant  negative correlation between Tw and Do judgments, replicating 
the findings of Oosterhof & Todorov (2008), where face Tw was negatively 
correlated with dominance. None of the other correlations reached significance. 
Notably, the results did not suffer major changes when analysed separately  based 
on participants’ gender.
 The high correlations between Tw and Att judgments may  imply that 
participants, in general, find it difficult to judge these two dimensions 
independently. However, the null correlation between Tw and Att judgments of 
female faces rules out this possibility. Instead, it is more likely that judging one of 
these dimensions is made difficult only  by  particular contexts and/or stimuli. In 
Table 4.11. Intramodal correlations between voice and face trait judgments. There 
were 26 stimuli, 9 female and 17 male. Significant correlations are in bold and p values are 
given in parentheses.
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these situations, participants may  rely on the “halo effect” and judge faces similarly 
on all positive (or negative) dimensions (e.g. Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). 
For example, it is conceivable that attractiveness is not such a well defined concept 
for male compared to female faces, and therefore people rate male faces on valence 
rather than attractiveness. Furthermore, attractiveness may be perceived 
predominantly as a visual attribute, difficult to “translate” into the auditory domain, 
which would generate high correlations between voice attractiveness and other 
positive traits. 
Intermodal correlations
 There are two reasons to be interested in looking at intermodal correlations of 
trait judgments. First, because people agree to such a large extent with respect to 
which faces (voices) are high on a given trait, it is reasonable to assume that there 
are certain visual (auditory) cues which are consistently seen as signalling that 
particular trait. The interesting question is whether the same individuals display 
both the telling visual and auditory cues. The second reason is an extension of the 
first. It has been claimed (e.g. Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Berry, 1991; 
Carre & McCormick, 2008; Stirrat & Perrett, 2008) that certain character traits 
(including trustworthiness) can be accurately  inferred from faces. If this were the 
case, one may expect some diagnostic information to “leak” through both faces and 
voices. 
 In our study, an initial comparison of face-based and voice-based ratings per 
target revealed significant correlations among Tw and Att  (but not Dom) judgments 
(Table 4.12). However, when ratings were analysed separately  per target gender, 
these correlations were no longer significant. This indicates the significant 
correlations when collapsing across gender were due to the previously documented 
bias to judge feminine targets more favourably  than masculine targets (Perrett et 
al., 1998). Higher ratings for both female faces and voices than male faces and 
voices, respectively, led to this apparent correlation between face and voice ratings 
when gender was disregarded. In effect, voices and faces determined independent 
perceptions of Tw and Att. Results did not differ according to participants’ gender. 
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Our findings are inconsistent with Collins & Missing (2003) who found that male 
judgments of female vocal and facial attractiveness are related. Their results might 
have been confounded by body size, which influenced both voice pitch and 
perceived attractiveness.
 For dominance judgments, we note a negative correlation between face-based 
and voice-based perception of male targets, suggesting that dominant faces had less 
dominant voices. This result is puzzling. It has been suggested that male facial 
width ratio (Verdonck et al., 1999) and voice pitch (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999) are 
both influenced by testosterone level, which in turn has been linked with dominant 
and aggressive behaviour (Ehrenkranz, Bliss, & Sheard, 1974). Therefore, if 
anything, we would have expected a positive correlation between ratings of voice 
and face dominance, reasoning that men with wider faces tend to have lower-
pitched voices and both wide faces and low-pitched voices would be perceived as 
dominant. The negative correlation might be explained by a compensatory strategy, 
according to which men with less dominant looks compensate through their voices. 
The effect is likely to be specific to men because dominance has been a crucial 
evolutionary trait for the male population.
EXPERIMENT 2: Integrated person perception
 
 As we have seen, people tend to associate positive or negative traits with 
voices, similar to the process taking place with faces. Face impressions were shown 
to play a significant role in social interactions (e.g. Hamermesh, 2011) even when 
reputational information is available (Rezlescu, Duchaine et  al., 2012), and it is 
Table 4.12. Correlations between voice-based and face-base judgments. Significant 
correlations are in bold and p values are given in parentheses.
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reasonable to assume voice impressions have a similar impact. However, social 
interactions typically involve simultaneous exchange of visual and auditory 
information, so a person impression is likely to be based on both the face and the 
voice (and possibly other information, such as body movements). Our next aim was 
to examine how face impressions and voice impressions interact to form an 
integrated person impression.
Methods
Participants
 There were three groups of online participants corresponding to the three trait 
judgments. The ‘trustworthiness’ group had 41 participants (age range 18 - 59, 
mean age 30.9, SD = 9.8; 17 female), the ‘attractiveness’ group had 41 participants 
(age range 19 - 66, mean age 34.0, SD = 13.4; 18 female) and the ‘dominance’ 
group had 84 participants (age range 18 - 51, mean age 28.6, SD = 8.2; 34 female). 
The considerably larger number of participants in the ‘dominance’ group was 
determined by  a script error that doubled the requested number of participants 
compared with the other groups (the results did not  differ when keeping only the 
first 41 participants). The task lasted two minutes and each participant received 
$0.25. 
Voice and face stimuli
 This experiment used a sample of the male WB stimuli (n = 17) from Study 
1.  The voice stimuli were of vowel A. After excluding targets above 40 years old 
(n = 3), with mild strabismus (n = 1) or facial hair (n = 1), we were left with 12 
targets whose faces and voices could be mixed, with all face-voice combinations 
appearing plausible.
Procedure
 First, faces were ordered based on their trustworthiness ratings from Study  1 
and binned accordingly into two equal groups, one with ‘untrustworthy’ (UTw) and 
the other with ‘trustworthy’ (Tw) faces. We then did the same for voices, producing 
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one group of UTw and one group  of Tw voices. Note that the face and voice of a 
particular target could fall in different categories (e.g. same target could have a 
‘trustworthy’ face and an ‘untrustworthy’ voice). Each group had six face (voice) 
stimuli. The average rating for the UTw faces was 3.9, for Tw faces 5.1, for UTw 
voices 4.4 and for Tw voices 5.3. After that, for each participant, we randomly 
paired half of the untrustworthy faces with untrustworthy  voices and the other half 
of the untrustworthy faces with trustworthy voices. Additionally, half of the 
trustworthy faces were paired with untrustworthy voices and the other half with 
trustworthy voices. In the end, we had four experimental conditions, with three 
pairs per condition. After a catch trial ensuring that that they  have the sound on, 
participants were presented each pair (face plus voice) in a randomised order and 
asked to rate the respective person for trustworthiness. 
 The same procedure was used to create the pairs of stimuli and collect ratings 
for the attractiveness and dominance judgments. The average rating per 
‘unattractive’ (UAtt) faces was 2.9, for ‘attractive’ (Att) faces 4.0, for Uatt voices 
3.9, for Att voices 5.0; for ‘undominant’ (UDom) faces 4.3, for ‘dominant’ (Dom) 
faces 5.8, for UDom voices 4.4, and for Dom voices 5.6. Allocation of participants 
to the trustworthiness, attractiveness or dominance condition was counterbalanced.
Results
 We calculated an average rating per condition per participant and submitted 
these numbers to three 2x2 (face x voice) within-subjects ANOVA, one per trait. 
For trustworthiness judgments, both main effects of face and voice were 
significant: face F(1,40) = 25.06, p  < .001, partial η2 = .39; voice F(1,40) = 30.85, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .44. In addition, there was a significant super-additive 
interaction effect between face and voice trustworthiness: F(1,40) = 9.67, p  = .003, 
partial η2 = .20.
 The main effects of face and voice were also significant for attractiveness 
judgments; face F(1,40) = 56.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .58; voice F(1,40) = 6.37, p 
< .016, partial η2 = .14. There was no interaction effect between faces and voices 
for attractiveness (p  = .086). We note that the main effect size of faces is four times 
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the main effect size of voices. This difference could not be attributed to a larger 
difference in the average ratings of Att and UAtt faces versus the difference in the 
average ratings of Att and UAtt voices, because they  were identical (see section 
above). Furthermore, to confirm that the larger effect size of faces is not driven by 
our artificial separation of stimuli into ‘unattractive and ‘attractive’ categories, we 
regressed the person ratings given by each participant on the average rating for 
each face and the average rating of each voice. As expected, both face and voice 
ratings were significant predictors (p < .001 and p = .003, respectively). More 
importantly, the ratio of their standardised coefficients (.318 divided by .126) 
confirmed the larger impact of the face on person ratings of attractiveness.  
 For dominance judgments, again both faces and voices had significant main 
effects; faces F(1,83) = 16.39, p  < .001, partial η2 = .17; voice F(1,83) = 91.61, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .53. The interaction effect between faces and voices approached 
significance, but the effect size was small: F(1,83) = 3.57, p  =.062, partial η2 = .04. 
We note that in terms of effect sizes, the situation is reversed compared to 
attractiveness judgments; for dominance, voices have an effect size three times 
larger than faces. The pattern of results for the three trait judgments is summarised 
in Table 4.13.
 
 Transforming participants’ ratings into z scores and reanalysing the data had 
no impact on the reported results. Similarly, adding participants’ gender as a 
between-subjects factor to the above ANOVAs produced negligible changes. In all 
cases, main effects of gender were not significant (all ps > .49) and there were no 
interaction effects with the other factors (all ps > .13) with the exception of a triple 
Table 4.13. Effect sizes (partial η2) for faces and voices in forming a person 
impression. Only significant effects are shown.
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interaction effect  with faces and voices for dominance judgments (p = .032, partial 
η2 = .06) denoting that the interaction effect  between faces and voices was more 
pronounced for male participants. 
 
Discussion
 Our results show that integration of face and voice information in forming 
person impressions differs according to the judged trait. Thus, while for all 
measured traits both faces and voices have a significant impact on person 
impressions, the effect sizes are of different  magnitudes. Faces seem to be more 
important than voices when it comes to attractiveness, while the reverse pattern 
was observed for dominance judgments. Trustworthiness impressions were equally 
influenced by faces and voices. Trustworthiness judgments were also the only ones 
for which we found a significant interaction effect between faces and voices. 
 Previous studies on bimodal integration found a dominant role for visual 
information across multiple domains. Interestingly though, this visual superiority 
effect is not rigid but varies according to signal reliability. For example, Collignon 
et al. (2008) showed that the visual dominance in emotional processing disappeared 
when the reliability of the visual stimuli was diminished. In our study, the different 
contributions of faces and voices to attractiveness and dominance perception may 
be explained within this framework. On one hand, if we consider that  attractiveness 
is predominantly a visual concept, visual information is likely considered most 
reliable and thus the key determinant in overall judgments of attractiveness. On the 
other hand, dominance judgments have been shown to correlate with more 
masculine aspects (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Because the voice is highly 
sexually dimorphic (Fitch & Giedd, 1999), it may be considered more reliable 
when judging a person’s masculinity and therefore given higher weight in overall 
assessments of dominance. Indeed, deep voices are reliably  associated with 
perceived dominance in men (Jones et al., 2010; Puts et  al., 2006; Puts et al., 2007) 
and previous studies found that men with lower-pitched voices were preferred in 
political contexts (Klofstad, Anderson, & Peters, 2012; Tigue et al., 2012). The 
voice pitch may even be a valid cue to dominance; it  can signal testosterone level 
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(Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999), and testosterone level is directly linked to actual 
dominance in men (Mazur & Booth, 1998). 
 Our results for crossmodal integration of attractiveness perception are partly 
consistent with Surawski and Ossoff (2006), who found a visual superiority effect 
and a synergistic combination of face and voice attractiveness in evaluations of 
other character traits of political candidates. The higher impact of visual 
information was evident in our study, but we did not find a significant interaction 
between faces and voices in evaluations of person attractiveness. The difference is 
probably due to different task demands; while we measured integrated 
attractiveness, Surawski and Ossoff (2006) measured perceived competence, 
trustworthiness and leadership. As we have seen in present study, people integrate 
information differently according to the judged trait.
 For combined trustworthiness perception, the fact that audio-visual 
integration did not  show the visual dominance found in emotion perception 
(Collignon et  al., 2008) challenges the claim that  trustworthiness and expressions 
share the same perceptual mechanisms (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). The different 
pattern of visual and auditory information integration for trustworthiness and 
attractiveness judgments also suggest that, despite a high correlation between these 
judgments within the same modality, they are still distinct judgments. In other 
words, when asked to judge perceived trustworthiness, people do not rely on 
perceived attractiveness (at least, not entirely). 
 
CONCLUSION
 Our findings suggest that, while sharing some aspects with face impressions, 
voice impressions also display specific properties. First, voices, just like faces, can 
lead to formation of reliable trait  impressions of trustworthiness, attractiveness and 
dominance. Our measures of reliability and inter-rater agreement were high and 
comparable to those of face impressions reported in the current study or elsewhere. 
Second, we showed that voice-based judgments of trustworthiness and 
attractiveness were highly correlated, perhaps due to a valence halo effect used to 
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compensate the mismatch between the domain of the attractiveness judgment 
(predominantly visual) and the domain of the stimuli (auditory). Third, we showed 
that voice impressions do not correlate with face impressions (with the exception of 
perceived dominance for male stimuli). This suggests visual cues are not paired 
with auditory cues (diagnostic or not) when it comes to trait perception. 
 For face impressions, Tw judgments of male targets correlated positively with 
Att judgments and negatively  with Dom judgments. In contrast, judgments of 
female targets did not  correlate with each other. As we noted, a separate analysis 
per gender is necessary to avoid artificial correlations due to gender biases in trait 
perception. For example, if women are generally  perceived as more trustworthy 
and more attractive than men, Tw and Att ratings will erroneously appear as 
correlated because of this divide between men and women. 
 Interpersonal perceptions in humans usually involve a combination of visual 
and auditory  stimuli. In our second study  we showed that an integrated person 
impression assigns different weights to facial and vocal information, depending on 
the trait. Voices and faces are equally important to an integrated trustworthiness 
impression, which also shows an interaction effect. In contrast, attractiveness 
seems to rely more on faces, while dominance seems to rely  more on voices. The 
differential roles of faces and voices in attractiveness and dominance may be 
explained by the predominantly visual character of attractiveness and by the strong 
links between voice pitch, masculinity and dominance. 
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
 The experiments in the current thesis aimed to contribute to a better 
understanding of several key  topics in face perception, mainly revolving around the 
specificity of face processing mechanisms, the functional and neural bases of facial 
trait perception, and some outstanding issues related to face trustworthiness 
impressions. More specifically, I addressed the following questions:
1. Are face recognition mechanisms distinct from mechanisms involved in 
within-level discrimination of non-face objects? (Chapter 2.1)
2. Are face recognition mechanisms also involved in processing non-face 
objects for which one has acquired expertise? (Chapter 2.2)
3. Can facial trait perception dissociate from facial identity  recognition? 
(Chapter 3.1)
4. Is normal perception of face trustworthiness and aggressiveness dependent 
on intact facial expression and sex perception mechanisms? (Chapter 3.2)
5. Is facial width-to-height ratio a reliable predictor of perceived 
trustworthiness? (Chapter 4.1)
6. How accurate are face trustworthiness impressions in real-life settings and 
do dynamic images improve accuracy? Does response accuracy  correlate 
with confidence? (Chapter 4.2)
7. Does reputation abolish the effect of face trustworthiness in economic 
interactions? (Chapter 4.3)
8. How do faces and voices contribute to an integrated person impression? 
(Chapter 4.4)
  In what follows, I will summarise the findings by  question, present their 
implications and directions for future research.
 
5.1. Are face recognition mechanisms distinct from mechanisms involved 
in within-level discrimination of  non-face objects? 
 This was a test of one of the alternative hypotheses to face specificity - the 
individuation hypothesis (Damasio et al., 1982), according to which face 
recognition mechanisms should not be different from those involved in exemplar 
recognition within non-face object classes. An extensive investigation (21 
experiments) of a new case of acquired prosopagnosia, Herschel, provided 
evidence for face specific mechanisms. Behaviourally, Herschel was severely 
impaired with the recognition of familiar faces, discrimination between unfamiliar 
identities, and the perception of facial expression and gender. His visual 
recognition deficits were however largely restricted to faces. He showed normal 
recognition memory for a wide variety of object classes in several paradigms, 
normal ability to discriminate between highly similar items within a novel object 
category, fine discrimination between human bodies and intact ability  to name 
basic objects (except mammals). Furthermore, Herschel displayed a normal face 
composite effect and typical global advantage and global interference effects in the 
Navon task, suggesting spared integration of both face and non-face information. 
Intriguingly, despite his fine performance with object recognition from brief 
presentations of intact images, Herschel failed visual closure tests requiring 
recognition of basic objects from degraded images. This abnormality in basic 
object recognition is at odds with his spared within-class recognition and presents a 
challenge to hierarchical models of object perception (e.g. Rosch et al., 1976), 
according to which successful within-level discrimination is dependent on intact 
basic level recognition.
 The clear dissociation between Herschel’s face recognition (impaired) and 
within-level recognition of non-face objects (normal) is strong evidence against the 
individuation hypothesis. However, Herschel’s prosopagnosia is not “pure” (i.e. his 
visual recognition impairments are not strictly confined to faces) and several of his 
results warrant further investigation. First, additional visual and semantic testing of 
his difficulties at identifying mammals may provide further insights with respect to 
the organisation of the visual recognition system - patient studies (Levine & 
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Calvanio, 1989; Farah et al., 1991) and functional imaging studies (Chao et al., 
1999; Noppeney  et al., 2006) suggest a distinction between representations of 
living and nonliving objects. Second, his results at tests of general configural 
processing were mixed, with normal performance in the Navon task but impaired 
scores at visual closure. Further testing is necessary  to clarify  if his prosopagnosia 
(and maybe also his deficits with mammal recognition) is a result of impaired 
configural processing. Third, additional probing of Herschel’s basic object 
recognition is necessary before drawing firm conclusions about a dissociation 
between normal within-level and degraded basic-level recognition.
5.2. Are face-specific mechanisms involved in processing non-face 
objects for which one has acquired expertise? 
 The expertise hypothesis - another alternative to face specificity -  suggests 
that face recognition mechanisms operate on all objects with which an observer has 
acquired expertise (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). A widely 
used method for studying expertise in the laboratory involves a training procedure 
claimed to lead to the development of expertise with a novel object class named 
greebles. Challenging the expertise hypothesis, in section 2.2 I presented two cases 
of acquired prosopagnosia who showed normal accuracy and response times 
throughout the standard greeble training procedure along with severe deficits on a 
matched face training procedure. Furthermore, both acquired prosopagnosics 
fulfilled the criterion claimed to signal successful acquisition of greeble expertise. 
The results demonstrate that face expertise and greeble expertise rely on separate 
mechanisms. 
 The findings are novel - I showed that lesions to a normal brain can produce 
impairments with faces but leave intact the system for learning individual greebles, 
highly-similar exemplars within one object category. The two acquired cases who 
were previously trained with the greebles were unable to develop normal greeble 
expertise (Behrmann, Marotta et al., 2005; Bukach et al., 2012), but these 
prosopagnosic cases suffered from object recognition deficits (Bukach et al., 2012; 
Gauthier et al., 1999) which makes it  unclear whether their difficulties with 
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greebles stem from disruption of object recognition mechanisms or a general 
expertise mechanism. Duchaine et al. (2004) showed normal greeble learning in 
one developmental prosopagnosic, but this prosopagnosic’s performance with faces 
in a comparable task was not assessed. 
 The findings are also robust - I presented two cases of acquired 
prosopagnosia (Herschel and Florence) whose face recognition deficits resulted 
from different lesion locations. The expertise training procedure for greebles was 
based on one used by  Gauthier and Tarr (1997) and a face learning procedure was 
designed to match the greeble procedure. Both Herschel and Florence showed clear 
differences in performance between faces and greebles during the training sessions 
(1 to 4) and testing sessions (5 to 8). While their face performance was severely 
impaired, their greeble performance (accuracy  and response times) was comparable 
to controls.
 The findings should have a major impact on the field, because the research 
program involving the greebles has been highly influential. According to Web of 
Science, the original article introducing the greebles (Gauthier et al., 1997) has 
been cited 369 times, and two other papers claiming that recognition of expert 
objects is carried out by the same mechanisms involved in face recognition 
(Gauthier et al., 1999; Gauthier et al., 2000) have been cited more than 500 times 
each, with the number of yearly citations increasing. In the current study I 
∂dresented compelling evidence that greeble expertise is not dependent on the same 
mechanisms as face expertise, which conclusively rejects evidence purportedly 
supporting the expertise account derived from greebles studies.
5.3. Can facial trait perception dissociate from facial identity recognition? 
 In Section 3.2 I presented compelling evidence that facial trait perception can 
dissociate from identity  recognition. Four individuals with acquired prosopagnosia 
were tested for perception of face trustworthiness, attractiveness and 
aggressiveness, with three tests with different task demands (ratings, sorting, 
categorisation) per each trait. One prosopagnosic (Florence) showed normal trait 
perception in all tests. Each of the other three prosopagnosics was normal on all 
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tests pertaining to at least one trait. 
 Successful trait perception in individuals with severe face recognition 
difficulties has been previously  reported (Quadflieg et al., 2012; Todorov & 
Duchaine, 2008), but they had several limitations. First, they tested trait perception 
only with ratings, and ratings might not be sensitive enough to detect more subtle 
impairments. Second, trait perception measured with ratings was compared with 
identity  recognition measured by other formats; it is possible the noted dissociation 
might have been influenced by the different test formats. Third, Quadflieg et  al. 
(2012) used insufficiently controlled face stimuli (see introduction and discussion 
from Section 3.2), while Todorov and Duchaine (2008) measured only  one trait 
(trustworthiness). We can also add that the individuals showing a dissociation 
between trait and identity perception in Todorov and Duchaine (2008) were 
developmental prosopagnosics, i.e. their face processing mechanisms did not 
develop normally. Extrapolation of any  dissociation found in developmental 
prosopagnosic to a normal face processing system should be done with caution. In 
contrast, we tested four acquired prosopagnosics on multiple tests for each facial 
ability, with one test format (sorting) identical for trait and identity perception. Our 
stimuli were tightly controlled for non-face cues that might lead to apparently 
normal face evaluations.
 The findings have implications for models of face perception. Trait 
perception is an important aspect  of face processing, with considerable impact on 
social interactions. The fact that it seems to rely on distinct perceptual mechanisms 
from those involved in identity perception underlines the necessity to include it in 
any model aiming to explain how people perceive faces. Whether trait perception is 
performed by mechanisms which are also different from other aspects of face 
perception (e.g. expressions, sex) was examined in the following section.
5.4. Is normal perception of face trustworthiness and aggressiveness 
dependent on intact facial expression and sex perception mechanisms? 
 The overgeneralisation model of facial trait perception (Oostehof & Todorov, 
2008) posits that trustworthiness judgments from faces are by-products of (happy 
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and angry) expression perception mechanisms, and dominance judgments are by-
products of sex perception mechanisms. According to this model, impairments with 
facial expression and sex recognition would also affect trustworthiness and 
dominance perception. However, contrary to these predictions, one individual with 
acquired prosopagnosia (Florence) showed normal aggressiveness judgments 
despite impaired sex perception. Aggressiveness is highly  correlated with 
dominance and had the highest loading on the dominance component in the two-
dimensional model of trait perception proposed by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008). 
Furthermore, Florence provided face trustworthiness judgments in line with 
controls but she showed mixed performance with expression tests: she failed one 
test, scored in the lower normal range for two tests, and succeeded at one. Although 
these results do not show severe deficits, they question the integrity of Florence’s 
expression perception mechanisms.
 Perception of each expression, trait and sex was assessed with two tests, one 
requiring sorting and the other requiring categorisation of faces on the judged 
dimension. Therefore, observed dissociations were robust and could not be 
attributed to different  task demands. Face stimuli were black and white images 
cropped to show only  internal facial features, so that perception of traits could not 
rely on skin colour or external cues. 
 The results are clearly  inconsistent with the emotion and sex 
overgeneralisation theories of facial trait perception, showing that judgments of 
face trustworthiness and aggressiveness/dominance do not depend on intact 
expression and sex recognition mechanisms. The findings do not question the fact 
that subtle cues to happy and angry expressions may influence perceived 
trustworthiness, similar to how a more feminine/masculine appearance might 
influence perceived dominance/aggressiveness. They are simply  not indicative of a 
tight relationship  between these abilities, suggesting a more comprehensive 
account of trait perception is needed.
 The fact that  trait perception can dissociate from identity  recognition (Section 
3.1), expression and sex recognition (Section 3.2) suggests further divisions in 
general face models. The new battery of tests of face perception will be extended 
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by developing similar sorting and categorisation tasks examining perception of 
other traits, all basic expressions, gaze, and also aspects related to physical 
properties of faces (e.g. shape and reflectance cues, spacing and part  cues, cues 
pertaining to different spatial frequencies). These tests can then be used for 
comprehensive investigations of more cases of acquired prosopagnosia to reveal 
associations and dissociations between perception of various facial aspects, leading 
to a refinement of existing models of face perception. 
5.5. Is facial width-to-height ratio (WHR) a reliable predictor of 
perceived trustworthiness? 
 Following Stirrat and Perrett’s (2010) assertion that facial WHR is a valid cue 
to trustworthiness that is used by people in their judgments of face trustworthiness, 
I examined whether WHR influences perceived trustworthiness when faces are 
controlled for attractiveness and femininity/masculinity. Participants were asked to 
play  trust games with presumed real partners whose faces varied on WHR (but not 
attractiveness or femininity). Contrary to Stirrat and Perrett (2010), the results did 
not reveal a preference towards faces with lower WHR. Instead, we found that 
perceived femininity/masculinity  of faces predicted participants’ choices. This 
effect was replicated with the original set of face stimuli used by Stirrat and Perrett 
(2010). When participants were asked to select between two similar faces differing 
on WHR, they generally preferred the narrower faces (just like in Stirrat & Perrett,
2010). However, they also judged the narrower faces as more feminine-looking and 
we found a large correlation (r = .90) between choices based on the trustworthiness 
dimension and those based on the perceived femininity  dimension. The results of 
these two experiments suggest face trustworthiness judgments are driven by 
perceived femininity/masculinity rather than WHR.
 Further studies are needed to confirm this suggestion. For example, showing 
that wider faces with more feminine features are perceived to be more trustworthy 
than narrower faces with more masculine features would be compelling evidence. 
One way to make faces appear more feminine/masculine is to modify their 
eyebrows (Bruce et al., 1993).
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5.6. How accurate are face trustworthiness impressions in real-life 
settings and do dynamic images improve accuracy? Does response 
accuracy correlate with confidence?
 Previous studies furnished mixed evidence on the accuracy of face 
trustworthiness judgments. Their criterion was behaviour in laboratory games (i.e. 
cooperative or not) or group membership  (i.e. criminals versus non-criminals). 
Using data from a television programme, where contestants played economic 
games for real and substantial amounts of money, I investigated if deceptive 
behaviour can be inferred from faces. The stimuli were either static images (face 
stills) or dynamic images (five second face clips, no sound) recorded at the time 
when deception was likely to occur. In addition and in line with previous studies, I 
examined whether deceptive behaviour in laboratory trust  games can be detected 
from static and dynamic face stimuli.
 Overall, the results from three experiments suggest that people can 
distinguish between cooperators and cheaters from faces. For laboratory stimuli, 
discrimination was successful only  for female stills, and at chance for male stills 
and female and male clips. For real-world stimuli, response accuracy  did not vary 
between male and female stimuli. Performance with clips was above chance in two 
out of two experiments, while performance with stills was better than chance in 
two out of three studies. There was no clear advantage noted for clips compared to 
stills. 
 These results suggest that people are capable of deriving useful information 
from faces about deceptive behaviour. Notably, the performance is only slightly 
higher than chance. To maximise the benefits provided by the ability to “read” 
faces, an insight with respect to when face impressions are accurate or not is 
required. However, the null correlations between response accuracy and confidence 
reveal that people do not have this insight. The implication is that individual 
decisions to trust or not another party should not be guided by face impressions.
 An interesting question is whether trustworthiness detection can be improved. 
For example, implicit  evaluations were found to be more accurate than explicit 
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judgments of trustworthiness (Bonnefon et al., 2012). Similarly, it is conceivable 
more analytical evaluations (such as asking participants to reflect on their 
responses by providing confidence ratings, like in our study) may  decrease 
accuracy. Perhaps trust-related consequential decisions made on a set of faces 
would be more successful when there is no attention drawn to what is actually 
measured.   
 
5.7. Does reputation abolish the effect of face trustworthiness in 
economic interactions? 
 Previous studies demonstrated that face trustworthiness influences economic 
interactions when agents do not have any information about each other (e.g. Stirrat 
& Perrett, 2010; van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). However, economic partners 
typically have a reputation built on previous actions, and reputation is a stronger 
predictor of future behaviour than face configuration. Therefore, when reputation is 
known, it is conceivable that the effect of face trustworthiness will disappear. 
Contrary  to this possibility, I showed that face trustworthiness still matters, 
although the impact is reduced and much smaller than the impact of information 
about past  behaviour. Interestingly, face trustworthiness and reputation did not 
interact.
 For research on face impressions, the results demonstrate the importance of 
replicating potentially interesting findings obtained in strictly controlled laboratory 
conditions in more realistic settings. For example, economic interactions almost 
never occur between partners who do not know anything about each other. There is 
a large face trustworthiness premium in these artificial conditions (around 42%, see 
Rezlescu, Duchaine et al., 2012), but in situations which better simulate real 
interactions the premium turns out to be far more modest (6%), although still 
significant. In real life, the face trustworthiness premium is likely to be even more 
reduced, considering the plethora of factors affecting social and economic 
interactions.
 On the other hand, an interesting question to be answered by future studies is 
whether the face trustworthiness premium varies with the degree of ambiguity  in 
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reputation. In the present study, potential economic partners had markedly  positive 
or negative reputation, which might have decreased reliance on facial cues. 
Crossmodal integration in sensory studies suggest a channel’s dominance depends 
on signal reliability.
5.8. How do faces and voices contribute to an integrated person 
impression?
 In Section 4.4 I showed that voices, like faces, determine trait impressions 
that are highly reliable (i.e. consistent across listeners). Voice trustworthiness 
correlated with voice attractiveness (these two traits correlate for faces as well), but 
not with voice dominance (in contrast with face impressions correlations). There 
was no significant correlation between voice and face impressions, with the 
exception of a negative correlation for perceived dominance in men. This might be 
a compensatory  strategy, by which men with less dominant looks compensate 
through their voices.
 When participants were asked to provide a person impression based on face 
and voice, different  patterns of information integration emerged. For all measured 
traits (trustworthiness, attractiveness, dominance), the main effects of face and 
voice impressions were significant, but the effect  sizes differed. For perceived 
trustworthiness, the effect sizes were comparable and face and voice impressions 
also showed an interaction effect. For attractiveness, the effect size of face 
impressions was four times larger than the effect size of voice impressions. For 
dominance, the reverse was true: the effect size of voice impressions was 
approximately three times larger than the effect size of face impressions. Faces and 
voices did not show an interaction effect for either attractiveness or dominance. 
 The results for attractiveness and dominance were explained in terms of 
perceived signal reliability  for face and voice information. On one hand, because 
attractiveness is predominantly a visual concept, visual information is likely  to be 
considered most reliable and thus given higher weight in integrated judgments of 
attractiveness. On the other hand, dominance is related to perception of masculinity 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) and voice is highly sexually dimorphic. Furthermore, 
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testosterone level, which correlates with dominant/aggressive behaviour (Mazur & 
Booth, 1998), was linked to deep voices (Dabbs & Mallinger, 1999). Therefore, 
impressions based on voices are likely to be judged as more reliable for male 
dominance and given more weight than faces in integrated perception of 
dominance. 
 Future studies should extend the number of traits measured and examine 
whether variance in various voice impressions can be explained by a reduced 
number of dimensions. A similar approach in face impressions has produced a two-
dimensional model of facial trait  perception (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), with 
trustworthiness and dominance the principal components. It would be interesting to 
learn if this two-dimensional model is specific to faces or is amodal, extending to 
trait impressions from voices. Furthermore, it  would be interesting to verify if the 
proposed dependency of face trustworthiness/dominance judgments on facial 
expression/sex recognition mechanisms replicates with voices. 
 Spectral analysis of voices has the potential to reveal important physical 
attributes associated with particular trait  impressions. Furthermore, it can reveal 
potential valid cues to actual personality traits or behavioural propensities. 
GENERAL SUMMARY
 In summary, this thesis has investigated several key topics related to social 
perception of faces. In Chapters 2 and 3, acquired prosopagnosia was used as a tool 
to: i) test (and reject) two alternative hypotheses to face specificity; ii) confirm 
dissociations between face identity  and trait perception, and test the emotion and 
sex overgeneralisation theories in facial trait  perception. In Chapter 4 behavioural 
studies with healthy  participants examined facial cues to perceived trustworthiness, 
accuracy  of face trustworthiness judgments and interactions of face impressions 
with reputation and voice impressions. In addition to answering important 
questions, some of these studies have paved the way for future explorations into the 
cognitive neuroscience and social cognition of faces. 
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Participant’s name: 
 
 
Investment Game 
 
 
Investment Game 
 
Thank you for completing our interactive investment game.  Please answer the following questions.  
A. Please indicate the degree to which your personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements by 
choosing a number from the scale below that most accurately reflects your opinion.  
                 1=strongly disagree         .......................4=neither agree nor disagree..........................              7=strongly agree 
1. I tend to be accepting of others. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
2. My relationships with others are characterized by trust and acceptance. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
3. Basically I am a trusting person. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
4. It is better to trust people until they prove otherwise than to be suspicious of others until they prove otherwise.  
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
5. I accept others at ‘face value’. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
6. Most people are trustworthy. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
7. It is better to be suspicious of people you have just met, until you know them better. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
8. I make friends easily. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
9. Only a fool would trust most people 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
10. I find it better to accept others for what they say and what they appear to be. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
11. I would admit to being more than a little paranoid about people I meet. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
12. I have few difficulties trusting people. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
University College London   page 2 of 6 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6SSO 
 
 
Participant’s name: 
 
 
 
Investment game 
 
1=strongly disagree         .......................4=neither agree nor disagree..........................              7=strongly agree 
 
13. Basically I tend to be distrustful of others. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
14. Experience has taught me to be doubtful of others until I know they can be trusted. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
15. I have a lot of faith in people I know. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
16. Even during the ‘bad times’, I tend to think that things will work out in the end. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
17. I tend to take others at their word. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
18. When it comes to people I know, I am believing and accepting. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
19. I feel I can depend on most people I know. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
20. I almost always believe what people tell me. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
21. I retreat from others.   
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
22. I am filled with doubts about things. 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
23. I feel short-changed in life. 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
24. I avoid contacts with others. 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
25. I believe that most people would lie to get ahead. 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
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26. I find it hard to forgive others. 
 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
27. I believe that people seldom tell you the whole story. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
B. For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described 
activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.!Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to 
Extremely Likely, using the given scale. 
 
1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
 
2. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
 
3. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
 
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
 
5. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
 
6. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7        
Extremely  Moderately      Somewhat       Not Sure  Somewhat           Moderately             Extremely 
 Unlikely    Unlikely      Unlikely        Likely                 Likely                      Likely 
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C. You are to report how often you performed the following actions: 
 
 
1. I agreed that I was wrong, even though I wasn’t. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
2. I smoked marijuana when everyone else did, even though I didn’t want to. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
3. I walked out of the store knowing that I’d been short-changed. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
4. I accepted verbal abuse without defending myself. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
5. I made love with my partner when I didn’t want to. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
6. When I stood to speak and the others continued talking, I simply sat down. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
7. I continued to apologize for the minor mistake. 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
8. I drank a lot at the party when the others gave me a hard time. 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
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9. I listened quietly when my parents said that my hair was ugly. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
10. I was not able to tell my friend that I was angry with her. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
11. At the meeting, I let others monopolize the conversation. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
12. I wept when I couldn’t solve the simple problem. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
13. I said “thank-you” enthusiastically and repeatedly when someone did me an insignificant favour. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
14. I avoided direct eye contact when the shop clerk spoke to me. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
15. I did not start a single conversation at the party. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
16. Although my friends thought my partner had humiliated me, I date him/her again. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
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17. I blushed when he stared at me. 
 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
18. I pretended I was ill when declining the invitation to the party. 
1            2             3            4             5            6            7          
Never         Once        2-3 times    From time      Regularly       Quite          Very  
    to time     often         often 
 
D. Indicate the degree to which your personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements by choos-
ing a number from the scale below that most accurately reflects your opinion.  
                 1=strongly disagree         ....................... 4=neither agree nor disagree..........................              7=strongly agree 
1. I believe I am more attractive than the average person my gender. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
2. A socially dominant person tells other people what to do, is respected, influential, and often a leader; whereas a submissive 
person is not influential or assertive and is usually directed by others. According to this description, I am more dominant than 
an average person.  
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
3. If I got in a fistfight with an average person of my age and gender, I would probably win. 
1           2            3           4            5           6           7          
 
Please tell us about yourself: 
Age:                     Gender: M           F     
Highest level of education completed:  
primary school                        secondary or high school                        technical or vocational school           
other college                           graduate school                             postgraduate or professional degree  
Occupation:  
 
 
That was all. THANK YOU! 
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
  
   
   
 
 
